§7.3.27dicet enim adversarius, servire eum servitutem aut eo iure quo servum.
For the opponent will say that he serves a servitude, or under that law by which a slave does.
videamus ergo propria et differentia, quae libro quinto leviter rei transitu attigeram.
Let us therefore look at properties and differences, which I had lightly touched upon in passing in the fifth book.
servus, cum manumittitur, fit libertinus, addictus recepta libertate ingenuus; servus invito domino libertatem non consequetur, addictus soluendo citra voluntatem domini consequetur: ad servum nulla lex pertinet, addictus legem habet.
A slave, when he is manumitted, becomes a freedman, while a debt-bondsman, upon recovering his liberty, becomes free-born; a slave will not obtain liberty against the will of his master, but an debt-bondsman will obtain it by paying without the master's consent: no law applies to a slave, but an debt-bondsman has a law.
propria liberi, quod nemo habet nisi liber, praenomen, nomen, cognomen, tribum; habet haec addictus.
Properties of a free man, which no one has unless he is free, are the praenomen, nomen, cognomen, and tribe; a debt-bondsman has these.
§7.3.28excusso quid sit, prope peracta est quaestio, an hoc sit.
Once 'what it is' has been examined, the question 'whether this is it' is almost finished.
id enim agimus ut sit causae nostrae conveniens finitio.
For we are striving that there may be a definition suitable to our case.
potentissima est autem rei ea qualitas, an amor insania. huc pertinebunt probationes, quas Cicero dicit proprias esse finitionis, ex antecedentibus, consequentibus, adiunctis, repugnantibus, causis, effectis, similibus; de quorum argumentorum natura dictum est.
But most powerful is that quality, as 'whether love is madness.' To this will belong the proofs, which Cicero says are proper to definition, from antecedents, consequents, adjuncts, repugnants, causes, effects, and similars; concerning the nature of which arguments has been spoken.
§7.3.29breviter autem pro Caecina Cicero initia, causas, effecta, antecedentia, consequentia complexus est: quid igitur fugiebant? propter metum Quid metuebant? vim videlicet.
But briefly in the defense of Caecina, Cicero embraced beginnings, causes, effects, antecedents, and consequents: 'Why then did they flee? Through fear. What did they fear? Violence, obviously.
potestis igitur principia negare, cum extrema concedatis? sed similitudine quoque usus est, quae vis rei bello appellatur, ea rei otio non appellabitur? §7.3.30sed etiam ex contrario argumenta ducuntur, ut si quaeratur, amatorium venenum sit necne; quia venenum amatorium non sit.
Can you then deny the beginnings, when you concede the ends?' But he also made use of similarity: 'Shall that which is called violence in war, not be called so in peace?' But arguments are also drawn from the contrary, as if it is asked whether a love-potion is poison or not; because a love-potion is not poison.
illud alterum genus quo sit manifestius adolescentibus meis (meos enim semper adolescentes putabo), hic quoque fictae controversiae utar exemplo.
That the other class may be more manifest to my young men (for I shall always consider them my young men), here too I will use an example of a fictional controversy.
§7.3.31iuvenes, qui convivere solebant, constituerunt, ut rei litore cenarent.
Some young men, who were accustomed to feast together, decided to dine on the shore.
unius, qui cenae defuerat, nomen tumulo, quem exstruxerant, inscripserunt.
They inscribed the name of one who had been absent from the dinner on a mound they had constructed.
pater eius, a transmarina peregrinatione cum ad litus idem appulisset, lecto nomine suspendit se.
His father, on landing at that same shore after a journey across the sea, read the name and hanged himself.
§7.3.32dicuntur ii causa mortis fuisse.
They are said to have been the cause of death.
hic finitio est accusatoris, per quem factum est, ut quis perierit, causa mortis est; rei est, qui fecit quid sciens, per quod perire homini necesse est. remota finitione accusatori sat est dicere, causa mortis fuistis; per vos enim factum est, ut homo periret; quia, nisi vos illud fecissetis, viveret. §7.3.33contra, Non statim, per quem factum est, ut quis periret, is damnari debet, ut accusator, testis, iudex rei capitalis.
Here the definition of the accuser is: 'he through whom it was brought about that someone perished is the cause of death'; that of the defendant is: 'he who knowingly did something by which it was necessary for a person to perish.' If the definition is removed, it is enough for the accuser to say: 'you were the cause of death; for through you it was brought about that the man perished; because, if you had not done that, he would be alive.' On the other hand: 'Not immediately is he through whom it was brought about that someone perished to be condemned, as the accuser, the witness, and the judge in a capital trial.
nec undecunque causa fluxit, ibi culpa est: ut si quis profectionem suaserit aut amicum arcessierit trans mare et is naufragio perierit, ad cenam invitarit et is cruditate illic contracta decesserit. §7.3.34nec fuerit rei causa mortis solum adolescentium factum sed credulitas senis, rei dolore ferundo infirmitas; denique, si fortior fuisset aut prudentior, uiueret.
Nor wherever the cause flowed from, there is the fault: as if someone advised a journey, or summoned a friend across the sea and he perished in a shipwreck, or invited him to dinner and he died of indigestion contracted there.' 'Nor was the cause of death only the act of the young men, but the credulity of the old man, and his weakness in bearing grief; in short, if he had been stronger or wiser, he would be alive.
nec mala mente fecerunt; et ille potuit vel ex loco tumuli vel ex opere tumultuario suspicari non esse monumentum.
Nor did they act with an evil mind; and he was able to suspect, either from the position of the mound or from its hasty construction, that it was not a real tomb.
qui ergo puniri debent, rei quibus omnia absunt homicidae praeter manum? §7.3.35est interim certa finitio, de qua inter utramnque partem convenit: ut Cicero dicit, maiestas est rei imperii atque rei nominis populi Romani dignitate. quaeritur tamen, an maiestas minuta sit, ut rei causa Cornelii quaesitum est.
Why then should they be punished, from whom all the characteristics of a murderer are absent except for the hand?' There is sometimes a certain definition agreed upon between both parties: as Cicero says, 'Majesty is the dignity of the empire and the name of the Roman people.' Yet it is asked whether majesty has been diminished, as was questioned in the case of Cornelius.
sed hic etiamsi videri potest finitiva, tamen quia de finitione non ambigitur, iudicatio est qualitatis atque ad eum potius status reducenda, ad cuius forte quidem venimus mentionem, sed erat ordine proximus locus.
But here, although it can seem to belong to definition, yet because the definition is not disputed, the decision is one of quality, and should rather be referred to that status of which we have happened indeed to make mention, but which was the next place in order.