§6.2.9sed ipsam rei naturam spectanti mihi non tam mores significari videntur quam morum quaedam proprietas; nam ipsis quidem omnis habitus mentis continetur.
But to me, looking at the very nature of the matter, it seems that not so much character in general is signified by the word "mores" as a certain property of character; for by the word itself, every habit of the mind is contained.
cautiores voluntatem complecti quam nomina interpretari maluerunt.
The more cautious preferred to embrace the concept of disposition rather than to interpret the names.
adfectus igitur πάθος concitatos, Ἦθος mites atque compositos esse dixerunt; in altero vehementer commotos, in altero lenes; denique hos imperare, illos persuadere; hos ad perturbationem, illos ad benivolentiam praevalere.
Therefore, they said that pathos consists of excited emotions, and ethos of mild and composed ones; in the one they are vehemently stirred, in the other gentle; finally, the former command, the latter persuade; the former prevail in producing agitation, the latter in producing goodwill.
adiiciunt quidam? Ἦθος perpetuum, πάθος temporale esse.
Some add that ethos is permanent, while pathos is temporary.
quod ut accidere frequentius fateor, ita nonnullas credo esse materias, quae continuum desiderent adfectum.
While I admit that this happens more frequently, yet I believe there are some subjects which require a continuous emotion.
nec tamen minus artis aut usus hi leniores habent, virium atque impetus non tantundem exigunt.
Nor do these gentler emotions possess less of art or experience, although they do not demand the same amount of strength and impulse.
in causis vero etiam pluribus versantur, immo secundum quendam intellectum in omnibus.
Indeed, they are employed in even more cases, or rather, according to a certain understanding, in all of them.
§6.2.11nam cum ex illo ethico loco nihil non ab oratore tractetur, quidquid de honestis et utilibus, denique faciendis et non faciendis dicitur, Ἦθος vocari potest.
For since nothing from that ethical topic is not treated by the orator, whatever is said about things honorable and useful, and finally about what is to be done and not to be done, can be called ethos.
quidam commendationem atque excusationem propria huius officii putauerunt, nec abnuo esse ista in hac parte; sed non concedo ut sola sint.
Some have thought that recommendation and excuse are proper to this duty, and I do not deny that these are in this part; but I do not concede that they are the only ones.
quin illud adhuc adiicio, §6.2.12πάθος atque Ἦθος esse interim ex eadem natura, ita ut illud maius sit, hoc minus, ut amor πάθος caritas Ἦθος interdum diversa inter se, sicut in epilogis, nam quae πάθος concitavit, Ἦθος solet mitigare.
Nay, I even add this further, that pathos and ethos are sometimes of the same nature, so that the former is greater and the latter is smaller, just as love is pathos and affection is ethos; sometimes they are different from each other, as in perorations, for what pathos has excited, ethos is accustomed to calm.
proprie tamen mihi huius nominis exprimenda natura est, quatenus appellatione ipsa non satis significari videtur.
Properly, however, the nature of this name must be expressed by me, insofar as it does not seem to be sufficiently signified by the appellation itself.
§6.2.13Ἦθος quod intelligimus quodque a dicentibus desideramus, id erit, quod ante omnia bonitate commendabitur, non solum mite ac placidum, sed plerumque blandum et humanum et audientibus amabile atque iucundum, in quo exprimendo summa virtus ea est, ut fluere omnia ex natura rerum hominumque videantur utque mores dicentis ex oratione perluceant et quodammodo agnoscantur.
The ethos which we understand and which we desire from speakers will be that which is recommended above all by goodness, being not only mild and placid, but for the most part attractive, humane, lovable, and pleasing to the audience; in expressing which, the highest virtue is that all things should seem to flow from the nature of things and of men, and that the character of the speaker should shine through his speech and be in some way recognized.
§6.2.14quod est sine dubio inter coniunctas maxime personas, quotiens ferimus, ignoscimus, satisfacimus, monemus, procul ab ira, procul ab odio.
This is undoubtedly found among those persons who are most closely connected, as often as we endure, forgive, satisfy, or advise, far from anger and far from hatred.
sed tamen alia patris adversus filium, tutoris adversus pupillum, mariti adversus uxorem moderatio est (hi enim praeferunt eorum ipsorum, a quibus laeduntur, caritatem, neque alio modo invisos eos faciunt quam quod amare ipsi videntur), alia, cum senex adolescentis alieni convicium, honestus inferioris fert; hic enim tantum concitari, illic etiam adfici debet.
But yet, the moderation of a father toward a son, of a guardian toward a ward, and of a husband toward a wife is of one kind (for they display affection for those very persons by whom they are injured, and they make them hated in no other way than because they themselves seem to love them), while it is of another kind when an old man bears the abuse of another's youth, or an honorable man bears that of an inferior; for in the latter case, the mind ought only to be stirred, but in the former, it ought also to be deeply affected.
§6.2.15sunt et illa ex eadem natura, sed notus adhuc minoris, veniam petere adulescentiae, defendere amores.
There are also those things of the same nature, but of a still lower tone, such as asking pardon for youth or defending love affairs.
nonnunquam etiam lenis caloris alieni derisus ex hac forma venit, sed his non ex locis tantum.
Sometimes also a gentle derision of another's passion comes from this form, but not from these topics alone.
verum aliquanto magis propria fuit virtus simulationis, satisfaciendi rogandi εἰρωνεία quae diversum ei quod dicit intellectum petit.
But the virtue of simulation, of satisfying, of entreating, and of irony, which seeks an understanding different from what is said, was somewhat more proper.
§6.2.16hinc etiam ille maior ad concitandum odium nasci adfectus solet, cum hoc ipso, quod nos adversariis summittimus, intellegitur tacita impotentiae exprobratio.
From this also, that greater emotion for exciting hatred is accustomed to arise, when by this very fact, that we submit ourselves to our adversaries, a tacit reproach of their lack of self-control is understood.
namque eos graves et intolerabiles id ipsum demonstrat, quod cedimus, et ignorant cupidi maledicendi aut adfectatores libertatis plus invidiam quam convicium posse; nam invidia adversarios, convicium nos invisos facit.
For that we yield demonstrates that they are oppressive and intolerable, and those greedy for abuse or affectors of liberty do not know that hatred has more power than insult; for hatred makes our adversaries detested, while insult makes us disliked.
§6.2.17ille iam paene medius adfectus est ex amoribus et ex desideriis amicorum et necessariorum, nam et hoc maior est et illo minor.
That emotion arising from the love and longing of friends and relatives is already almost intermediate, for it is both greater than the latter and smaller than the former.
non parum significanter etiam illa in scholis ἤθη dixerimus, quibus plerumque rusticos, superstitiosos, avaros, timidos secundum condicionem propositionum effingimus.
Not without significance should we also call those things in the schools ethos, by which we usually portray rustics, superstitious persons, misers, and cowards according to the condition of the themes.
nam si ἤθη mores sunt cum hos imitamur, ex his ducimus orationem.
For if ethos means character, when we imitate these, we draw our speech from them.