§6.3.80mendacium quoque mendacio, ut Galba, dicente quodam, victoriato se uno in Sicilia quinque pedes longam murenam emisse: nihil, inquit, mirum; nam ibi tam longae nascuntur, ut iis piscatores pro restibus cingantur. §6.3.81contraria est neganti confessionis simulatio, sed ipsa quoque multum habet urbanitatis.
A lie is also parried by a lie, as Galba, when someone said that he had bought a murena five feet long in Sicily for a single victoriatus: "Nothing to wonder at," he said, "for there they grow so long that the fishermen use them as belts instead of ropes." The opposite of denying is the pretense of confession, but this itself also has much wit.
sic Afer, cum ageret contra libertum Claudii Caesaris, et ex diverso quidam condicionis eiusdem, cuius erat litigator, exclamasset,
"praeterea tu semper in libertos Caesaris dicis,"
"nec mehercule, inquit, quicquam proficio. "
cui vicinum est non negare quod obiicitur, cum et id palam falsum est et inde materia bene respondendi datur: ut Catulus dicenti Philippo,
"quid latras?"
"furem video,"
inquit. §6.3.82in se dicere non fere est nisi scurrarum et in oratore utique minime probabile, quod fieri totidem modis quot in alios potest.
Thus Afer, when he was pleading against a freedman of Claudius Caesar, and someone from the opposing side of the same condition as the litigant exclaimed: "Furthermore, you are always speaking against Caesar's freedmen," replied: "By Hercules, and I achieve nothing." Close to this is not to deny what is charged, when it is both openly false and gives material for replying well: as Catulus to Philippus saying: "Why do you bark?" replied: "I see a thief." To speak against oneself is almost exclusive to buffoons and by no means appropriate for an orator, which can be done in as many ways as against others.
ideoque hoc, quamvis frequens sit, transeo.
And therefore, although this is frequent, I pass over it.
§6.3.83illud vero, etiamsi ridiculum est, indignum tamen est homine liberali, quod aut turpiter aut potenter dicitur; quod fecisse quendam scio, qui humiliori libere adversus se loquenti, colaphum, inquit, tibi ducam et formulam scribam, quod caput durum habeas. hic enim dubium est, utrum ridere audientes an indignari debuerint.
But that, even if it is ridiculous, is nevertheless unworthy of a free man, which is said either basely or powerfully; which I know a certain man to have done, who said to a person of lower station speaking freely against him: "I will deal you a blow and write a formula, because you have a hard head." For here it is doubtful whether the audience ought to have laughed or been indignant.
§6.3.84superest genus decipiendi opinionem aut dicta aliter intellegendi, quae sunt in omni hac materia vel venustissima.
There remains the genus of deceiving expectation or understanding sayings otherwise, which are the most elegant in all this matter.
inopinatum et a lacessente poni solet, quale est, quod refert Cicero, quid huic abest nisi res et virus? aut illud Afri, homo in agendis causis optime vestitus; et in occurrendo, ut Cicero, audita falsa Vatinii morte, cum obvium libertum eius interrogasset,
"rectene omnia?"
dicenti,
"recte,"
"mortuus est?" §6.3.85inquit. plurimus autem circa simulationem et dissimulationem risus est, quae sunt vicina et prope eadem; sed simulatio est certam opinionem animi sui imitantis, dissimulatio aliena se parum intelligere fingentis.
The unexpected is usually employed by the assailant, such as what Cicero reports: "What does this man lack except property and poison?" Or that of Afer: "A man best dressed in pleading cases." And in an unexpected meeting, as Cicero, having heard the false report of Vatinius's death, when he met his freedman and asked: "Is everything well?" to him saying: "Well," Cicero said: "Is he dead?" But the most laughter is about pretense (simulatio) and dissimulation (dissimulatio), which are close and almost the same; but pretense is of one imitating a certain opinion in his own mind, dissimulation of one feigning to understand little of another's business.
simulavit Afer, cum in causa subinde dicentibus Celsinam de re cognovisse, quae erat potens femina: quis est, inquit, iste? Celsinam enim videri sibi virum finxit.
Afer used pretense when, in a case where people repeatedly said that Celsina, who was an influential woman, had taken cognizance of the matter, he asked: "Who is that man?" For he feigned that Celsina seemed to him to be a man.
§6.3.86dissimulavit Cicero, cum Sex. Annalis testis reum laesisset, et instaret identidem accusator ei, dic, M. Tulli, numquid potes de Sex. Annali? versus enim dicere coepit de libro Ennii annali sexto:
"
quis potis ingentis causas evolvere belli?
" §6.3.87cui sine dubio frequentissimam dat occasionem ambiguitas: ut Cascellio, qui consultatori dicenti,
"navem lividere volo,"
"perdes,"
inquit. sed averti intellectus et aliter solet, cum ab asperioribus ad leniora deflectitur: ut qui interrogatus, quid sentiret de eo, qui in adulterio deprehensus esset, tardum fuisse respondit.
Cicero used dissimulation when Sextus Annalis, as a witness, had harmed the defendant, and the accuser repeatedly pressed him: "Say, Marcus Tullius, can you say anything of Sextus Annalis?" For he began to recite verses from the sixth book of the Annals of Ennius: "Who is able to unfold the causes of a mighty war?" To which ambiguity, without doubt, gives the most frequent opportunity: as to Cascellius, who, to a client saying: "I want to divide my ship," replied: "You will lose it." But understanding is also accustomed to be diverted in another way, when it is deflected from harsher to gentler things: as he who, being asked what he thought of one who had been caught in adultery, replied that he had been slow.
§6.3.88ei confine est, quod dicitur per suspicionem: quale illud apud Ciceronem querenti, quod uxor sua ex fico sese suspendisset, rogo, des mihi surculum ex illa arbore, ut inseram; intelligitur enim quod non dicitur.
Bordering on this is what is said by hint (suspicion): like that in Cicero, to one complaining that his wife had hanged herself from a fig tree: "Please, give me a shoot from that tree, so that I may graft it." For what is not said is understood.
§6.3.89et hercule omnis salse dicendi ratio in eo est, ut aliter quam est rectum verumque dicatur: quod fit totum fingendis aut nostris aut alienis persuasionibus aut dicendo quod fieri non potest.
And by Hercules, the whole method of witty speaking consists in saying something otherwise than what is straight and true: which is done entirely by feigning either our own or others' beliefs, or by saying what cannot happen.
§6.3.90alienam finxit Iuba, qui querenti, quod ab equo suo esset aspersus, quid? Tu, inquit, me Hippocentaurum putas? suam C. Cassius, qui militi sine gladio decurrenti, Heus, commilito, pugno bene uteris, inquit. et Galba de piscibus, qui cum pridie ex parte adesi et versati postera die appositi essent, festinemus, alii subcenant, inquit. tertium illud Cicero, ut dixi, adversus Curium; fieri enim certe non poterat ut, cum declamaret, natus non esset.
Juba feigned another's belief, who to one complaining that he had been splashed by his horse, said: "What? Do you think me a Hippocentaur?" Gaius Cassius feigned his own, who said to a soldier charging without a sword: "Hey, comrade, you make good use of your fist." And Galba about the fish, which, when they had been partly eaten the day before, and turned over and served the next day: "Let us hasten," he said, "others are dining underneath." The third is that of Cicero, as I said, against Curius; for it certainly could not happen that, when he was declaiming, he had not been born.