§7.3.18aut, cum finitionem praecedit probatio, ut rei Philippicis Cicero Servium Sulpicium occisum ab Antonio colligit et rei clausula demum ita finit: is enim profecto mortem attulit qui causa mortis fuit. non negaverim tamen haec quoque, ut expediet causae, esse facienda, et si quando firme comprehendi poterit brevi complexu verborum finitio, esse id tum elegans tum etiam fortissimum, si modo erit illa inexpugnabilis.
Or, when proof precedes definition, as Cicero in the Philippics infers that Servius Sulpicius was killed by Antony, and at last in the conclusion defines it thus: 'for he indeed brought death who was the cause of death.' I would not, however, deny that these things also ought to be done, as it will be expedient for the case; and if ever a definition can be firmly grasped in a brief compass of words, it is then both elegant and also most powerful, provided only that it is irreproachable.
§7.3.19eius certus ordo est, quid sit, an hoc sit.
Its established order is: what it is, and whether this is it.
et rei hoc fere labor maior est, ut finitionem confirmes, quam ut rei rein finitionem applices.
And in this, the labor is almost greater to establish a definition than to apply a definition to the matter.
in eo, quid sit, duplex opus est. nam et nostra confirmanda est et adversae partis destruenda finitio.
In that question, 'what it is,' there is a double task; for we must both establish our own definition and destroy that of the opposing party.
§7.3.20ideoque rei schola, ubi nobis ipsi fingimus contradictionem, duos ponere debemus fines, quales utrinque esse optimi poterunt.
And therefore in the school, where we ourselves invent the contradiction, we ought to set up two definitions, such as may be the best on both sides.
at rei foro providendum, num forte supervacua et nihil ad causam pertinens an ambigua an contraria an communis sit finitio; quorum nihil accidere nisi agentis culpa potest.
But in the forum, care must be taken lest by chance the definition be superfluous and nothing to the purpose of the case, or ambiguous, or contradictory, or common; none of which can happen except by the fault of the pleader.
§7.3.21ut recte autem finiamus, ita fiet, si prius rei animo constituerimus quid velimus efficere.
But that we may define correctly, it will be so done if we have first determined in our mind what we want to effect.
sic enim accommodari ad voluntatem verba poterunt.
For in this way, words can be accommodated to our will.
atque ut a notissimo exemplo, quo sit res lucidior, non recedamus: qui privatam pecuniam de templo surripuit, sacrilegii reus est.
And, that we may not depart from the most well-known example, by which the matter may be clearer: he who stole private money from a temple is accused of sacrilege.
§7.3.22culpa manifesta est; quaestio est an huic crimini nomen quod est rei lege conveniat.
The guilt is manifest; the question is whether the name which is in the law fits this crime.
ergo ambigitur an hoc sacrilegium sit? accusator, quia de templo surrepta sit pecunia, utitur hoc nomine.
Therefore, is it disputed whether this is sacrilege? The accuser, because the money was stolen from the temple, uses this name.
reus, quia privatam surripuerit, negat esse sacrilegium sed furtum fatetur.
The defendant, because he stole private money, denies that it is sacrilege, but confesses to theft.
actor ergo ita finiet, sacrilegium est surripere aliquid de sacro; Reus, sacrilegium est surripere aliquid sacri. uterque finitionem alterius impugnat.
The prosecutor, therefore, will define it thus: 'sacrilege is to steal something from a sacred place'; the defendant: 'sacrilege is to steal something sacred.' Each attacks the definition of the other.
§7.3.23ea duobus generibus evertitur, si aut falsa est aut parum plena.
It is overthrown in two ways: if it is either false or not full enough.
nam illud tertium nisi stultis non accidit, ut nihil ad quaestionem pertineat.
For that third thing, that it belongs nothing to the question, does not happen except to fools.
§7.3.24Hic reus falsam dicit esse finitionem accusatoris, accusator autem non potest dicere falsam rei; nam est sacrilegium surripere aliquid sacri; sed dicit parum plenam, adiiciendum enim aut ex sacro.
Here the defendant says that the definition of the accuser is false, but the accuser cannot say that the definition of the defendant is false; for it is sacrilege to steal something sacred; but he says it is not full enough, for 'or from a sacred place' ought to be added.
§7.3.25maximus autem usus rei approbando refellendoque fine propriorum ac differentium, nonnunquam etiam etymologiae.
But the greatest use in establishing and refuting a definition belongs to properties and differences, and sometimes also to etymology.
quae tamen omnia, sicut rei ceteris, confirmat aequitas, nonnunquam et coniectura mentis.
Yet all these, as in other matters, are supported by equity, and sometimes also by the conjecture of the mind.
etymologia maxime rare est: quid enim est aliud tumultus, nisi perturbatio tanta, ut maior timor oriatur? unde etiam nomen ductum est tumultus.
Etymology is extremely rare: for what else is 'tumultus' (tumult) but so great a disturbance that a greater fear arises? Whence also the name 'tumultus' is derived.
§7.3.26circa propria ac differentia magna subtilitas, ut cum quaeritur an addictus, quem lex servire, donec solverit, iubet, servus sit.
There is great subtlety regarding properties and differences, as when it is asked whether an 'addictus' (debt-bondsman), whom the law orders to serve until he pays, is a slave.
altera pars finit ita, servus est, qui est iure rei servitute; altera, qui rei seruitute est eo iure, quo servus, aut, ut antiqui dixerunt, qui servitutem servit. quae finitio, etiamsi distat aliquo, nisi tamen propriis et differentibus adiuvatur, inanis est.
One party defines it thus: 'a slave is one who is legally in servitude'; the other: 'one who is in servitude by that law by which a slave is,' or, as the ancients said, 'who serves a servitude.' Which definition, even if it differs in some degree, is nevertheless useless unless it is aided by properties and differences.