§438ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν, ὦ φίλε.
SOCRATES: Not in the least, my friend.
καὶ ταῦτα μέν γε αὐτοῦ ἐάσωμεν, ἐπανέλθωμεν δὲ πάλιν ὅθεν δεῦρο μετέβημεν.
And let us leave these things here as they are, and return again to the point from which we digressed to this place.
ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα ἀναγκαῖον ἔφησθα εἶναι εἰδότα τίθεσθαι οἷς ἐτίθετο.
For just now in what went before, if you remember, you said that it was necessary for the one who establishes names to establish them with knowledge of the things for which he established them.
πότερον οὖν ἔτι σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἢ οὔ;
Does it then still seem so to you, or not?
ΚΡ. ἔτι.
CRATYLUS: Still.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τὸν τὰ πρῶτα τιθέμενον εἰδότα φῂς τίθεσθαι;
SOCRATES: Do you also say that the one who established the first names established them with knowledge?
ΚΡ. εἰδότα.
CRATYLUS: With knowledge.
ΣΩ. ἐκ ποίων οὖν ὀνομάτων ἢ μεμαθηκὼς ἢ ηὑρηκὼς ἦν τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ τά γε πρῶτα μήπω ἔκειτο, μαθεῖν δʼ αὖ φαμεν τὰ πράγματα καὶ εὑρεῖν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἄλλως ἢ τὰ ὀνόματα μαθόντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐξευρόντας οἷά ἐστι;
SOCRATES: From what names, then, had he either learned or discovered the things, if indeed the first names were not yet established, and on the other hand we say that it is impossible to learn and discover things in any other way than either by learning the names or by discovering ourselves what the things are?
ΚΡ. δοκεῖς τί μοι λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
CRATYLUS: You seem to me to have a point, Socrates.
ΣΩ. τίνα οὖν τρόπον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς εἰδότας θέσθαι ἢ νομοθέτας εἶναι, πρὶν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ὄνομα κεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἐκείνους εἰδέναι, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι τὰ πράγματα μαθεῖν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων;
SOCRATES: In what way, then, are we to say that they established them with knowledge, or were lawmakers, before any name whatsoever was established and before they knew it, if indeed it is not possible to learn things except from names?
ΚΡ. οἶμαι μὲν ἐγὼ τὸν ἀληθέστατον λόγον περὶ τούτων εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μείζω τινὰ δύναμιν εἶναι ἢ ἀνθρωπείαν τὴν θεμένην τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτὰ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.
CRATYLUS: I think, Socrates, the truest account of these matters is that some power greater than human established the first names for things, so that it is necessary for them to be correct.
ΣΩ. εἶτα οἴει ἐναντία ἂν ἐτίθετο αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ θείς, ὢν δαίμων τις ἢ θεός;
SOCRATES: Then do you think the founder, being some daemon or god, would establish names contrary to himself?
ἢ οὐδέν σοι ἐδοκοῦμεν ἄρτι λέγειν;
Or did we seem to you to be saying nothing just now?
ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἦν τούτων τὰ ἕτερα ὀνόματα.
CRATYLUS: But perhaps one of these two kinds was not really names.
ΣΩ. πότερα, ὦ ἄριστε, τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν στάσιν ἄγοντα ἢ τὰ ἐπὶ τὴν φοράν;
SOCRATES: Which of them, my excellent friend?
οὐ γάρ που κατὰ τὸ ἄρτι λεχθὲν πλήθει κριθήσεται.
Those leading to rest, or those leading to motion?
ΚΡ. οὔτοι δὴ δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
For surely, according to what was just said, it will not be decided by majority.
ΣΩ. ὀνομάτων οὖν στασιασάντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φασκόντων ἑαυτὰ εἶναι τὰ ὅμοια τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, τῶν δʼ ἑαυτά, τίνι ἔτι διακρινοῦμεν, ἢ ἐπὶ τί ἐλθόντες;
CRATYLUS: Certainly that would not be fair, Socrates.
οὐ γάρ που ἐπὶ ὀνόματά γε ἕτερα ἄλλα τούτων·
SOCRATES: Since names are then in conflict, and some claim that they themselves are like the truth, and others that they themselves are, by what shall we still distinguish them, or to what shall we go?
οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλʼ ἄττα ζητητέα πλὴν ὀνομάτων, ἃ ἡμῖν ἐμφανιεῖ ἄνευ ὀνομάτων ὁπότερα τούτων ἐστὶ τἀληθῆ, δείξαντα δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ὄντων.
For surely not to other names besides these; for there are none, but it is clear that we must seek some other things than names, which will show us, without names, which of these are the truth, by demonstrating, clearly, the truth of existing things.
ΚΡ. δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.
CRATYLUS: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Κρατύλε, δυνατὸν μαθεῖν ἄνευ ὀνομάτων τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.
SOCRATES: It is then, as it seems, Cratylus, possible to learn existing things without names, if indeed these things are so.
ΚΡ. φαίνεται.
CRATYLUS: It appears so.
ΣΩ. διὰ τίνος ἄλλου οὖν ἔτι προσδοκᾷς ἂν ταῦτα μαθεῖν;
SOCRATES: Through what other thing, then, do you still expect to learn these?
ἆρα διʼ ἄλλου του ἢ οὗπερ εἰκός τε καὶ δικαιότατον, διʼ ἀλλήλων γε, εἴ πῃ συγγενῆ ἐστιν, καὶ αὐτὰ διʼ αὑτῶν;
Is it through any other than what is both likely and most just, namely, through one another, if they are in any way akin, and themselves through themselves?
τὸ γάρ που ἕτερον ἐκείνων καὶ ἀλλοῖον ἕτερον ἄν τι καὶ ἀλλοῖον σημαίνοι ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα.
For that which is other and different from them would surely represent something other and different, but not them.
ΚΡ. ἀληθῆ μοι φαίνῃ λέγειν.
CRATYLUS: You seem to me to speak the truth.