§184ΣΩ. μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἓν ἑστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἧττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἕνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην.
SOCRATES: I have a certain hesitation, lest we examine Melissus and the others who say the whole is one and at rest in a crude manner, but I feel this less than toward Parmenides, who is one.
Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου,
αἰδοῖός τέ μοι
εἶναι ἅμα
δεινός τε. συμπροσέμειξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ, καί μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον.
For Parmenides appears to me, in the words of Homer, to be "both venerable and awesome." For indeed I met the man when I was very young and he was very old, and he seemed to me to possess a depth that was altogether noble.
φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα συνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος ὥρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι τί ποτʼ ἐστίν, ἄσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐτοῖς πείσεται·
I fear, then, lest we might not understand what is said, and still more fail to comprehend what he had in mind when he spoke, and, most important of all, that the question for the sake of which this discussion was started—about what knowledge is—might become unexamined because of the discussions breaking in on us, if one is to listen to them.
ἄλλως τε καὶ ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον, εἴτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξιʼ ἂν πάθοι, εἴτε ἱκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφανιεῖ.
Especially since the discussion we are now raising is of an unmanageable size; if one is to examine it as a side issue, it would suffer an unworthy treatment, and if sufficiently, by being prolonged it will make the subject of knowledge disappear.
δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὧν κυεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολῦσαι.
But we must do neither, but rather we must try to deliver Theaetetus by our obstetric art from the things he is pregnant with concerning knowledge.
ΘΕΟ. ἀλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.
THEODORUS: Indeed we must, if you think so, do this.
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι.
SOCRATES: Then consider this further point, Theaetetus, concerning what has been said.
αἴσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω· ἦ γάρ;
For you answered that perception is knowledge, did you not?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδʼ ἐρωτῴη· τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξέα καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει; εἴποις ἂν οἶμαι
ὄμμασί τε καὶ ὠσίν. ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.
SOCRATES: If, then, someone should ask you this: "By what does a human being see white and black things, and by what does he hear high and low sounds?" You would say, I think, "With eyes and ears." THEAETETUS: I would.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ διʼ ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἣν ἀποκρίνῃ, ᾗ οὐκ ὀρθή.
SOCRATES: A casual use of names and verbs, without examining them with precision, is for the most part not ungenerous, but rather its opposite is illiberal, yet sometimes it is necessary, just as now it is necessary to take hold of your answer, in that it is not correct.
σκόπει γάρ· ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ᾧ ὁρῶμεν τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ διʼ οὗ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν ὦτα, ἢ διʼ οὗ ἀκούομεν;
For consider: which answer is more correct, that eyes are that by which we see, or that through which we see; and ears that by which we hear, or that through which we hear?
ΘΕΑΙ. διʼ ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.
THEAETETUS: Through which we perceive each of them, it seems to me, Socrates, rather than by which.
ΣΩ. δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅτι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα συντείνει, ᾗ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.
SOCRATES: Yes, for it would be strange, my boy, if many perceptions were seated in us as if in wooden horses, and did not all tend together toward some one idea, whether soul or whatever one ought to call it, by which, through these as instruments, we perceive all perceptible things.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως.
THEAETETUS: Indeed, it seems to me in this way rather than in that.
ΣΩ. τοῦδέ τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ τινι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἑτέρων αὖ τινῶν· καὶ ἕξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν;
SOCRATES: It is for this very reason that I am precise with you, to see whether by some same part of ourselves we reach white and black things through the eyes, and other things again through other organs; and will you be able, when asked, to refer all such things to the body?
ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καί μοι λέγε·
But perhaps it is better that you yourself say it in answering, rather than that I busy myself on your behalf.
θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα διʼ ὧν αἰσθάνῃ, ἆρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης;
Tell me, then: do you not place all the things through which you perceive hot, hard, light, and sweet as belonging to the body?
ἢ ἄλλου τινός;
Or to something else?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.
THEAETETUS: To nothing else.