§164ΣΩ. δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον· εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεται.
SOCRATES: Yes, we must indeed, if we are going to save the former argument; but if not, it is gone.
ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ·
THEAETETUS: And I too, by Zeus, suspect so; however, I do not understand it sufficiently.
ἀλλʼ εἰπὲ πῇ.
But tell me how.
ΣΩ. τῇδε· ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου γέγονεν οὗπερ ὁρῶν· ὄψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτὸν ὡμολόγηται.
SOCRATES: In this way: the one who sees, we say, has become a knower of that very thing which he sees; for sight, perception, and knowledge have been agreed to be the same.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ γε.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γε ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὗ ἑώρα, ἐὰν μύσῃ, μέμνηται μέν, οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτό.
SOCRATES: But the one who sees and has become a knower of what he saw, if he should close his eyes, remembers indeed, but does not see it.
ἦ γάρ;
Is that not so?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε
οὐχ ὁρᾷ
οὐκ ἐπίσταταί
ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ
ὁρᾷ
ἐπίσταται. ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
SOCRATES: But "does not see" is "does not know," if indeed "sees" is also "knows." THEAETETUS: True.
ΣΩ. συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὗ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἔτι μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾷ· ὃ τέρας ἔφαμεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο.
SOCRATES: It follows, then, that one who became a knower of something, while still remembering it, does not know it, since he does not see it; which we said would be a monstrosity if it should happen.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
THEAETETUS: You speak most truly.
ΣΩ. τῶν ἀδυνάτων δή τι συμβαίνειν φαίνεται ἐάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταὐτὸν φῇ εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Some impossibility, then, clearly follows if one says that knowledge and perception are the same.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. ἄλλο ἄρα ἑκάτερον φατέον.
SOCRATES: Therefore, we must say that they are different.
ΘΕΑΙ. κινδυνεύει.
THEAETETUS: It is likely.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν δῆτʼ ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη;
SOCRATES: What, then, could knowledge be?
πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, λεκτέον.
We must speak again from the beginning, as it seems.
καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δρᾶν;
And yet, what in the world are we going to do, Theaetetus?
ΘΕΑΙ. τίνος πέρι;
THEAETETUS: About what?
ΣΩ. φαινόμεθά μοι ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην πρὶν νενικηκέναι ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ᾁδειν.
SOCRATES: We seem to me, like a low-bred cock, to be jumping away from the argument and crowing before we have won the victory.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή;
THEAETETUS: How so?
ΣΩ. ἀντιλογικῶς ἐοίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἀγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταὐτὰ ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσιν ποιοῦντες.
SOCRATES: We seem to have come to an agreement based on the mere agreement of names in a disputatious manner, and having got the better of the argument by such a thing, we are content; and while we claim to be not disputants but philosophers, we are unconsciously doing the very same things as those clever men.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὔπω μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.
THEAETETUS: I do not yet understand how you mean.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὅ γε δὴ νοῶ.
SOCRATES: Well, I shall try to make clear what I mean about them.
ἠρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον ὁρῶντα δὲ οὒ ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἅμα μεμνημένον· τοῦτο δʼ εἶναι ἀδύνατον.
For we asked whether one who has learned and remembers something does not know it, and by showing that the one who saw and has closed his eyes remembers indeed but does not see, we showed that he does not know and at the same time remembers; but this is impossible.
καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἅμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστιν.
And so the Protagorean tale has perished, and yours too at the same time, that knowledge and perception are the same.
ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.
THEAETETUS: So it seems.
ΣΩ. οὔ τι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν.
SOCRATES: Not at all, I think, my friend, if the father of the other tale were alive, but he would have defended it in many ways; but now, we are treating it like an orphan and abusing it.
καὶ γὰρ οὐδʼ οἱ ἐπίτροποι, οὓς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπεν, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὧν Θεόδωρος εἷς ὅδε.
For not even the guardians whom Protagoras left behind are willing to help, of whom Theodorus here is one.
ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκʼ αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.
So we ourselves shall probably have to help it for the sake of justice.
§165ΘΕΟ. οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἱππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος· ἡμεῖς δέ πως θᾶττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν.
