§14Non igitur nisi uoluntate peccatur.
Therefore, sin is not committed except by the will.
nobis autem uoluntas nostra notissima est: neque enim scirem me uelle, si quid sit uoluntas ipsa nescirem.
Moreover, our own will is most well-known to us: for neither would I know that I will, if I were ignorant of what the will itself is.
definitur itaque isto modo: uoluntas est animi motus cogente nullo ad aliquid uel non amittendum uel adipiscendum.
It is defined, therefore, in this manner: the will is a movement of the mind, with no one compelling, toward either not losing or acquiring something.
cur ergo ita tunc definire non possem? an erat difficile uidere inuitum uolenti esse contrarium, ita ut contrarium sinistrum dextro esse dicimus, non ut nigrum albo? nam eadem res simul et nigra et alba esse non potest;
Why then was I not able to define it so at that time? Or was it difficult to see that the unwilling is contrary to the willing, in the same way as we say the left is contrary to the right, not as black to white?
duorum autem in medio quisque positus ad alterum sinister est, ad alterum dexter; simul quidem utrumque unus homo.
For the same thing cannot be at the same time both black and white; but anyone placed in the middle of two is left to the one, and right to the other; at the same time indeed one man is both.
sed simul utrumque ad unum hominem nullo modo.
But at the same time he is by no means both to one man.
ita inuitus et uolens simul esse quidem unus animus potest, sed unum atque idem nolle simul et uelle non potest.
So indeed one and the same mind can be at the same time unwilling and willing, but it cannot at the same time nill and will one and the same thing.
cum enim quisque inuitus aliquid facit — si enim roges, utrum id facere uelit. nolle se dicit: item si roges. utrum id uelit non facere, uelle respondet —: ita inuitum ad faciendum, ad non faciendum autem uolentem reperies; id est enim unum animum uno tempore habentem utrumque. sed ad aliud atque aliud singulare referentem.
For when anyone does something unwillingly—for if you should ask whether he wills to do it, he says he nills; likewise if you should ask whether he wills not to do it, he answers that he wills—: thus you will find him unwilling toward doing, but willing toward not doing; for this is one mind having both at one time, but referring them to different singular things.
cur haec dico? quia si rursum quaeramus, quam ob causam id inuitus faciat, cogi se dicat.
Why do I say these things? Because if we should ask again for what cause he does it unwillingly, he would say that he is compelled.
nam et omnis inuitus faciens cogitur et omnis qui cogitur, si facit, nonnisi inuitus facit.
For both everyone who does something unwillingly is compelled, and everyone who is compelled, if he does it, does it not except unwillingly.
restat. ut uolens a cogente sit liber, etiamsi se quisquam cogi putet.
It remains that he who does it willing is free from the compeller, even if anyone should think himself to be compelled.
et hoc enim modo omnis. qui uolens facit. non cogitur. et omnis, qui non cogitur, aut uolens facit aut non facit.
For in this way also everyone who does something willing is not compelled, and everyone who is not compelled either does it willing or does it not.
haec cum in omnibus hominibus, quos interrogare non absurde possumus, a puero usque ad senem, a ludo litterario usque ad solium sapientis natura ipsa proclamet.
Since nature itself proclaims these things in all men whom we can interrogate not absurdly, from a boy even to an old man, from the elementary school even to the throne of the wise.
cur ego tunc non uiderem in definitione uoluntatis ponendum esse cogente nullo\', quod nunc quasi experientia maiore cautissimus posui? at si hoc ubique manifestum a est et non doctrina, sed natura omnibus promptum, quid restat - quod uideatur obscurum, nisi forte ullum lateat. aliquid nos uelle cum uolumus, et ad hoc moueri animum nostrum idque aut habere nos aut non habere.
Why did I not see then that 'with no one compelling' ought to be put in the definition of the will, which now, as if with greater experience, I have put most cautiously? But if this is manifest everywhere and is ready to all not by doctrine but by nature, what remains that seems obscure, unless by chance it is hidden from anyone that we will something when we will, and that our mind is moved toward this, and that we either have it or do not have it, and, if we had it, we will to retain it, if we did not have it, we will to acquire it?
et, si haberemus, retinere uelle, si non haberemus, adquirere? quare aut non amittere, aut adipisci aliquid uult omnis, qui uult.
Wherefore everyone who wills, wills either not to lose or to acquire something.
quamobrem si omnia ista luce clariora sunt, sicuti sunt. neque meae tantum, sed notitiae generis humani ueritatis ipsius liberalitate donata, cur illo etiam tempore dicere non possem: uoluntas est motus animi cogente nullo ad aliquid uel non amittendum uel adipiscendum?
For which reason, if all these things are clearer than light, as indeed they are, and are granted not only to my knowledge but to the knowledge of the human race by the liberality of truth itself, why at that time also could I not say: the will is a movement of the mind, with no one compelling, toward either not losing or acquiring something?
§15Dicet aliquis: et hoc te aduersum Manichaeos quid adiuuaret? expecta;
Someone will say: and how would this aid you against the Manichaeans?
sine prius etiam peccatum definiamus. quod sine uoluntate esse non posse omnis mens apud se diuinitus conscriptum legit.
Wait; let us first define sin also, which every mind reads written within itself by divine power that it cannot be without the will.
ergo peccatum est uoluntas retinendi uel consequendi quod iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstinere.
Therefore, sin is the will of retaining or of obtaining what justice forbids and from which it is free to abstain.
quamquam si liberum non sit. non est uoluntas. sed malui grossius quam scrupulosius definire.
Although if it is not free, it is not the will; but I preferred to define it more grossly than more scrupulously.
etiamne hic libri obscuri mihi scrutandi erant, unde discerem neminem uituperatione subplicioue dignum, qui aut id uelit, quod iustitia uelle non prohibet, aut id non faciat.
Did I also have to search obscure books here, whence I might learn that no one is worthy of blame or punishment who either wills that which justice does not forbid to will, or does not do that which he cannot do?
quod facere non potest? nonne ista cantant et pastores in montibus et in theatris poetae et indocti in circulis et docti in bibliothecis et magistri in scholis et antistites in sacratis locis et in orbe terrarum genus humanum? quod si nemo uituperatione uel damnatione dignus est aut non contra uetitum iustitiae faciens aut quod non potest non faciens, omne autem peccatum uel um b. uituperandum est uel damnandum, quis dubitet tunc esse peccatum.
Do not the shepherds in the mountains sing these things, and the poets in the theatres, and the unlearned in circles, and the learned in libraries, and the masters in schools, and the bishops in sacred places, and the human race in the world? But if no one is worthy of blame or condemnation who either does not act against the prohibition of justice or does not do what he cannot do, and moreover every sin is either to be blamed or to be condemned, who would doubt that sin exists then when both to will is unjust and it is free to nill?
cum et uelle iniustum est et liberum nolle? et ideo definitionem illam et ueram et ad intellegendum esse facillimam et non modo nunc, sed tunc quoque a me potuisse dici: peccatum est uoluntas retinendi uel consequendi. quod iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstinere?
And therefore that definition is both true and most easy to understand, and not only now but then also could have been said by me: sin is the will of retaining or of obtaining what justice forbids and from which it is free to abstain?