§16Age nunc. uideamus quid nos haec adiuuarent.
Come now, let us see how these things would aid us.
primum omnium. ut nihil amplius desiderarem: totam causam quippe finirent.
First of all, so that I should desire nothing further: for they would indeed put an end to the whole dispute.
nam quisquis secreta conscientiae suae legesque diuinas penitus naturae inditas apud animum intus, ubi expressiores certioresque sunt, consulens has duas definitiones uoluntatis atque peccati ueras esse concedit, totam Manichaeorum haeresim paucissimis et breuissimis, sed plane inuictissimis ratiunculis sine ulla cunctatione condemnat.
For whoever, consulting the secrets of his own conscience and the divine laws deeply implanted in nature within the mind, where they are clearer and more certain, concedes that these two definitions of the will and of sin are true, condemns the whole heresy of the Manichaeans with very few and short, but clearly most invincible brief arguments without any hesitation.
quod sic considerari potest. duo animarum genera esse dicunt: unum bonum, quod ita ex deo sit. ut non ex aliqua materia uel ex nihilo ab eo factum. sed de ipsa eius omnino substantia pars quaedam processisse dicatur: alterum autem malum, quod nulla prorsus ex parte ad deum pertinere credunt credendumque commendant.
This can be considered in this way: they say that there are two kinds of souls, one good, which is from God in such a way that it is said to have proceeded not from some matter or from nothing made by Him, but a certain part entirely from His substance itself; the other, moreover, evil, which they believe and recommend to be believed to belong in no part at all to God.
et ideo illud summum bonum, hoc uero summum malum esse praedicant atque ista duo genera fuisse aliquando discreta, nunc esse commixta.
And therefore they preach that the former is the supreme good, but the latter is the supreme evil, and that those two kinds were at one time separate, but are now mixed.
genus quidem commixtionis huius et causam nondum audieram; sed tamen iam quaerere poteram, utrum illud malum genus animarum, antequam bono misceretur, habuisset aliquam uoluntatem.
I had not yet heard indeed the manner and cause of this mixture; but nevertheless I was already able to ask, whether that evil kind of souls, before it was mixed with the good, had had any will.
si enim non habebat, sine peccato atque innocens erat et ideo nullo modo malum.
For if it did not have, it was without sin and innocent and therefore in no way evil.
si autem ideo malum, quia licet esset sine uoluntate. tamquam ignis, tamen si bonum adtigisset. uiolaret atque corrumperet: quantum est nefas et naturam mali tantum ualere ad commutandam ullam dei partem et summum illud bonum corruptibile et uiolabile credere? quod si uoluntas inerat, profecto inerat cogente nullo motus animi ad aliquid uel non amittendum uel adipiscendum.
But if it was evil for this reason, that although it was without will, like fire, yet if it should touch the good, it would violate and corrupt it: how great an impiety is it to believe both that the nature of evil has so much power as to change any part of God, and that that supreme good is corruptible and violable? But if a will was in it, surely there was in it a movement of the mind, with no one compelling, toward either not losing or acquiring something.
hoc autem aliquid aut bonum erat aut bonum putabatur: non enim aliter adpeti posset.
Moreover this 'something' was either good or was thought to be good: for otherwise it could not be desired.
sed in summo malo ante commixtionem, quam praedicant, nullum umquam bonum fuit.
But in the supreme evil, before the mixture which they preach, there was never any good.
unde igitur ibi uel scientia uel opinio boni esse potuit? an nihil uolebant, quod apud se esset, atque illud bonum uerum, quod extra erat, adpetebant? ista uero praeclara et magna laude praedicanda uoluntas est, qua summum adpetitur et uerum bonum.
Whence therefore could there be in it either knowledge or opinion of the good? Or did they will nothing which was among themselves, and desired that true good which was outside? But that is a noble will and worthy of being preached with great praise, by which the supreme and true good is desired.
unde igitur in summo malo motus animi tanta laude dignissimus? an studio nocendi adpetebant? primo eodem reuoluitur ratio.
Whence therefore in the supreme evil was a movement of the mind most worthy of such praise? Or did they desire it with a desire to harm? First, the argument returns to the same point.
qui enim nocere uult. bono aliquo uult priuare alium propter aliquod bonum suum.
For he who wills to harm, wills to deprive another of some good for the sake of some good of his own.
erat igitur in eis uel scientia boni uel opinio, quae summo malo nullo modo esse debebat.
Therefore, there was in them either knowledge of the good or opinion, which in the supreme evil ought in no way to be.
deinde bonum illud extra se positum, cui nocere studebant. utrum omnino esset, unde cognouerant? si intellexerant. quid tali mente praeclarius? an quicquam est aliud.
Secondly, how had they known whether that good placed outside themselves, which they studied to harm, existed at all? If they had understood it, what is nobler than such a mind?
quo magnis laboribus omnis bonorum porrigatur intentio. nisi ut summum illud et sincerum bonum intellegatur? quod ergo nunc uix paucis bonis iustisque conceditur.
Or is there anything else toward which the entire intention of the good is directed with great labors, except that that supreme and sincere good may be understood? Therefore, was that which is now scarcely granted to a few good and just people, already possible then for that pure evil, with no good helping?
id tunc illud merum malum nullo bono adiuuante iam poterat? si autem illae animae corpora gerebant et id oculis uiderant, quot linguae, quot pectora, quae ingenia laudandis istis oculis praedicandisque sufficiunt, quibus uix possunt mentes iustorum adaequari? quanta bona inuenimus in summo malo? si enim uidere deum malum est, non est bonum deus; bonum est autem deus: bonum est igitur deum uidere et nescio quid huic bono conparari queat.
But if those souls bore bodies and had seen it with eyes, how many tongues, how many breasts, what intellects are sufficient for praising and preaching those eyes, to which the minds of the just can scarcely be compared? How many goods do we find in the supreme evil? For if to see God is evil, God is not good; but God is good: therefore, it is good to see God, and I do not know what can be compared to this good.
porro quod uidere bonum est. unde fieri potest.
Furthermore, since to see is good, whence can it happen that to be able to see is evil?
ut posse uidere sit malum? quapropter quisquis uel in illis oculis uel in illis mentibus fecit. ut ab his posset uideri diuina substantia. magnum et ineffabili laude dignissimum bonum fecit.
Wherefore, whoever in those eyes or in those minds made it so that the divine substance could be seen by them, made a great good, most worthy of unspeakable praise.
si autem non factum, sed ipsum per se tale ac sempiternum erat difficile hoc malo quicquam melius inuenitur.
But if it was not made, but was such and eternal of itself, it is difficult to find anything better than this evil.