§436ΚΡ. οὕτως ἔγωγε, οὐ πάνυ τι εἶναι ἄλλον, τοῦτον δὲ καὶ μόνον καὶ βέλτιστον.
CRATYLUS: I think so; there is no other way at all, but this is both the only and the best one.
ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ καὶ εὕρεσιν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην εἶναι, τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα εὑρόντα καὶ ἐκεῖνα ηὑρηκέναι ὧν ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα· ἢ ζητεῖν μὲν καὶ εὑρίσκειν ἕτερον δεῖν τρόπον, μανθάνειν δὲ τοῦτον;
SOCRATES: And is the discovery of existing things also this very same, that he who discovered the names also discovered those things of which they are the names; or is it necessary to seek and discover in another way, but to learn in this way?
ΚΡ. πάντων μάλιστα καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ εὑρίσκειν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον κατὰ ταὐτά.
CRATYLUS: Most assuredly, both seeking and discovering are by this same way and in the same manner.
ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἴ τις ζητῶν τὰ πράγματα ἀκολουθοῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, σκοπῶν οἷον ἕκαστον βούλεται εἶναι, ἆρʼ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐ σμικρὸς κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἐξαπατηθῆναι;
SOCRATES: Come then, Cratylus, let us consider: if someone, in seeking things, should follow the names, examining what each name wants to be, do you realize that there is no small danger of being deceived?
ΚΡ. πῶς;
CRATYLUS: How so?
ΣΩ. δῆλον ὅτι ὁ θέμενος πρῶτος τὰ ὀνόματα, οἷα ἡγεῖτο εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα ἐτίθετο καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥς φαμεν.
SOCRATES: It is clear that the first founder of names established the names according to how he thought the things were, as we say.
ἦ γάρ;
Is that not so?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνος μὴ ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖτο, ἔθετο δὲ οἷα ἡγεῖτο, τί οἴει ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀκολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ πείσεσθαι;
SOCRATES: If, then, he did not think correctly, but established them according to how he thought, what do you think we who follow him will suffer?
ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι;
Anything else than being deceived?
ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ εἰδότα τίθεσθαι τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, οὐδʼ ἂν ὀνόματα εἴη.
CRATYLUS: But perhaps it is not so, Socrates, but it is necessary that the person who establishes names establishes them with knowledge; otherwise, as I said long ago, they would not even be names.
μέγιστον δέ σοι ἔστω τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἔσφαλται τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ τιθέμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε οὕτω σύμφωνα ἦν αὐτῷ ἅπαντα.
And let this be the greatest proof for you that the founder has not missed the truth: for all things would never have been so consistent with him.
ἢ οὐκ ἐνενόεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα κατὰ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο τὰ ὀνόματα;
Or did you not notice yourself, when you were speaking, how all the names were made in the same manner and for the same purpose?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ὠγαθὲ Κρατύλε, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀπολόγημα.
SOCRATES: But this, my good Cratylus, is no defense at all.
εἰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον σφαλεὶς ὁ τιθέμενος τἆλλα ἤδη πρὸς τοῦτʼ ἐβιάζετο καὶ αὑτῷ συμφωνεῖν ἠνάγκαζεν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ὥσπερ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου σμικροῦ καὶ ἀδήλου ψεύδους γενομένου, τὰ λοιπὰ πάμπολλα ἤδη ὄντα ἑπόμενα ὁμολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις.
For if the founder made a mistake at the first step, and then forced the rest to conform to this and compelled them to agree with himself, there is nothing strange in that; just as in geometrical diagrams, when a small and unnoticed error occurs at the beginning, all the other many subsequent parts agree with one another.
δεῖ δὴ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς παντὸς πράγματος παντὶ ἀνδρὶ τὸν πολὺν λόγον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πολλὴν σκέψιν εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ὑπόκειται· ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνῃ ἑπόμενα.
Indeed, concerning the beginning of every matter, every man must spend much discussion and much investigation as to whether it is correctly assumed or not; and once that is sufficiently examined, the rest appear to follow from it.
οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοιμʼ ἂν εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα συμφωνεῖ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς.
Not but what I should be surprised if even the names agree with themselves.
πάλιν γὰρ ἐπισκεψώμεθα ἃ τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν.
For let us look again at what we went through before.
ὡς τοῦ παντὸς ἰόντος τε καὶ φερομένου καὶ ῥέοντός φαμεν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ ὀνόματα.
