§62ΦΑΙΔ. ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις.
Socrates: "But you must be eager," he said, "for perhaps you might indeed hear.
ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον ὂν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἠρέμα ἐπιγελάσας, Ἴττω Ζεύς, ἔφη, τῇ αὑτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών.
Yet perhaps it will seem strange to you if this alone of all other things is absolute, and it never happens to man, as in other things, that sometimes and for some people it is better to die than to live; and for those for whom it is better to die, it seems strange to you perhaps if it is not holy for these men to do good to themselves, but they must wait for another benefactor." And Cebes, laughing quietly, said "Let Zeus be witness," speaking in his own dialect.
καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ’ εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ’ ἴσως γ’ ἔχει τινὰ λόγον.
Socrates: "Indeed, it would seem so," said he, "at least to be unreasonable in this way; however, perhaps it does have some reason.
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ’ ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.
Now, the doctrine spoken about these things in secret teachings, that we men are in a kind of guardpost and that one must not release oneself from it or run away, seems to me to be something great and not easy to see through; however, Cebes, this at least seems to me to be well said, that gods are those who take care of us and that we men are one of the possessions of the gods.
ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως; ἔμοιγε, φησὶν ὁ Κέβης.
Or does it not seem so to you?" "To me at least it does," said Cebes.
οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτεινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ καί, εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν; πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη.
Socrates: "Then," said he, "would you not also, if one of your own possessions should kill itself, when you had not signaled that you wished it to die, be angry with it and, if you had any punishment, punish it?" "Certainly," he said.
ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὑτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν. ἀλλ’ εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται.
Socrates: "Perhaps then, in this way, it is not unreasonable that one must not kill oneself before a god sends some necessity, such as the one now present to us." Cebes: "This indeed seems likely," he said.
ὃ μέντοι νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι.
"However, what you were saying just now, that philosophers would easily be willing to die, seems strange, Socrates, if what we were saying just now is reasonable, namely that a god is the one who takes care of us and we are his possessions.
τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον· οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὑτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος.
For it does not make sense that the wisest men should not be angry when departing from this service in which those who are the best rulers of all existing things, the gods, supervise them; for surely he does not think that he will take better care of himself when he becomes free.
ἀλλ’ ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ’ ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπό γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ’ ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν ἀεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὑτοῦ βελτίονι.
But a foolish man might perhaps think that one must flee from his master, and would not calculate that one must not flee from a good master but rather stay with him as much as possible, wherefore he would flee unreasonably; but the one who has sense would surely desire always to be with one who is better than himself.
καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὐναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνῄσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας χαίρειν.
And yet in this way, Socrates, the contrary is likely to be the case than what was just now said; for it is fitting for the wise to be angry when dying, but for the foolish to rejoice."