§74ΦΑΙΔ. οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.
"Is it then also possible, on seeing a painted Simmias, to recollect Simmias himself?" "Indeed it is," he said.
ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ’ ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων; συμβαίνει. ἀλλ’ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνῄσκηταί τίς τι, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
"Does it not then follow from all these cases that recollection is on the one hand from similar things, and on the other hand also from dissimilar things?" "It does." "But whenever anyone is reminded of something from similar things, is it not necessary that he also experience this: to consider whether this lacks anything in its similarity, or not, in relation to that of which he was reminded?" "It is necessary," he said.
σκόπει δή, ἦ δ’ ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.
"Consider then," he said, "if these things are so.
φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον·
We say, surely, that there is something equal—I do not mean a stick to a stick, nor a stone to a stone, nor any other such thing, but beyond all these, something else, the equal itself.
φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; πάνυ γε, ἦ δ’ ὅς.
Shall we say it is something, or nothing?" "We shall indeed, by Zeus," said Simmias, "wondrously so." "And do we indeed know what it is?" "Certainly," he said.
πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;
"From where did we get the knowledge of it?
ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων;
Is it not from the things we were just mentioning, by seeing equal sticks or stones or some other equal things, that from these we thought of that, which is different from them?
ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται;
Or does it not seem different to you?
σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε.
Consider it also in this way.
ἆρ’ οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ’ οὔ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. τί δέ;
Do not equal stones and sticks, though they are the same things, sometimes appear equal to one person, but not to another?" "Certainly." "And what about this?
αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ᾽, ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας; ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.
Did the equals themselves ever appear to you to be unequal, or equality to be inequality?" "Never, Socrates." "Then these equal things and the equal itself," he said, "are not the same." "In no way do they seem so to me, Socrates." "But yet, from these equal things," he said, "which are different from that equal itself, you have nevertheless thought of and received the knowledge of it?" "You speak most truly," he said.
οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου; πάνυ γε. διαφέρει δέ γε, ἦ δ’ ὅς, οὐδέν·
"Is it then either because it is similar to these, or because it is dissimilar?" "Certainly." "But it makes no difference," he said.
ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. τί δέ; ἦ δ’ ὅς·
"As long as, on seeing one thing, you think of another from this sight, whether similar or dissimilar, it is necessary," he said, "that this has been recollection." "Certainly." "And what about this?" he said.
ἦ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις;
"Do we experience something of this sort in regard to the sticks and the equal things we were just mentioning?
ἆρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν; καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ.
Do they seem to us to be equal in the same way as that which is equal itself, or do they fall short of being such as the equal itself, or not at all?" "They fall short by far," he said.
οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν; ἀνάγκη. τί οὖν;
"Do we then agree on this, that when someone, on seeing something, thinks: 'This which I now see wants to be like some other of the things that exist, but falls short and cannot be such as that, but is inferior'—is it not necessary, surely, that he who thinks this must happen to have known beforehand that which he says it resembles, but falls short of?" "It is necessary." "What then?
τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἢ οὒ περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; παντάπασί γε.
Have we ourselves also experienced this sort of thing in regard to equal things and the equal itself?" "Absolutely."