§162ΘΕΟ. ὦ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἁνήρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ εἶπες.
THEODORUS: Socrates, the man is my friend, just as you said just now.
οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαίμην διʼ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδʼ αὖ σοὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν.
So I would not accept Protagoras being refuted through my agreement, nor on the other hand would I oppose you contrary to my own opinion.
τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ· πάντως καὶ νυνδὴ μάλʼ ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν.
So take Theaetetus again; at any rate just now he seemed to respond to you very properly.
ΣΩ. ἆρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθών, ὦ Θεόδωρε, πρὸς τὰς παλαίστρας ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνούς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδυόμενος;
SOCRATES: Would you, then, Theodorus, if you went to Lacedaemon, to the wrestling schools, expect to watch others naked, some of them of poor physique, and not yourself strip and show your own form in turn?
ΘΕΟ. ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι;
THEODORUS: But why indeed do you think otherwise, if they were going to permit me and be persuaded?
ὥσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐᾶν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἕλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν.
Just as now I think I shall persuade you to let me watch and not drag me to the gymnasium since I am already stiff, but to wrestle with the one who is younger and more flexible.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι.
SOCRATES: Well, if it is pleasing to you in this way, Theodorus, "it is not displeasing to me either," as the proverb-mongers say.
πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἰτέον.
So we must go back again to the wise Theaetetus.
λέγε δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἃ νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ἆρα οὐ σὺ θαυμάζεις εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσῃ μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὁτουοῦν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν;
Tell me then, Theaetetus, first as to what we have just gone through, do you not wonder if you should suddenly turn out to be in no way inferior in wisdom to any man whatever, or even to the gods?
ἢ ἧττόν τι οἴει τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι;
Or do you think the Protagorean "measure" is said any less of gods than of men?
ΘΕΑΙ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε·
THEAETETUS: By Zeus, not I, certainly!
καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾷς, πάνυ θαυμάζω.
And as to what you ask, I wonder at it extremely.
ἡνίκα γὰρ διῇμεν ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τοὐναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν.
For when we were going through the way they say that what seems to each person is also so for the one to whom it seems, it appeared to me to be very well said; but now it has suddenly shifted to the opposite.
ΣΩ. νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθῃ.
SOCRATES: For you are young, my dear boy; so you respond quickly to popular harangues and are persuaded.
πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἤ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ· ὦ γενναῖοι παῖδές τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε συγκαθεζόμενοι, θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, ἐξαιρῶ, καὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν ἀποδέχοιντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὁτουοῦν·
For Protagoras, or someone else on his behalf, will say in reply to this: "O noble boys and old men, you sit together and harangue the crowd, dragging the gods into the midst, whom I exclude from both speaking and writing about them, as to whether they exist or do not exist; and you say things which the multitude would accept upon hearing, namely that it is terrible if each of us humans is to differ in no way in wisdom from any beast of pasture.
ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδʼ ἡντινοῦν λέγετε ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδʼ ἑνὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη.
But you state no proof or necessity of any kind, but you use probability; if Theodorus or any other of the geometers should wish to use this in doing geometry, he would not be worth even a single penny.
σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίᾳ τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τηλικούτων λεγομένους λόγους. §163ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν.
Consider, then, you and Theodorus, whether you will accept, on such great matters, arguments spoken on the basis of plausibility and probabilities." THEAETETUS: But that is not just, Socrates; neither you nor we would say so.
ΣΩ. ἄλλῃ δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς ὅ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος.
SOCRATES: Then we must examine it in another way, as it seems, according to your and Theodorus' opinion.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ.
THEAETETUS: Yes, in another way altogether.
ΣΩ. τῇδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον.
SOCRATES: Let us then look at it in this way, to see whether knowledge and perception are indeed the same or different.
εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινεν, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν.
For it was to this, I suppose, that our whole argument was tending, and for the sake of this we stirred up all these many strange things.
οὐ γάρ;
Is it not so?
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Entirely so.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἃ τῷ ὁρᾶν αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι;
SOCRATES: Shall we then agree that whatever we perceive by seeing or hearing, we also at the same time know all of these?
οἷον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν ὅταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι;
For example, before we have learned the language of foreigners, shall we say that we do not hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and know what they are saying?
καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἐπίστασθαι εἴπερ ὁρῶμεν διισχυριούμεθα;
And again, if we do not know letters, when we look at them, shall we maintain that we do not see them, or that we know them, since indeed we see them?
ΘΕΑΙ. αὐτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ὁρῶμέν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ἃ δὲ οἵ τε γραμματισταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἑρμηνῆς διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.
THEAETETUS: We shall say, Socrates, that we know just this very part of them which we see and hear; of the letters, we both see and know the shape and color, and of the words, we both hear and at the same time know the high and low pitch; but as for what the grammar teachers and interpreters teach about them, we neither perceive it by seeing or hearing, nor do we know it.
ΣΩ. ἄριστά γʼ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ.
SOCRATES: Excellent, Theaetetus, and it is not worth disputing with you on this, so that you may also grow.
ἀλλʼ ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει πῇ αὐτὸ διωσόμεθα.
But look at this other thing that is approaching, and consider how we shall push it aside.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή;
THEAETETUS: What sort of thing is it?
ΣΩ. τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις ἔροιτο· ἆρα δυνατὸν ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτό ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σῳζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μέμνηται; μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι εἰ μαθών τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδε.
SOCRATES: Something like this: if someone should ask: "Is it possible for one who has ever become a knower of something, while still having memory of this very thing and preserving it, at the very time when he remembers it, not to know this very thing which he remembers?" But I am being wordy, as it seems, when I wish to ask simply whether one who has learned something and remembers it does not know it.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;
THEAETETUS: How could that be, Socrates?
τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὃ λέγεις.
For what you say would be a monstrosity.
ΣΩ. μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ;
SOCRATES: Am I then talking nonsense?
σκόπει δέ.
But consider.
ἆρα τὸ ὁρᾶν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἴσθησιν;
Do you not say that seeing is perceiving, and that sight is perception?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.
THEAETETUS: I do.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ ἰδών τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν ὃ εἶδεν κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον;
SOCRATES: Therefore, the one who has seen something has become a knower of that which he saw, according to the argument just now?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;
SOCRATES: Well then, do you say that memory is something?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;
SOCRATES: Is it of nothing, or of something?
ΘΕΑΙ. τινὸς δήπου.
THEAETETUS: Of something, surely.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὧν ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ᾔσθετο, τοιουτωνί τινων;
SOCRATES: Of things he learned and perceived, then, of such things?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAETETUS: What else?
ΣΩ. ὃ δὴ εἶδέ τις, μέμνηταί που ἐνίοτε;
SOCRATES: And what a man has seen, he remembers sometimes, doesn't he?
ΘΕΑΙ. μέμνηται.
THEAETETUS: He does.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ μύσας;
SOCRATES: Even when he has closed his eyes?
ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο;
Or if he has done this, has he forgotten?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε φάναι.
THEAETETUS: Why, Socrates, it would be a terrible thing to say that!