§435ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ γιγνώσκεις ἐμοῦ φθεγγομένου, δήλωμα σοι γίγνεται παρʼ ἐμοῦ;
SOCRATES: Therefore, if you understand when I speak, does a representation come to you from me?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὃ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι, εἴπερ τὸ λάβδα ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι τῇ ᾗ φῂς σὺ σκληρότητι·
SOCRATES: Yes, from something unlike what I have in mind when I speak, if indeed lambda is unlike that hardness which you speak of.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τί ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς σαυτῷ συνέθου καί σοι γίγνεται ἡ ὀρθότης τοῦ ὀνόματος συνθήκη, ἐπειδή γε δηλοῖ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ ἀνόμοια γράμματα, ἔθους τε καὶ συνθήκης τυχόντα;
And if this is so, what else than that you have made an agreement with yourself, and for you the correctness of a name becomes agreement, since indeed both similar and dissimilar letters represent, having met with custom and agreement?
εἰ δʼ ὅτι μάλιστα μή ἐστι τὸ ἔθος συνθήκη, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς ἔτι ἔχοι λέγειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα δήλωμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔθος· ἐκεῖνο γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ὁμοίῳ καὶ ἀνομοίῳ δηλοῖ.
But even if custom is not agreement in the highest degree, it would no longer be right to say that likeness is the representation, but custom; for that, as it seems, represents by both the like and the unlike.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτα συγχωροῦμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε—τὴν γὰρ σιγήν σου συγχώρησιν θήσω—ἀναγκαῖόν που καὶ συνθήκην τι καὶ ἔθος συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς δήλωσιν ὧν διανοούμενοι λέγομεν·
And since we admit this, Cratylus—for I shall take your silence as agreement—it is necessary, I suppose, that both some agreement and custom contribute to the representation of what we think and speak.
ἐπεί, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ ʼθέλεις ἐπὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐλθεῖν, πόθεν οἴει ἕξειν ὀνόματα ὅμοια ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐπενεγκεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐᾷς τι τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ συνθήκην κῦρος ἔχειν τῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος πέρι;
For, my excellent friend, if you are willing to go to numbers, from where do you think you will have names similar to apply to each single one of the numbers, if you do not allow your agreement and consent to have some authority concerning the correctness of names?
ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν· ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς, τὸ τοῦ Ἑρμογένους, γλίσχρα ᾖ ἡ ὁλκὴ αὕτη τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ᾖ καὶ τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ συνθήκῃ, εἰς ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα.
For my own part, I too prefer that names should be as much as possible like things; but let it not be that in truth, as Hermogenes said, this dragging in of likeness is a sticky business, and it is necessary also to make use of this vulgar thing, agreement, for the correctness of names.
ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν κάλλιστʼ ἂν λέγοιτο ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς πλείστοις ὁμοίοις λέγηται, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν, αἴσχιστα δὲ τοὐναντίον.
Since perhaps, as far as possible, it would be spoken most beautifully when it is spoken with all or as many similar letters as possible—and this means appropriate ones— and most uglily the opposite.
τόδε δέ μοι ἔτι εἰπὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, τίνα ἡμῖν δύναμιν ἔχει τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τί φῶμεν αὐτὰ καλὸν ἀπεργάζεσθαι;
But tell me this further after these things: what power do names have for us, and what fine thing shall we say they accomplish?
ΚΡ. διδάσκειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τοῦτο πάνυ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ὃς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπίστηται, ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα.
CRATYLUS: It seems to me, Socrates, to teach, and this is very simple: whoever knows the names also knows the things.
ΣΩ. ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Κρατύλε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, ὡς ἐπειδάν τις εἰδῇ τὸ ὄνομα οἷόν ἐστιν—ἔστι δὲ οἷόνπερ τὸ πρᾶγμα— εἴσεται δὴ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπείπερ ὅμοιον τυγχάνει ὂν τῷ ὀνόματι, τέχνη δὲ μία ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ πάντων τῶν ἀλλήλοις ὁμοίων.
SOCRATES: For perhaps, Cratylus, you mean something like this: that when someone knows what the name is like—and it is just like the thing— he will then also know the thing, since indeed it happens to be like the name, and there is one and the same art of all things that are like one another.
κατὰ τοῦτο δή μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν ὡς ὃς ἂν τὰ ὀνόματα εἰδῇ εἴσεται καὶ τὰ πράγματα.
In this way, indeed, you seem to me to say that whoever knows the names will also know the things.
ΚΡ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
CRATYLUS: You speak most truly.
ΣΩ. ἔχε δή, ἴδωμεν τίς ποτʼ ἂν εἴη ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς διδασκαλίας τῶν ὄντων ὃν σὺ λέγεις νῦν, καὶ πότερον ἔστι μὲν καὶ ἄλλος, οὗτος μέντοι βελτίων, ἢ οὐδʼ ἔστιν ἄλλος ἢ οὗτος.
SOCRATES: Let us see then, what this way of teaching about existing things would be, which you now mention, and whether there is indeed another way, but this one is better, or whether there is no other way but this.
ποτέρως οἴει;
Which way do you think?