§17Postremo ut nihil horum laudandorum habeant illae animae. quae illorum rationibus habere coguntur, quaererem, utrum aliquas an nullas animas deus damnet: si nullas, nullum meritorum iudicium est.
Finally, granted that those souls should have none of these praise-worthy things which they are forced to have by their arguments, I would ask, whether God condemns some souls or none.
nulla prouidentia, et casu potius quam ratione mundus administratur uel potius non administratur; non enim administratio casibus danda est.
If none, there is no judgment of merits, no providence, and the world is administered by chance rather than by reason, or rather, it is not administered at all; for administration is not to be given to chance.
hoc autem si omnibus qualibet religione deuinctis credere nefas est. restat. ut aut sit aliquarum animarum damnatio aut nulla peccata sint.
But if to believe this is a crime for all who are bound by any religion whatever, it remains that there is either condemnation of some souls or that there are no sins.
sed si nulla peccata sunt, etiam nullum malum: quod isti si dixerint. haeresim suam uno ictu interficient.
But if there are no sins, there is also no evil; and if they say this, they will kill their own heresy with a single blow.
conuenit igitur mihi cum eis aliquas animas diuina lege iudicioque damnari.
It is agreed between me and them, therefore, that some souls are condemned by divine law and judgment.
at hae si bonae sunt, quae illa iustitia est? si malae.
But if these are good, what is that justice?
natura, an uoluntate? sed natura esse malae animae nullo modo queunt.
If evil, is it by nature or by will? But souls can in no way be evil by nature.
unde hoc docemus? de superioribus definitionibus uoluntatis atque peccati.
Whence do we teach this? From the above definitions of the will and of sin.
quia dicere animas et malas esse et nihil peccare plenum est dementiae, dicere autem peccare sine uoluntate. magnum deliramentum est. et peccati reum tenere quemquam, quia non fecit, quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis est et insaniae.
Because to say that souls are both evil and sin nothing is full of madness, whereas to say that they sin without will is a great delusion, and to hold anyone guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do is of the highest injustice and insanity.
quamobrem illae animae quicquid faciunt. si natura, non uoluntate faciunt, id est si libero et ad faciendum et ad non faciendum motu animi carent, si denique his abstinendi ab opere suo potestas nulla conceditur, peccatum earum tenere non possumus.
Wherefore, whatever those souls do, if they do it by nature, not by will—that is, if they lack a free movement of the mind both for doing and for not doing, if finally no power of abstaining from their work is granted to them—we cannot hold them guilty of sin.
at omnes fatentur et malas animas iuste et eas, quae non peccauerunt, iniuste damnari: fatentur igitur eas malas esse, quae peccant.
But all confess both that evil souls are justly condemned and those that have not sinned, unjustly; they confess, therefore, that those are evil which sin.
illae autem, sicut ratio docuit, non peccant; animarum ergo malarum genus nescio quod extraneum, quod a Manichaeis inducitur. nullum est.
But those, as reason has taught, do not sin; therefore, that strange, I know not what, kind of evil souls which is introduced by the Manichaeans is nothing.
§18Nunc bonum illud genus uideamus, quod rursus ita laudant, ut ipsam dei substantiam dicant esse.
Now let us see that good kind, which again they so praise that they say it is the very substance of God.
quanto autem melius est, ut suum quisque ordinem meritumque cognoscat nec ita sacrilega superbia uentiletur, ut cum se totiens commutari sentiat, summi illius boni, quod incommutabile pia ratio profitetur et docet. credat esse substantiam? ecce enim cum manifestum sit non peccare animas in eo, quod non sunt tales, quales esse non possunt — unde iam constat nescio quas illas inducticias nullo modo peccare et propterea illas non esse omnino —: relinquitur, ut quoniam concedunt esse peccata, non inueniant, quibus ea tribuant, nisi bono generi animarum et substantiae dei.
But how much better is it that each one should know his own order and merit, and not be puffed up with such sacrilegious pride that, although he feels himself to be changed so many times, he should believe himself to be the substance of that supreme good which pious reason confesses and teaches to be unchangeable? For behold, since it is manifest that souls do not sin in that they are not such as they cannot be—whence it is already established that those, I know not what, introduced souls in no way sin, and therefore do not exist at all—: it remains that, since they concede that there are sins, they do not find to whom to attribute them except to the good kind of souls and to the substance of God.
maxime autem urgentur auctoritate christiana; numquam enim negauerunt dari ueniam peccatorum, cum fuerit ad deum quisque conuersus: numquam dixerunt — ut alia multa —, quod scripturis diuinis hoc quispiam corruptor inseruerit.
But they are most strongly urged by Christian authority; for they have never denied that forgiveness of sins is given when anyone is converted to God; they have never said—as in many other things—that some corruptor inserted this into the divine Scriptures.
quibus ergo peccata donantur? si alienigenis illis malis, possunt et bonae fieri, possunt dei regnum possidere cum Christo.
To whom, then, are sins forgiven? If to those foreign evil souls, they can also become good, and can possess the kingdom of God with Christ.
quod isti quia negant nec habent alterum genus nisi earum, quas de substantia dei esse perhibent, restat, ut non solum etiam ipsas, sed ipsas solas peccare fateantur.
But because they deny this, and have no other kind except of those which they assert to be from the substance of God, it remains that they must confess not only that these themselves sin, but that they alone sin.
ego autem nihil pugno: non solae peccent. peccant tamen.
But I fight nothing: let them not sin alone, yet they do sin.
at enim mali commixtione coguntur.
But indeed they are compelled by the mixture of evil.
si ita coguntur. ut resistendi potestas nulla sit. non peccant: si est in potestate resistere sua et propria uoluntate consentiunt, cur tanta bona in summo malo, cur hoc malum in summo bono per doctrinam illorum cogimur inuenire, nisi quia neque illud malum est quod suspicione inducunt neque hoc summum bonum quod superstitione peruertunt?
If they are so compelled that there is no power of resisting, they do not sin; if it is in their power to resist and they consent by their own and proper will, why are we compelled by their doctrine to find so many goods in the supreme evil, and this evil in the supreme good, except because neither is that evil which they introduce by suspicion, nor is this the supreme good which they pervert by superstition?