THEODORUS: For it is not I, Socrates, but rather Callias the son of Hipponicus who is the guardian of his affairs; as for us, we turned away rather too quickly from mere words to geometry.
χάριν γε μέντοι σοὶ ἕξομεν ἐὰν αὐτῷ βοηθῇς.
However, we shall be grateful to you if you help him.
ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε.
SOCRATES: Well said, Theodorus.
σκέψαι οὖν τήν γʼ ἐμὴν βοήθειαν.
Consider, then, my assistance.
τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἄν τις ὁμολογήσειεν μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ᾗ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι.
For one might agree to things even more terrible than those just now, if he does not pay attention to the words, in the way we are mostly accustomed to affirm and deny.
σοὶ λέγω ὅπῃ, ἢ Θεαιτήτῳ.
Shall I tell you how, or to Theaetetus?
ΘΕΟ. εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ νεώτερος· σφαλεὶς γὰρ ἧττον ἀσχημονήσει.
THEODORUS: To both of us in common, indeed, but let the younger one answer; for if he trips, he will disgrace himself less.
ΣΩ. λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα, ἔστι δὲ οἶμαι τοιόνδε τι· ἆρα οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο ὃ οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι; ΘΕΟ. τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε;
SOCRATES: I speak, then, of the most terrible question, and it is, I think, something like this: "Is it possible for the same person, knowing something, not to know this very thing which he knows?" THEODORUS: What then shall we answer, Theaetetus?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατόν που, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
THEAETETUS: Impossible, I suppose, I think.
ΣΩ. οὔκ, εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις.
SOCRATES: Not so, if indeed you will pose that seeing is knowing.
τί γὰρ χρήσῃ ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συσχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνήρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἕτερον ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ ὁρᾷς τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ κατειλημμένῳ;
For what will you do with an inescapable question, being trapped "in a well," as the saying goes, when an undaunted man asks, covering one of your eyes with his hand, whether you see the cloak with the covered eye?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ φήσω οἶμαι τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι ἑτέρῳ.
THEAETETUS: I shall say no, I suppose, with this one, but yes indeed with the other.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἅμα ταὐτόν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, do you both see and not see the same thing at the same time?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτω γέ πως.
THEAETETUS: Something like that.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὔτʼ ἠρόμην τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλʼ εἰ ὃ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐπίστασαι.
SOCRATES: "I am not prescribing or asking anything about that 'how'," he will say, "but whether that which you know, you also do not know.
νῦν δὲ ὃ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὁρῶν φαίνῃ.
But now you turn out to be seeing what you do not see.
ὡμολογηκὼς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.
And you happen to have agreed that seeing is knowing and not seeing is not knowing.
ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου τί σοι συμβαίνει. ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τἀναντία οἷς ὑπεθέμην.
Calculate, then, from these what follows for you." THEAETETUS: Why, I calculate that it is the opposite of my hypotheses.
ΣΩ. ἴσως δέ γʼ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτʼ ἔπαθες εἴ τίς σε προσηρώτα εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὀξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ μή, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἡνίκʼ ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταὐτὸν ἔθου, ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιεὶς πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν συνεποδίσθης ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, οὗ δή σε χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ συνδήσας ἤδη ἂν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων ὅσων σοί τε κἀκείνῳ ἐδόκει.
SOCRATES: Perhaps, my wonderful friend, you would have suffered more such things if someone had asked you further whether it is possible to know sharply and to know dimly, and to know from near but not from far, and both intensely and mildly the same thing, and myriad other questions, which a mercenary light-armed soldier in arguments, lying in wait, would ask you when you posited that knowledge and perception are the same; and making an assault upon hearing and smelling and such-like perceptions, he would refute you, holding on and not letting go until, having wondered at his much-coveted wisdom, you were entangled by him; where indeed, having mastered and bound you, he would then ransom you for as much money as seemed good to you and to him.
τίνʼ οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίης ἂν ἴσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ;
What argument, then, you might perhaps say, will Protagoras say in aid of his own?
ἄλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν;
Shall we try to say something else?
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: By all means, indeed.