§12Uerum esto: non poteram illo tempore sensibilia haec ab intellegibilibus, carnalia scilicet ab spiritalibus diiudicare atque discernere.
But let it be: I was not able at that time to distinguish and discern these sensible things from the intelligible, that is to say, carnal things from spiritual.
non erat aetatis. non disciplinae, non cuiusdam etiam consuetudinis. non ullorum denique meritorum non enim parui gaudii felicitatisque res est —: itane tandem ne illud quidem arripere poteram, quod in omnium hominum iudicio summi dei legibus natura ipsa constituit?
Quiuis enim homines, quos modo a communi sensu generis humani nulla disrupisset amentia, quae uellent ad iudicandum studia detulissent, quamlibet inperitiam, quantamcumque etiam tarditatem, uelim experiri, quid mihi responderent roganti, utrum eis peccasse uideretur, de cuius dormientis manu scripsisset alius aliquid flagitiosum.
It was not a matter of age, not of training, not of some custom, nor finally of any merits—for it is a matter of no small joy and happiness—. But pray, could I not even grasp that which nature itself, by the laws of the supreme God, has established in the judgment of all men? For whoever the men might be, whom no madness had severed from the common sense of humankind, whatever interests they might have brought to judge, whatever ignorance, and however great sluggishness, I would like to test what they would answer to me asking whether it seemed to them that he had sinned, from whose sleeping hand another had written something shameful.
omnes quis dubitet ita fuisse negaturos illud esse peccatum, ita reclamaturos, ut etiam succenserent fortasse, quod tali eos rogatione dignos putarim? a quibus ego, quoque modo poteram.
Who would doubt that all would so deny that it was a sin, and would so cry out against it, that they might even be angry that I thought them worthy of such a question?
reconciliatis et in consilium restitutis peterem, ut me aliud tam manifestum, tam in omnium cognitione positum interrogantem non moleste ferrent.
From whom I, having reconciled them in whatever way I could and restored them to counsel, would beg that they not take it amiss that I ask another thing so manifest, so placed in the knowledge of all.
tunc quaererem: si non dormientis, sed scientis manu, qui membris tamen ceteris uinctus atque constrictus esset, quisquam ualentior aliquid similiter fecisset mali, utrum quia id nosset. quamuis omnino noluisset, ullo peccati nomine teneretur.
Then I would ask: if not by the hand of one sleeping, but of one knowing, who nevertheless was bound and constricted in his other limbs, someone stronger had done some similar evil, whether because he knew it, although he had been entirely unwilling, he would be held by any name of sin.
et hic mihi omnes mirantes, quod talia sciscitarer, sine cunctatione responderent nihil etiam istum omnino peccasse.
And here all, wondering that I should ask such things, would answer me without hesitation that this man also had sinned not at all.
quid ita? quia de quo nesciente uel resistere non ualente quisquam quippiam mali fecerit, iuste damnari nullo modo potest.
Why so? Because concerning that which someone has done of evil when one was ignorant or unable to resist, he can in no way be justly condemned.
atque id ipsum cur ita esset, si in illis hominibus naturam ipsam percontarer humanam, facile peruenirem ad id, quod cuperem, isto modo quaerens: quid? si dormiens ille iam sciret, quid alius de manu eius facturus esset, et de industria se plus potus etiam, ne expergisceretur, somno dederet, ut aliquem iurando falleret, num ei quicquam somnus ad innocentiam suffragaretur? quid aliud illi quam nocentem hominem pronuntiarent? quid? si et ille uolens uinctus est, ut aliquem similiter praetenta defensione deciperet, quid ei tandem, ut peccato careat. illa uincula profuerunt? quamquam his obstrictus reuera resistere non ualeret, sicut ille dormiens, quid tunc fieret. omnino nesciret.
And why that very thing was so, if I were to inquire of human nature itself in those men, I would easily arrive at what I desired, asking in this manner: What? If that sleeping man already knew what another was going to do with his hand, and purposely gave himself up to sleep, having even drunk more, lest he should wake up, in order to deceive someone by swearing, would sleep support him at all towards innocence? What else would they pronounce him than a guilty man? What? If he also was bound willingly, so as to deceive someone in like manner under a pretended defense, what, pray, did those chains profit him that he should be free from sin? Although bound by these he could not in truth resist, just as that sleeping man, and would be entirely ignorant of what was happening then.
numquidnam igitur dubitandum est, quin peccasse ambo iudicarentur? quibus concessis colligerem nusquam scilicet nisi in uoluntate esse peccatum, cum mihi auxiliaretur etiam illud, quod iustitia peccantes tenet sola mala uoluntate. quamuis quod uoluerint inplere nequiuerint.
Is it therefore to be doubted at all that both would be judged to have sinned? Which things being granted, I would conclude that sin is indeed nowhere but in the will, since that also would aid me, that justice holds sinners by the evil will alone, although they were unable to fulfill what they willed.
§13Quisquamne me ista tractantem possit dicere in rebus obscuris abditisque uersari. ubi propter intellegentium paucitatem uel fraudis uel ostentationis suspicio nasci solet? secedat paulisper illa intellegibilium sensibiliumque distinctio, nulla mihi fiat inuidia, quod tardas animas subtilium disputationum stimulis persequor.
Could anyone say that I, treating of these things, am conversant in obscure and hidden matters, where because of the fewness of those who understand, suspicion of either fraud or ostentation is wont to arise? Let that distinction between intelligible and sensible things withdraw for a little while; let no ill-will be made against me because I pursue slow minds with the goads of subtle disputations.
liceat mihi me scire uiuere, liceat mihi scire me uelle uiuere: in quae si consentit genus humanum, tam nobis cognita est uoluntas nostra quam uita.
Let it be permitted to me to know that I live, let it be permitted to me to know that I will to live; in which things if the human race agrees, our will is as known to us as our life.
neque cum istam scientiam profitemur, metuendum est, ne nos quisquam falli posse conuincat: hoc ipsum enim falli nemo potest, si aut non uiuat aut nihil uelit.
Nor when we profess this knowledge is it to be feared lest anyone convince us that we can be deceived; for no one can be deceived in this very thing, unless he either does not live or wills nothing.
non me arbitror quicquam obscurum adtulisse et uereor, ne cuiquam magis, quod haec nimium manifesta sint, uidear esse culpandus; sed quorsum tendant, consideremus.
I do not think that I have brought forward anything obscure, and I fear lest I seem to anyone rather to be blamed because these things are too manifest; but let us consider where they tend.