§66.17Honestum omne securum est, tranquillum est; si recusat aliquid, si conplorat, si malum iudicat, perturbationem recepit et in magna discordia volutatur.
Every honorable thing is secure, is tranquil; if it refuses anything, if it laments, if it judges anything to be an evil, it has admitted perturbation and tosses about in great discord.
Hinc enim species recti vocat, illinc suspicio mali retrahit.
For from here the appearance of the right calls, and from there the suspicion of evil pulls back.
Itaque qui honeste aliquid facturus est, quicquid opponitur, id etiam si incommodum putat, malum non putet, velit, libens faciat.
Therefore, he who is about to do something honorably, whatever is opposed, even if he thinks it an inconvenience, let him not think it an evil; let him wish it, let him do it willingly.
Omne honestum iniussum incoactumque est, sincerum et nulli malo mixtum.
Every honorable thing is unbidden and uncoerced, pure and mixed with no evil.
§66.18Scio, quid mihi responderi hoc loco possit: "hoc nobis persuadere conaris, nihil interesse, utrum aliquis in gaudio sit an in eculeo iaceat ac tortorem suum lasset?" Poteram respondere: Epicurus quoque ait sapientem, si in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum: "dulce est et ad me nihil pertinet. "Quid miraris, si ego paria bona dico alterius in convivio iacentis, alterius inter tormenta fortissime stantis, cum quod incredibilius est dicat Epicurus, dulce esse torreri?
I know what can be answered to me in this place: "Are you trying to persuade us of this, that it makes no difference whether someone is in joy or lies on the rack and tires out his torturer?" I could have answered: Epicurus also says that the wise man, even if he were burned in the bull of Phalaris, would cry out: "It is sweet, and it does not concern me." Why do you wonder if I say that the goods of one lying at a banquet and of another standing most bravely amid tortures are equal, when Epicurus says what is more incredible, that it is sweet to be burned?
§66.19Sed hoc respondeo, plurimum interesse inter gaudium et dolorem; si quaeratur electio, alterum petam, alterum vitabo.
But I answer this, that there is a very great difference between joy and pain; if choice were sought, I will seek the one, I will avoid the other.
Illud secundum naturam est, hoc contra.
The former is according to nature, the latter contrary to it.
Quamdiu sic aestimantur, magno inter se dissident spatio; cum ad virtutem ventum est, utraque par est et quae per laeta procedit et quae per tristia.
As long as they are valued thus, they differ from each other by a great space; but when we come to virtue, both are equal, both that which proceeds through joyful things and that which proceeds through sad things.
§66.20Nullum habet momentum vexatio et dolor et quicquid aliud incommodi est; virtute enim obruitur.
Vexation and pain and whatever other inconvenience there is have no weight; for they are overwhelmed by virtue.
Quemadmodum minuta lumina claritas solis obscurat, sic dolores, molestias, iniurias virtus magnitudine sua elidit atque opprimit et quocumque adfulsit, ibi quicquid sine illa apparet, extinguitur; nec magis ullam portionem habent incommoda, cum in virtutem inciderunt, quam in mari nimbus.
Just as the brightness of the sun obscures tiny lights, so virtue by its greatness crushes and oppresses pains, annoyances, and injuries, and wherever it shines, whatever appears without it is extinguished there; nor do inconveniences have any more portion, when they fall into virtue, than a storm cloud in the sea.
§66.21Hoc ut scias ita esse, ad omne pulchrum vir bonus sine ulla cunctatione procurret; stet illic licet carnifex, stet tortor atque ignis, perseverabit nec quid passurus, sed quid facturus sit, aspiciet, et se honestae rei tamquam bono viro credet; utilem illam sibi iudicabit, tutam, prosperam.
That you may know this to be so, the good man will run forward to every beautiful thing without any hesitation; though the executioner stand there, though the torturer and fire stand there, he will persevere and will look not at what he is to suffer, but at what he is to do, and he will trust himself to the honorable thing as if to a good man; he will judge it useful to himself, safe, prosperous.
Eundem locum habebit apud illum honesta res, sed tristis atque aspera, quem vir bonus pauper aut exul ac pallidus.
An honorable thing, though sad and harsh, will have the same place with him as a poor or exiled and pale good man.
§66.22Agedum pone ex alia parte virum bonum divitiis abundantem, ex altera nihil habentem, sed in se omnia; uterque aeque vir bonus erit, etiam si fortuna dispari utetur.
Come now, place on one side a good man abounding in riches, on the other one having nothing but all things in himself; both will be equally a good man, even if they use unequal fortune.
Idem, ut dixi, in rebus iudicium est, quod in hominibus: aeque laudabilis virtus est in corpore valido ac libero posita quam in morbido ac vincto.
The same judgment, as I have said, is in things as in men: virtue placed in a healthy and free body is equally praiseworthy as in a sick and bound one.
§66.23Ergo tuam quoque virtutem non magis laudabis, si corpus illi tuum integrum fortuna praestiterit quam si ex aliqua parte mutilatum; alioqui hoc erit ex servorum habitu dominum aestimare.
Therefore, you will not praise your own virtue any more if fortune has provided an intact body to it than if it is mutilated in some part; otherwise, this will be to value the master from the condition of the slaves.
Omnia enim ista, in quae dominium casus exercet, serva sunt, pecunia et corpus et honores, inbecilla, fluida, mortalia, possessionis incertae.
For all those things over which chance exercises dominion are slaves—money, body, honors—weak, fluid, mortal, of uncertain possession.
Illa rursus libera et invicta opera virtutis, quae non ideo magis adpetenda sunt, si benignius a fortuna tractantur, nec minus, si aliqua iniquitate rerum premuntur.
On the other hand, those works of virtue are free and unconquered, which are not to be sought any more on that account if they are treated more kindly by fortune, nor any less if they are pressed by some unfairness of things.
§66.24Quod amicitia in hominibus est, hoc in rebus adpetitio.
What friendship is in men, this desire is in things.
Non, puto, magis amares virum bonum locupletem quam pauperem, nec robustum et lacertosum quam gracilem et languidi corporis; ergo ne rem quidem magis adpetes aut amabis hilarem ac pacatam quam distractam et operosam.
You would not, I think, love a rich good man more than a poor one, nor a strong and muscular one more than a slender one of weak body; therefore, you will not desire or love a cheerful and peaceful thing any more than a distracted and troublesome one.
§66.25Aut si hoc est, magis diliges ex duobus aeque bonis viris nitidum et unctum quam pulverulentum et horrentem.
Or if this is so, you will love more, of two equally good men, the neat and anointed one than the dusty and unkempt one.
Deinde hoc usque pervenies, ut magis diligas integrum omnibus membris et inlaesum quam debilem aut luscum.
Then you will arrive even at this, that you love more the one who is intact in all his limbs and uninjured than the weak or one-eyed one.
Paulatim fastidium tuum illo usque procedet, ut ex duobus aeque iustis ac prudentibus comatum et crispulum malis.
Gradually your fastidiousness will proceed so far that, of two equally just and prudent men, you prefer the one with long hair and curly hair.
Ubi par in utroque virtus est, non conparet aliarum rerum inaequalitas.
Where virtue is equal in both, the inequality of other things does not appear.
Omnia enim alia non partes, sed accessiones sunt.
For all other things are not parts, but additions.