§66.26Num quis tam iniquam censuram inter suos agit, ut sanum filium quam aegrum magis diligat, procerumve et excelsum quam brevem aut modicum? Fetus suos non distinguunt ferae et se in alimentum pariter omnium sternunt; aves ex aequo partiuntur cibos.
Does anyone pass so unjust a judgment among his own children as to love a healthy son more than a sick one, or a tall and towering one more than a short or ordinary one? Wild beasts do not distinguish their offspring and lay themselves down for the nourishment of all alike; birds divide their food equally.
Vlixes ad Ithacae suae saxa sic properat, quemadmodum Agamemnon ad Mycenarum nobiles muros.
Ulysses hastens to the rocks of his Ithaca in the same way as Agamemnon to the noble walls of Mycenae.
Nemo enim patriam quia magna est amat, sed quia sua.
For no one loves his country because it is great, but because it is his own.
§66.27Quorsus haec pertinent? Ut scias virtutem omnia opera velut fetus suos isdem oculis intueri, aeque indulgere omnibus et quidem inpensius laborantibus, quoniam quidem etiam parentium amor magis in ea, quorum miseretur, inclinat.
What is the point of these things? That you may know that virtue looks upon all its works with the same eyes as if they were its offspring, showing equal indulgence to all, and indeed more intensely to those that are struggling, since indeed even parents' love inclines more toward those for whom they feel pity.
Virtus quoque opera sua, quae videt adfici et premi, non magis amat, sed parentium bonorum more magis conplectitur ac fovet.
Virtue also does not love its works which it sees afflicted and oppressed any more, but in the manner of good parents embraces and cherishes them more.
§66.28Quare non est ullum bonum altero maius? Quia non est quicquam apto aptius, quia plano nihil est planius.
Why is no good greater than another? Because there is nothing more fitting than what is fitting, because nothing is flatter than what is flat.
Non potes dicere hoc magis par esse alicui quam illud; ergo nec honesto honestius quicquam est.
You cannot say that this is more equal to something than that; therefore neither is anything more honorable than the honorable.
§66.29Quod si par omnium virtutum natura est, tria genera bonorum in aequo sunt.
But if the nature of all virtues is equal, the three classes of goods are on an equal footing.
Ita dico: in aequo est moderate gaudere et moderate dolere.
I say this: it is on an equal footing to rejoice moderately and to suffer pain moderately.
Laetitia illa non vincit hanc animi firmitatem sub tortore gemitus devorantem; illa bona optabilia, haec mirabilia sunt, utraque nihilominus paria, quia quidquid incommodi est, vi tanto maioris boni tegitur.
That joy does not surpass this firmness of mind which swallows down groans under the torturer; the former are desirable goods, the latter admirable, both nonetheless equal, because whatever inconvenience there is, is covered by the power of a so much greater good.
§66.30Quisquis haec inparia iudicat, ab ipsis virtutibus avertit oculos et exteriore circumspicit; bona vera idem pendent, idem patent.
Whoever judges these to be unequal turns his eyes away from the virtues themselves and looks around at externals; true goods have the same weight, the same openness.
Illa falsa multum habent vani.
Those false goods have much emptiness.
Itaque speciosa et magna contra visentibus, cum ad pondus revocata sunt, fallunt.
Therefore, though beautiful and great to those looking at them from opposite, when they are brought back to the scale of weight, they deceive.
§66.31Ita est, mi Lucili; quicquid vera ratio commendat, solidum et aeternum est, firmat animum attollitque semper futurum in excelso; illa quae temere laudantur et vulgi sententia bona sunt, inflant inanibus laetos.
So it is, my Lucilius; whatever true reason commends is solid and eternal, strengthens the mind and lifts it up, destined to remain always on high; those things which are praised rashly and are goods in the opinion of the crowd puff up with empty things those who rejoice.
Rursus ea, quae Minentur tamquam mala. iniciunt formidinem mentibus et illas non aliter quam animalia species periculi agitant.
On the other hand, those things which threaten as if they were evils inject fear into minds, and shake them no differently than the appearance of danger agitates beasts.
§66.32Utraque ergo res sine causa animum et diffundit et mordet; nec illa gaudio nec haec metu digna est.
Therefore both things without cause both relax and bite the mind; neither is the former worthy of joy nor the latter of fear.
Sola ratio inmutabilis et iudicii tenax est.
Reason alone is unchangeable and tenacious of its judgment.
Non enim servit, sed imperat sensibus.
For it does not serve, but commands the senses.
Ratio rationi par est, sicut rectum recto; ergo et virtus virtuti.
Reason is equal to reason, just as the straight is to the straight; therefore also virtue is to virtue.
Virtus non aliud quam recta ratio est.
Virtue is nothing other than right reason.
Omnes virtutes rationes sunt.
All virtues are reasons.
Rationes sunt, si rectae sunt.
They are reasons, if they are right.
Si rectae sunt, et pares sunt.
If they are right, they are also equal.
§66.33Qualis ratio est, tales et actiones sunt; ergo omnes pares sunt.
As reason is, so also are actions; therefore all are equal.
Nam cum similes rationi sint, similes et inter se sunt.
For since they are similar to reason, they are also similar to one another.
Pares autem actiones inter se esse dico, qua honestae rectaeque sunt.
But I say that actions are equal to one another in so far as they are honorable and right.
Ceterum magna habebunt discrimina variante materia, quae modo latior est, modo angustior, modo inlustris, modo ignobilis, modo ad multos pertinens, modo ad paucos.
Otherwise, they will have great differences as the material varies, which is now broader, now narrower, now illustrious, now ignoble, now pertaining to many, now to few.
In omnibus tamen istis id, quod optimum est, par est; honestae sunt.
Yet in all these, that which is best is equal; they are honorable.
§66.34Tamquam viri boni omnes pares sunt, qua boni sunt.
Just as all good men are equal, in so far as they are good.
Sed habent differentias aetatis: alius senior est, alius iuvenior; habent corporis: alius formosus, alius deformis est; habent fortunae: ille dives, hic pauper est, ille gratiosus, potens, urbibus notus et populis, hic ignotus plerisque et obscurus.
But they have differences of age: one is older, another younger; they have differences of body: one is beautiful, another is deformed; they have differences of fortune: that one is rich, this one poor; that one is influential, powerful, known to cities and peoples, this one unknown to most and obscure.
Sed per illud, quo boni sunt, pares sunt.
But through that by which they are good, they are equal.