§189ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἕν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὂν.
SOCRATES: Then also he who hears something hears at least some one thing, and a thing which is?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ ἁπτόμενος δή του ἑνός γέ του ἅπτεται καὶ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἑνός;
SOCRATES: And indeed, one who touches something touches at least some one thing, and a thing which is, if indeed he touches one?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτο.
THEAETETUS: This too.
ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἕν γέ τι δοξάζει;
SOCRATES: And does not one who opines opine at least some one thing?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
THEAETETUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. ὁ δʼ ἕν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι;
SOCRATES: And does not one who opines some one thing opine something that is?
ΘΕΑΙ. συγχωρῶ.
THEAETETUS: I agree.
ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὂν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.
SOCRATES: Therefore, one who opines what is not opines nothing.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ φαίνεται.
THEAETETUS: It appears not.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.
SOCRATES: But surely, one who opines nothing at all does not even opine.
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: That is clear, as it seems.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτό.
SOCRATES: Therefore, it is not possible to opine what is not, either about the things which are or by itself.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ φαίνεται.
THEAETETUS: It appears not.
ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι ἄρʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν.
SOCRATES: Is opining falsely, then, something other than opining what is not?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἄλλο ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: It seems to be other.
ΣΩ. οὔτʼ ἄρʼ οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδής ἐστι δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, neither in this way nor in the way we were examining a little while ago does false opinion exist in us.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν δή.
THEAETETUS: Certainly not indeed.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα ὧδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν;
SOCRATES: But do we call this so when it arises in the following way?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
THEAETETUS: How?
ΣΩ. ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῆ φαμεν εἶναι δόξαν, ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ φῇ εἶναι.
SOCRATES: We say that false opinion is a sort of 'other-opining', when someone, exchanging in his mind one of the things that are for another of the things that are, says that it is that other.
οὕτω γὰρ ὂν μὲν ἀεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθʼ ἑτέρου, καὶ ἁμαρτάνων οὗ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξάζων.
For in this way he always opines something that is, but one thing instead of another, and missing the mark of what he was aiming at, he might justly be called one who opines falsely.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι.
THEAETETUS: You seem to me to have spoken most correctly now.
ὅταν γάρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ.
For when someone opines ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he truly opines falsely.
ΣΩ. δῆλος εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ οὐ δεδιώς.
SOCRATES: It is clear, Theaetetus, that you despise me and do not fear me.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μάλιστα;
THEAETETUS: Why especially?
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψευδοῦς ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος εἰ οἷόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως.
SOCRATES: I suppose you think I would not catch you up on your 'truly false', asking whether it is possible for a fast thing to become slowly, or a light thing heavily, or any other opposite to become contrary to itself, not according to its own nature but according to that of its opposite.
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρρήσῃς, ἀφίημι.
However, I let this pass, so that you may not be bold in vain.
ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φῄς, τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι;
But does it please you, as you say, that opining falsely is 'other-opining'?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε.
THEAETETUS: To me, yes.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὡς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.
SOCRATES: There is, then, according to your opinion, a setting down in thought of one thing as another and not as what it is.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι μέντοι.
THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed.
ΣΩ. ὅταν οὖν τοῦθʼ ἡ διάνοιά του δρᾷ, οὐ καὶ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἤτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον διανοεῖσθαι;
SOCRATES: Whenever, then, the mind of someone does this, is it not also necessary that it thinks either of both or of one of them?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν· ἤτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει.
THEAETETUS: Necessarily indeed; either at the same time or in turn.
ΣΩ. κάλλιστα.
SOCRATES: Excellent.
τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἆρʼ ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς;
But do you call 'thinking' the same thing that I do?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί καλῶν;
THEAETETUS: Calling it what?
§190ΣΩ. λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ.
SOCRATES: The talk which the soul itself goes through with itself concerning whatever it is examining.
ὥς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι.
I present this to you as one who does not know.
τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα.
For this is what it appears to me to be doing when it is thinking: nothing other than conversing, questioning itself and answering, affirming and denying.
ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπᾴξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς.
And when it has reached a decision, whether slowly or by leaping more quickly to it, and now says the same thing and no longer doubts, we set this down as its opinion.
ὥστʼ ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὑτόν·
So that I call opining 'speaking', and opinion 'spoken talk'—not, indeed, to another nor aloud, but in silence to oneself.
σὺ δὲ τί;
What about you?
ΘΕΑΙ. κἀγώ.
THEAETETUS: I agree too.
ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ φησίν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.
SOCRATES: So, whenever someone opines one thing as another, he also says to himself, as it seems, that the one is the other.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAETETUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. ἀναμιμνῄσκου δὴ εἰ πώποτʼ εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον.
SOCRATES: Recall then whether you have ever said to yourself that most assuredly the beautiful is ugly or the unjust is just.
ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, σκόπει εἴ ποτʼ ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐδʼ ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἄρτιά ἐστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.
Or indeed, as the sum of all, examine whether you have ever attempted to persuade yourself that most assuredly one thing is another, or whether, quite to the contrary, you have never dared to say to yourself, even in your sleep, that absolutely odd numbers are even, or anything else of that sort.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
THEAETETUS: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. ἄλλον δέ τινα οἴει ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον τολμῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν ἀναπείθοντα αὑτὸν ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἕν;
SOCRATES: And do you think anyone else, whether sane or mad, would dare to say in all seriousness to himself, trying to persuade himself, that a cow must be a horse or that two must be one?
ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
THEAETETUS: By Zeus, not I.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφότερά γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειεν ὡς τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, if speaking to oneself is opining, no one who speaks of and opines both, and touches both with his soul, would say and opine that the one is the other.
ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα· λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.
And you must also let the phrase pass; for I mean it in this way: that no one opines that the ugly is beautiful or anything else of that sort.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐῶ τε καί μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.
THEAETETUS: But, Socrates, I do let it pass, and it seems to me to be as you say.
ΣΩ. ἄμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τό γε ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζειν.
SOCRATES: So, for one who opines both, it is impossible to opine that the one is the other.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: So it seems.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἕτερόν γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῇ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι.
SOCRATES: But surely, one who opines only one of them, but the other not at all, will never opine that the one is the other.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὗ μὴ δοξάζει.
THEAETETUS: You speak the truth; for he would be compelled to touch also that which he does not opine.
ΣΩ. οὔτʼ ἄρʼ ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δοξάζοντι ἐγχωρεῖ ἀλλοδοξεῖν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, neither for one who opines both nor for one who opines only one is 'other-opining' possible.
ὥστʼ εἴ τις ὁριεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδῆ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι· οὔτε γὰρ ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν ἡμῖν οὖσα δόξα.
So, if anyone defines false opinion as 'hetero-opining', he would be saying nothing at all; for neither in this way nor according to the previous ones does false opinion appear to exist in us.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: It seems not.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανήσεται ὄν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα.
SOCRATES: But indeed, Theaetetus, if this does not appear to exist, we shall be compelled to admit many strange things.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ ποῖα δή;
THEAETETUS: What sort of things, indeed?