§66.9Omnis sine modo est virtus; modo certa mensura est.
Every virtue is without limit; for limit is a certain measure.
Constantia non habet, quo procedat, non magis quam fiducia aut veritas aut fides.
Constancy has no point to which it may advance, no more than confidence, truth, or fidelity.
Quid accedere perfecto potest? Nihil, aut perfectum non erat, cui accessit.
What can be added to the perfect? Nothing; otherwise, that to which it was added was not perfect.
Ergo ne virtuti quidem, cui si quid adici potest, defuit.
Therefore, not even to virtue [can anything be added]; if anything can be added to it, it was lacking.
Honestum quoque nullam accessionem recipit; honestum est enim propter ista, quae rettuli.
The honorable also admits no addition; for it is honorable on account of those things which I have mentioned.
Quid porro? Decorum et iustum et legitimum non eiusdem esse formae putas, certis terminis conprensum? Crescere posse inperfectae rei signum est.
What further? Do you not think that the decorous, the just, and the lawful are of the same form, enclosed within certain limits? To be able to grow is a sign of an imperfect thing.
§66.10Bonum omne in easdem cadit leges; iuncta est privata et publica utilitas, tam mehercules quam inseparabile est laudandum petendumque.
Every good falls under the same laws; private and public utility are joined, as inseparably, by Hercules, as what is praiseworthy and what is to be sought.
Ergo virtutes inter se pares sunt et opera virtutis et omnes homines, quibus illae configere.
Therefore, virtues are equal among themselves, and so are the works of virtue, and all men to whom those virtues have fallen.
§66.11Satorum vero animaliumque virtutes cum mortales sint, fragiles quoque caducaeque sunt et incertae.
But the virtues of plants and animals, since they are mortal, are also fragile, fleeting, and uncertain.
Exibunt residuntque et ideo non eodem pretio aestimantur; una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula.
They rise and subside, and therefore are not valued at the same price; one rule is applied to human virtues.
Una enim est ratio recta simplexque.
For right reason is one and simple.
Nihil est divino divinius, caelesti caelestius.
Nothing is more divine than the divine, more celestial than the celestial.
§66.12Mortalia minuuntur, cadunt, deteruntur, crescunt, exhauriuntur, inplentur.
Mortal things decrease, fall, wear away, grow, are emptied, are filled.
Itaque illis in tam incerta sorte inaequalitas est; divinorum una natura est.
Therefore, in so uncertain a lot, there is inequality among them; the nature of divine things is one.
Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa.
Reason, moreover, is nothing other than a part of the divine spirit merged into a human body.
Si ratio divina est, nullum autem bonum sine ratione est, bonum omne divinum est.
If reason is divine, and no good is without reason, every good is divine.
Nullum porro inter divina discrimen est; ergo nec inter bona.
Furthermore, there is no distinction among divine things; therefore, none among goods either.
Paria itaque sunt et gaudium et fortis atque obstinata tormentorum perpessio; in utroque enim eadem est animi magnitudo, in altero remissa et laeta, in altera pugnax et intenta.
Therefore, both joy and the brave and obstinate endurance of tortures are equal; for in both, the greatness of soul is the same, in the one relaxed and cheerful, in the other combative and intent.
§66.13Quid? Tu non putas parem esse virtutem eius, qui fortiter hostium moenia expugnat, et eius, qui obsidionem patientissime sustinet? Magnus Scipio, qui Numantiam cludit et conprimit cogitque invictas manus in exitium ipsas suum verti; magnus ille obsessorum animus, qui scit non esse elusam, cui mors aperta est, et in complexu libertatis expirat.
What? Do you not think that the virtue of him who bravely storms the enemy's walls is equal to that of him who endures a siege with the greatest patience? Great is Scipio, who encloses and compresses Numantia and forces unconquered hands to turn themselves to their own destruction; great is that spirit of the besieged, who knows that for him to whom death is open, liberty is not cheated, and who expires in the embrace of liberty.
Aeque reliqua quoque inter se paria sunt, tranquillitas, simplicitas, liberalitas, constantia, aequanimitas, tolerantia.
Equally, the rest are also equal among themselves: tranquility, simplicity, liberality, constancy, equanimity, tolerance.
Omnibus enim istis una virtus subest, quae animum rectum et indeclinabilem praestat.
For beneath all these lies a single virtue, which renders the mind straight and unswerving.
§66.14"Quid ergo? Nihil interest inter gaudium et dolorum inflexibilem patientiam?" Nihil, quantum ad ipsas virtutes; plurimum inter illa, in quibus virtus utraque ostenditur.
“What then? Is there no difference between joy and the unbending endurance of pain?” None, as far as the virtues themselves are concerned; but a great deal between those things in which each virtue is shown.
In altero enim naturalis est animi remissio ae laxitas, in altero contra naturam dolor.
For in the one there is a natural relaxation and ease of the mind, in the other a pain contrary to nature.
Itaque media sunt haec, quae plurimum intervalli recipiunt; virtus in utroque par est.
Therefore, these are indifferent things, which admit a very great interval; but virtue is equal in both.
§66.15Virtutem materia non mutat; nec peiorem facit dura ac difficilis, nec meliorem hilaris et laeta.
Matter does not change virtue; neither does harsh and difficult matter make it worse, nor does cheerful and joyful matter make it better.
Necesse est ergo par sit.
It is necessary, therefore, that it be equal.
In utraque enim quod fit, aeque recte fit, aeque prudenter, aeque honeste.
For what is done in both is done equally rightly, equally prudently, equally honorably.
Ergo aequalia sunt bona, ultra quae nec hic potest se melius in hoc gaudio gerere nec ille melius in illis cruciatibus.
Therefore, those goods are equal, beyond which neither this man can conduct himself better in this joy, nor that man better in those tortures.
Duo autem, quibus nihil fieri melius potest, paria sunt.
Moreover, two things than which nothing can be done better, are equal.
§66.16Nam si, quae extra virtutem posita sunt, aut minuere illam aut augere possunt, desinit unum bonum esse, quod honestum.
For if those things which are placed outside virtue can either decrease or increase it, that which is the honorable ceases to be the sole good.
Si hoc concesseris, omne honestum perit.
If you grant this, all that is honorable perishes.
Quare? Dicam: quia nihil honestum est, quod ab invito, quod coactum fit.
Why? I will tell you: because nothing is honorable which is done by one who is unwilling, or which is coerced.
Omne honestum voluntarium est.
All that is honorable is voluntary.
Admisce illi pigritiam, querellam, tergiversationem, metum; quod habet in se optimum, perdidit, sibi placere.
Mix with it laziness, complaint, hesitation, fear; it has lost what it has best in itself, namely, to please itself.
Non potest honestum esse, quod non est liberum; nam quod timet, servit.
That which is not free cannot be honorable; for that which fears, serves.