§19At si de duobus istis generibus animarum delirare illos et errare docuissem aut certe ipse didicissem, quid remanere poterat, cur mihi iam de ulla re audiendi uel consulendi uiderentur? an ut discerem hinc ostendi animarum duo esse genera, quod in deliberando nunc in malam partem, nunc in bonam nutat adsensio? cur non magis hoc signum est unius animae, quae libera illa uoluntate huc et huc ferri, hinc atque hinc referri potest? nam mihi cum accidit. unum me sentio utrumque considerantem alterutrum eligentem; sed plerumque illud libet, hoc decet, quorum nos in medio positi fluctuamus.
But if I had taught that they rave and err concerning these two kinds of souls, or at least had learned it myself, what could remain why they should seem to me to be listened to or consulted on any matter anymore? Or was it that I might learn that two kinds of souls are shown from this, that in deliberating our assent wavers now toward the bad side, now toward the good? Why is this not rather the sign of a single soul, which by that free will of hers can be carried hither and thither, and brought back from this side and that? For when this happens to me, I feel myself to be one, considering both and choosing one or the other; but for the most part that pleases, this is fitting, between which we, placed in the middle, fluctuate.
nec mirum: ita enim nunc constituti sumus, ut et per carnem uoluptate adfici et per spiritum honestate possimus.
And no wonder: for we are now so constituted that we can both be affected by pleasure through the flesh and by honor through the spirit.
quare non duas animas hinc fateri cogor? possumus enim melius et multo expeditius intellegere duo genera rerum bonarum, quorum tamen neutrum ab auctore deo sit alienum, animam unam ex diuersis adficere partibus, inferiore ac superiore. uel quod recte ita dici potest, exteriore atque interiore.
Therefore I am not forced to confess two souls from this. For we can better and much more easily understand that two kinds of good things, neither of which however is foreign to God their author, affect a single soul from different parts, the lower and the higher, or what can rightly be so called, the outer and the inner.
ista sunt duo genera, quae sensibilium et intellegibilium nomine paulo ante tractauimus, quae carnalia et spiritalia libentius et familiarius nos uocamus.
These are the two kinds which a little before we treated under the name of the sensible and the intelligible, which we more willingly and familiarly call the carnal and the spiritual.
sed factum est nobis difficile a carnalibus abstinere, m cum panis uerissimus noster spiritalis sit.
But it has become difficult for us to abstain from carnal things, although our truest bread is spiritual.
cum labore namque nunc comedimus panem.
For with labor we now eat our bread.
neque enim nullo in subplicio sumus peccato transgressionis mortales ex inmortalibus facti.
For we are not in no punishment, having been made mortal from immortal by the sin of transgression.
eo contingit, ut cum ad meliora conantibus nobis consuetudo facta cum carne et peccata nostra quodam modo militare contra nos et difficultatem nobis facere coeperint.
By this it happens that, when we strive for better things, the habit formed with the flesh and our sins begin in a certain way to wage war against us and to cause us difficulty.
nonnulli stulti aliud genus animarum. quod non sit ex deo. superstitione obtunsissima suspicentur.
Some foolish people, by a most dull superstition, suspect another kind of souls which is not from God.
§20Quamquam etiam si eis concedatur inferiore alio genere animarum nos inlici ad turpia. non inde conficiunt aut illas natura malas esse aut istas summum bonum.
Although, even if it were conceded to them that we are enticed to shameful deeds by another, lower kind of souls, they do not thence prove either that those souls are evil by nature, or that these are the supreme good.
fieri enim potest. ut propria illae uoluntate adpetendo, quod non licebat, hoc est peccando, ex bonis factae sint malae rursusque fieri bonae possint.
For it can happen that, by desiring of their own will what was not allowed, that is by sinning, they have become evil from good, and can become good again.
sed ut fit quamdiu manent in peccato, ad sese alias occulta quadam suasione traducant; deinde, ut omnino malae non sint. sed in suo genere quamuis inferiore opus proprium sine ullo peccato exerceant; istae autem superiores, quibus actionem longe praestantiorem rerum moderatrix iustitia summa tribuerit. si illas inferiores. sequi et imitari uoluerint peccando fiunt malae, non quia malas, sed quia male imitantur.
But, as happens as long as they remain in sin, they draw others to themselves by a certain hidden persuasion; then, that they are not altogether evil, but in their own kind, however lower, they perform their proper work without any sin; while these superior souls, to whom the supreme justice that governs all things has assigned a far more excellent action, if they choose to follow and imitate those lower ones, become evil by sinning, not because they imitate evil things, but because they imitate them badly.
ab illis enim agitur proprium, ab istis adpetitur alienum: unde illae in suo gradu manent, istae ad inferiora merguntur.
For by those their own work is done, but by these what belongs to another is desired; whence those remain in their own grade, while these are submerged into lower things.
uelut cum homines ferina sectantur.
Just as when men pursue the ways of beasts.
pulchre namque incedit quadrupedans equus;
For a four-legged horse walks beautifully; but if a man should practice this on his feet and hands, who would think him worthy even of the food of chaff?
at si hoc homo pedibus manibusque meditetur, quis eum uel palearum cibo dignum putet? recte igitur plerumque inprobamus imitantem, cum eum, quem imitatur, probemus.
Rightly therefore do we for the most part disapprove of the imitator, while we approve of him whom he imitates.
inprobamus autem non quia non sit adsecutus, sed quia omnino adsequi uoluit.
But we disapprove of him, not because he did not achieve it, but because he wished to achieve it at all.
in equo enim probamus illud, cui quantum praeponimus hominem, tantum offendimur, quod inferiora sectatur.
For in the horse we approve that very thing, which in proportion as we prefer a man to it, so much are we offended that he pursues lower things.
quid? inter ipsos homines in inmittenda uoce nonne quod praeco bene facit, etiamsi clarius ac melius id faciat praetor, insanus est? caelestia suspice: lucens luna laudatur suoque laudatur cursu atque uicibus bene considerantibus satis placet; tamen si eam sol uelit imitari — fingamus enim eos posse habere huiusmodi uoluntates —, cui non summe ac iure displiceat? ex quibus illud est.
What? Among men themselves, in emitting the voice, is not that which a herald does well, even if a praetor should do it more loudly and better, insane? Look up at the heavenly things: the shining moon is praised, and is praised for her course and phases, giving sufficient pleasure to those who consider them well; yet if the sun should wish to imitate her—for let us imagine that they can have wills of this kind—to whom would it not be highly and justly displeasing?
quod intellegi uolo. etiam si sunt animae — quod interim incertum est — corporeis officiis non peccato, sed natura deditae nosque, quamquam sint inferiores, aliqua tamen interiore uicinitate contingunt, non illas ideo malas haberi oportere, quia nos, cum eas sequimur et corporea diligimus, mali sumus.
From which comes that which I wish to be understood: even if there are souls—which in the meantime is uncertain—devoted to bodily duties not by sin, but by nature, and although they are inferior, they touch us by a certain inner proximity, they ought not therefore to be held evil because we, when we follow them and love bodily things, are evil.
propterea enim corporea diligendo peccamus, quia spiritalia diligere et iustitia iubemur et natura possumus et tunc in nostro genere optimi et beatissimi sumus.
For we sin in loving bodily things for this reason, that we are both commanded by justice and able by nature to love spiritual things, and then we are best and happiest in our own kind.