§161ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν, ὅτι δή ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν.
SOCRATES: This, then, as it seems, we have at last with difficulty brought to birth, whatever it actually turns out to be.
μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ ἀνεμιαῖόν τε καὶ ψεῦδος.
But after the birth, we must truly run around it in a circle with our argument, examining it, lest it escape our notice that what has been generated is not worth rearing, but is a wind-egg and a falsehood.
ἢ σὺ οἴει πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι, ἢ καὶ ἀνέξῃ ἐλεγχόμενον ὁρῶν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς ἐάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ;
Or do you think your offspring must be reared in any case and not exposed? And will you bear to see it being examined and refuted, and not be extremely angry if someone takes it away from you, as if from a first-time mother?
ΘΕΟ. ἀνέξεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ δύσκολος.
THEODORUS: Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates; for he is by no means ill-tempered.
ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπὲ ᾗ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
But, by the gods, tell me in what way is this not so?
ΣΩ. φιλόλογός γʼ εἶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἴει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἐξελόντα ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα·
SOCRATES: You are absolutely a lover of discourse and a good man, Theodorus, because you think I am a bag of arguments and can easily pull one out and say that this is not so.
τὸ δὲ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρʼ ἐμοῦ ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρʼ ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως.
But you do not realize what is happening, that none of the arguments comes out of me, but always from the one who is conversing with me; I myself know nothing more except a tiny bit, just enough to take an argument from another wise man and accept it reasonably.
καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειράσομαι, οὔ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν.
And now I will try to get this from him, not say anything myself.
ΘΕΟ. σὺ κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ ποίει οὕτως.
THEODORUS: You speak better, Socrates; so do so.
ΣΩ. οἶσθʼ οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἑταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου;
SOCRATES: Do you know then, Theodorus, what I wonder at in your companion Protagoras?
ΘΕΟ. τὸ ποῖον;
THEODORUS: What is that?
ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἴρηκεν, ὡς τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἔστιν·
SOCRATES: The other things he has said quite to my liking, as that what seems to each person is also so.
τὴν δʼ ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς Ἀληθείας ὅτι
πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὗς
ἢ
κυνοκέφαλος
ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὁ δʼ ἄρα >ἐτύγχανεν ὢν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρίνου, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου του ἀνθρώπων.
But I wondered at the beginning of his book, because he did not say at the beginning of his Truth that a pig is the measure of all things, or a dog-faced baboon, or some other even more absurd creature that possesses perception, so that he might have begun to speak to us in a grand and utterly contemptuous manner, showing that while we wonder at him as if he were a god for his wisdom, he happened to be, in respect of intelligence, no better than a tadpole, let alone any other human being.
ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν, ὦ Θεόδωρε;
Or how else should we say, Theodorus?
εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν διʼ αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἑτέρου ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλʼ ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δή ποτε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρʼ ἐκεῖνον, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἑκάστῳ τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας;
For if indeed what each person judges through perception is to be true for him, and neither is anyone else a better judge of another's experience, nor is another more authorized to examine another's opinion, whether it is right or false, but—as has been said many times—each person alone will judge his own things, and all these are right and true, why on earth, my friend, is Protagoras wise, so that he is even thought worthy to be a teacher of others, justly and with great fees, while we are more ignorant and had to go to school to him, when each of us is himself the measure of his own wisdom?
ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωταγόραν;
How can we avoid saying that Protagoras says this to win the crowd?
τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία.
And I keep silent about my own case and that of my art of midwifery, as to how much ridicule we incur, and I think also the whole business of dialectic.
τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἑκάστου οὔσας, οὐ μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἡ Ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο;
For to examine and attempt to refute one another's appearances and opinions, which are right for each, is it not a long and vast piece of nonsense, if the Truth of Protagoras is true, and did not speak playing with us from the sanctuary of his book?