We say that names represent reality to us on the assumption that everything is moving, going, and flowing.
ἄλλο τι οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ δηλοῦν;
Does it seem to you to represent it in any other way?
§437ΚΡ. πάνυ σφόδρα, καὶ ὀρθῶς γε σημαίνει.
CRATYLUS: Very much so, and it represents it correctly.
ΣΩ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, τὴν
ἐπιστήμην,
ὡς ἀμφίβολόν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαίνοντι ὅτι ἵστησιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι συμπεριφέρεται, καὶ ὀρθότερόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ νῦν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμβάλλοντας τὸ εἶ
ἑπεϊστήμην,
ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμβολὴν ποιήσασθαι ἀντὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ εἶ ἐν τῷ ἰῶτα.
SOCRATES: Let us consider, then, taking them up again from the names themselves: first, this name "knowledge" (epistēmē), how ambiguous it is, and seems rather to represent that it stays (histēsin) our soul upon things than that it moves along with them; and it is more correct to say its beginning as it is now, rather than by inserting "ei" to say "hepeistēmē", but to make the insertion in iota instead of in "ei".
ἔπειτα τὸ
βέβαιον,
ὅτι βάσεώς τινός ἐστιν καὶ στάσεως μίμημα ἀλλʼ οὐ φορᾶς.
Next, "certain" (bebaion), because it is an imitation of some base (basis) and rest (stasis), but not of motion (phora).
ἔπειτα ἡ
ἱστορία
αὐτό που σημαίνει ὅτι ἵστησι τὸν ῥοῦν.
Then, "investigation" (historia) itself surely represents that it stops (histēsi) the flow (rhous).
καὶ τὸ
πιστὸν
ἱστὰν παντάπασι σημαίνει.
And "faithful" (piston) altogether represents stopping (histan).
ἔπειτα δὲ ἡ
μνήμη
παντί που μηνύει ὅτι μονή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀλλʼ οὐ φορά.
And then "memory" (mnēmē) indicates to everyone that there is a stay (monē) in the soul, but not a motion.
εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ
ἁμαρτία
καὶ ἡ
συμφορά,
εἰ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομά τις ἀκολουθήσει, φανεῖται ταὐτὸν τῇ
συνέσει
ταύτῃ καὶ
ἐπιστήμῃ
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα ὀνόμασιν.
And if you like, "error" (hamartia) and "misfortune" (symphora), if one follows them according to the name, will appear to be the same as this "understanding" (synesis) and "knowledge" (epistēmē) and all the other names concerning noble things.
ἔτι τοίνυν ἡ
ἀμαθία
καὶ ἡ
ἀκολασία
παραπλησία τούτοις φαίνεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἅμα θεῷ ἰόντος πορεία φαίνεται, ἡ
ἀμαθία,
ἡ δʼ
ἀκολασία
παντάπασιν ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασι φαίνεται.
Furthermore, "ignorance" (amathia) and "licentiousness" (akolasia) appear similar to these; for "ignorance" appears to be the journey (poreia) of one going together with God (hama theōi), while "licentiousness" appears to be entirely an following (akolouthia) after things.
καὶ οὕτως, ἃ νομίζομεν ἐπὶ τοῖς κακίστοις ὀνόματα εἶναι, ὁμοιότατʼ ἂν φαίνοιτο τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις.
And so, the names which we think belong to the worst things would appear most similar to those belonging to the finest.
οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πόλλʼ ἄν τις εὕροι εἰ πραγματεύοιτο, ἐξ ὧν οἰηθείη ἂν αὖ πάλιν τὸν τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενον οὐχὶ ἰόντα οὐδὲ φερόμενα ἀλλὰ μένοντα τὰ πράγματα σημαίνειν.
And I think someone, if he took the trouble, would find many other names from which he might again think that the founder of names represented things not as moving or flowing, but as staying.
ΚΡ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ἐκείνως ἐσήμαινεν.
CRATYLUS: But, Socrates, you see that the majority of names represented them in that other way.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Κρατύλε;
SOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus?
ὥσπερ ψήφους διαριθμησόμεθα τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἔσται ἡ ὀρθότης;
Are we to count the names like votes, and is their correctness to be in that?
ὁπότερα ἂν πλείω φαίνηται τὰ ὀνόματα σημαίνοντα, ταῦτα δὴ ἔσται τἀληθῆ;
Whichever way the majority of names appear to represent, will that be the truth?
ΚΡ. οὔκουν εἰκός γε.
CRATYLUS: Surely that is not likely.