§185ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν ἃ διʼ ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνῃ, ἀδύνατον εἶναι διʼ ἄλλης ταῦτʼ αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ διʼ ἀκοῆς, διʼ ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ διʼ ὄψεως, διʼ ἀκοῆς;
SOCRATES: Will you also be willing to agree that it is impossible to perceive through one power what you perceive through another— for example, to perceive through sight what you perceive through hearing, or through hearing what through sight?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;
THEAETETUS: How could I not be willing?
ΣΩ. εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοῇ, οὐκ ἂν διά γε τοῦ ἑτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδʼ αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοιʼ ἄν.
SOCRATES: If, then, you think something about both, you could not perceive about both through the one organ, nor again through the other.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Of course not.
ΣΩ. περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἦ διανοῇ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν;
SOCRATES: Now, concerning sound and concerning color, first of all, do you think this very thing about both: that they both are?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.
THEAETETUS: I do.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταὐτόν;
SOCRATES: And also that each is other than the other, but the same as itself?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAETETUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἑκάτερον δὲ ἕν;
SOCRATES: And that both together are two, but each is one?
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ τοῦτο.
THEAETETUS: That too.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν, δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπισκέψασθαι;
SOCRATES: And are you also able to examine whether they are unlike or like each other?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.
THEAETETUS: Perhaps.
ΣΩ. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν διανοῇ;
SOCRATES: Through what, then, do you think all these things about both of them?
οὔτε γὰρ διʼ ἀκοῆς οὔτε διʼ ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν.
For it is possible to grasp what is common to them neither through hearing nor through sight.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἴη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι ἆρʼ ἐστὸν ἁλμυρὼ ἢ οὔ, οἶσθʼ ὅτι ἕξεις εἰπεῖν ᾧ ἐπισκέψῃ, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοὴ φαίνεται, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο.
And here is a further proof of what we are saying: if it were possible to examine both as to whether they are salty or not, you know that you would be able to say by what you will examine it, and this appears to be neither sight nor hearing, but something else.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ οὐ μέλλει, ἥ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις;
THEAETETUS: How could it be otherwise? It is, of course, the power that works through the tongue.
ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις.
SOCRATES: Well said.
ἡ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό τʼ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ τὸ
ἔστιν
ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ
οὐκ ἔστι
καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἠρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν;
But now, through what does the power work which reveals to you that which is common to all things as well as to these, to which you apply the terms "is" and "is not," and the other things about which we were just asking?
τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα διʼ ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα;
For all these, what organs will you assign through which that part of us which perceives perceives each of them?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν τε καὶ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἕν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν.
THEAETETUS: You mean "being" and "not being," "likeness" and "unlikeness," "sameness" and "difference," and further "one" and any other "number" applied to them.
δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἐρωτᾷς, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἕπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.
And it is clear that you are also asking about "even" and "odd," and all other things that follow from these, through which of the bodily organs we perceive them with the soul.
ΣΩ. ὑπέρευ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.
SOCRATES: Excellent, Theaetetus! You follow me perfectly, and those are the very things I am asking about.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλήν γʼ ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδʼ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλʼ αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.
THEAETETUS: But by Zeus, Socrates, I would not be able to say, except that it seems to me that in the first place there is no such special organ for these as there is for those, but rather the soul itself, by means of itself, appears to me to examine the things that are common to all.
ΣΩ. καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός.
SOCRATES: For you are beautiful, Theaetetus, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly; for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good.
πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεταί σοι τὰ μὲν αὐτὴ διʼ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων.
And besides being beautiful, you have done me a great favor by releasing me from a very long argument, if it appears to you that some things the soul examines itself by means of itself, and others through the powers of the body.
τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι.
For this was what seemed to me too, and I wanted it to seem so to you as well.