§7.3.10interim quaeritur rei rebus specie diversis, an et hoc et hoc eodem modo sit appellandum, cum res utraque habet suum nomen, ut amatorium, venenum.
Sometimes it is asked, in things different in species, whether both this and that should be called by the same name, when both things have their own name, as a love-potion and a poison.
in omnibus autem huius generis litibus quaeritur, an etiam hoc, quia nomen de quo ambigitur utique rei alia re certum est.
But in all lawsuits of this kind, it is asked whether this also is so, because the name in dispute is certainly established in another thing.
sacrilegium est rem sacram de templo surripere: an et privatam? adulterium cum aliena uxore domi coire: an et rei lupanari? tyrannicidium occidere tyrannum: an et rei mortem compellere?
Sacrilege is to steal a sacred thing from a temple; is it also to steal a private one? Adultery is to copulate with another's wife at home; is it also to do so in a brothel? Tyrannicide is to kill a tyrant; is it also to compel him to death?
§7.3.11ideoque συλλογισμός de quo postea dicam, velut infirmior est finitio, quia rei hac quaeritur, an idem sit huius rei nomen quod alterius, illo, an proinde habenda sit haec atque illa.
And therefore, the syllogism, of which I shall speak later, is, as it were, a weaker definition; because in this latter (definition) it is asked whether the name of this thing is the same as that of the other, whereas in the former (syllogism) it is asked whether this thing ought to be treated in the same manner as that.
est et talis finitionum diversitas, §7.3.12ut qui idem sentiant, non iisdem verbis comprehendant: ut rhetorice bene dicendi scientia, et eadem bene inveniendi et bene enuntiandi et dicendi secundum virtutem orationis et dicendi quod sit officii. atque providendum ut, si sensu non pugnant, comprehensione dissentiant.
There is also such a diversity of definitions, that those who think the same thing do not express it in the same words; as, for instance, rhetoric is 'the science of speaking well,' and the same is 'the science of inventing well and expressing well,' and 'speaking according to the virtue of speech,' and 'speaking what is of duty.' And care must be taken that, if they do not conflict in meaning, they may yet differ in expression.
sed de his disputatur, non litigatur.
But about these things there is academic discussion, not litigation.
§7.3.13opus est aliquando finitione obscurioribus et ignotioribus verbis ut, quid sit clarigatio, erctum citum: interim notis nomine verbis, quid sit penus, quid litus.
Sometimes there is need of definition for obscure and less-known words, such as what 'clarigatio' or 'erctum citum' is; at other times for words well known by name, such as what 'penus' or 'litus' is.
quae varietas efficit, ut eam quidam coniecturae, quidam qualitati, quidam legitimis quaestionibus subiecerint.
This variety has caused some to subject definition to conjecture, some to quality, and some to legal questions.
§7.3.14quibusdam ne placuit quidem omnino subtilis haec et ad morem dialecticorum formata conclusio, ut rei disputationibus potius arguta verborum cavillatrix quam rei oratoris officio multum adlatura momenti.
To some, indeed, this subtle conclusion, formed after the manner of the dialecticians, did not please at all, as being a clever caviler of words in disputations rather than something that would bring much weight to the duty of an orator.
licet enim valeat rei sermone tantum, ut constrictum vinculis suis eum qui responsurus est vel tacere vel etiam invitum id quod sit contra cogat fateri, non eadem est tamen eius rei causis utilitas.
For although it may have so much power in conversation that it binds the person who is to answer with its chains, forcing him either to be silent or even against his will to confess that which is contrary, yet the utility of that thing in lawsuits is not the same.
§7.3.15persuadendum enim iudici est, qui etiamsi verbis devinctus est, tamen, nisi ipsi rei accesserit, tacitus dissentiet.
For the judge must be persuaded, who, even if he is bound by words, will nevertheless, unless he has come to agree on the matter itself, silently dissent.
agenti vero quae tanta est huius praecisae comprehensionis necessitas? an, si non dixero, homo est animal mortale rationale, non potero, expositis tot corporis animique proprietatibus, latius oratione ducta, vel a dis eum vel a mutis discernere?
What great necessity, indeed, is there for this precise definition for one who is pleading? Or, if I do not say 'man is a mortal rational animal,' shall I not be able, after explaining so many properties of body and mind, and drawing out my speech more widely, to distinguish him either from the gods or from dumb beasts?
§7.3.16quid quod nec uno modo definitur res eadem (ut facit Cicero: quid est enim vulgo? universos) et latiore varioque tractatu, ut omnes oratores plerumque fecerunt? rarissima enim apud eos reperitur ilia ex consuetudine philosophorum ducta servitus ad certa se verba adstringendi, idque faciendum rei libris Ciceronis de Oratore vetat M. Antonius.
What of the fact that the same thing is defined not in one way only (as Cicero does: 'for what is "vulgus"? the whole body of people') but with a broader and more varied treatment, as all orators have for the most part done?
§7.3.17nam est etiam periculosum, cum, si uno verbo sit erratum, tota causa cecidisse videamur; optimaque est media illa via, qua utitur Cicero pro Caecina, ut res proponatur, verba non periclitentur. etenim, reciperatores, non ea sola vis est quae ad corpus nostrum vitamque pervenit, sed etiam multo maior ea quae periculo mortis iniecto formidine animum perterritum loco saepe et certo statu demovet.
For that servitude, derived from the custom of philosophers, of binding oneself to fixed words is very rarely found among them, and Marcus Antonius forbids doing this in Cicero's books 'On the Orator.' For it is also dangerous, since, if we err in a single word, we seem to have lost the whole case; and that middle way is the best, which Cicero uses in defense of Caecina, so that the matter may be proposed while the words are not endangered: 'For, gentlemen of the jury, that is not the only violence which reaches our body and life, but also that much greater violence which, by casting the danger of death, drives a mind terrified with fear from its place and established state.'