§6.2.1quamvis autem pars haec iudicialium causarum summe praecipueque constet adfectibus, et aliqua de iis necessario dixerim, non tamen potui ac ne debui quidem istum locum in unam speciem concludere.
Although this part of judicial cases consists highly and especially of emotions, and I have necessarily said some things about them, yet I could not and indeed ought not to have confined that topic into a single species.
quare adhuc opus superest, cum ad obtinenda quae volumus potentissimum, tum supra dictis multo difficilius, movendi iudicum animos atque in eum quem volumus habitum formandi et velut transfigurandi.
Therefore, a task still remains, which is both most powerful for obtaining what we wish and much more difficult than the things mentioned above: namely, of moving the minds of the judges and of forming and, as it were, transfiguring them into that disposition which we wish.
qua de re pauca, §6.2.2quae postulabat materia, sic attigi, ut magis quid oporteret fieri quam quo id modo consequi possemus, ostenderem.
Concerning which matter, a few things, which the subject demanded, I have touched upon in such a way as to show rather what ought to be done than in what manner we could attain it.
nunc altius omnis rei repetenda ratio est.
Now the system of the whole matter must be traced from a deeper origin.
nam et per totam, ut diximus, causam locus est adfectibus. et eorum non simplex natura nec in transitu tractanda, quo nihil adferre maius vis orandi potest.
For both throughout the whole case, as we have said, there is room for emotions; and their nature is not simple, nor to be treated in passing, than which the power of oratory can bring forward nothing greater.
§6.2.3nam cetera forsitan tenuis quoque et angusta ingenii vena, si modo vel doctrina vel usu sit adiuta, generare atque ad frugem aliquam perducere queat; certe sunt semperque fuerunt non parum multi, qui satis perite, quae essent probationibus utilia, reperirent; quos equidem non contemno, sed hactenus utiles credo, ne quid per eos iudici sit ignotum, atque (ut dicam, quod sentio) dignos, a quibus causam diserti docerentur.
For other matters, perhaps, even a thin and narrow vein of talent, provided it be assisted either by learning or by experience, may be able to generate and bring to some fruit; certainly there are, and always have been, not a few who could discover with sufficient skill what things were useful for proofs; whom indeed I do not despise, but believe to be useful to this extent, that nothing should be unknown to the judge through them, and (to say what I feel) worthy to have the case taught by them to eloquent men.
qui vero iudicem rapere et, in quem vellet habitum animi, posset perducere, quo dicente flendum irascendumve esset, rarus fuit.
But he who could carry away the judge, and lead him into whatever disposition of mind he wished, under whose speaking there must be weeping or anger, has been rare.
§6.2.4atqui hoc est quod dominetur in iudiciis, haec eloquentia regnat.
And yet, this is what dominates in trials; this eloquence reigns.
Namque argumenta plerumque nascuntur ex causa, et pro meliore parte plura sunt semper, ut, qui per haec vicit, tantum non defuisse sibi advocatum sciat.
For arguments generally arise from the case, and there are always more on the better side, so that he who has won through these knows only that an advocate was not lacking to him.
§6.2.5ubi vero animis iudicum vis adferenda est et ab ipsa veri contemplatione abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus est.
But where force must be applied to the minds of the judges, and the mind must be led away from the very contemplation of the truth, there is the proper work of the orator.
hoc non docet litigator, hoc causarum libellis non continetur.
This the litigant does not teach; this is not contained in the briefs of cases.
probationes enim efficiant sane ut causam nostram meliorem esse iudices putent, adfectus praestant ut etiam velint; sed id quod volunt credunt quoque.
For let proofs indeed make the judges think our case is better, but emotions ensure that they also wish it to be so; and what they wish, they also believe.
§6.2.6nam cum irasci, favere, odisse, misereri coeperunt, agi iam rem suam existimant; et, sicut amantes de forma iudicare non possunt, quia sensum oculorum praecipit animus, ita omnem veritatis inquirendae rationem iudex omittit occupatus adfectibus; aestu fertur et velut rapido flumini obsequitur.
For when they have begun to be angry, to favor, to hate, to pity, they already think their own interest is at stake; and, just as lovers cannot judge of beauty, because the mind anticipates the sense of the eyes, so the judge, occupied by emotions, abandons every method of inquiring into the truth; he is carried away by the tide and obeys, as it were, a rapid torrent.
§6.2.7ita argumenta ac testes quid egerint, pronuntiatio ostendit; commotus autem ab oratore iudex, quid sentiat, sedens adhuc atque audiens confitetur.
Thus, what arguments and witnesses have accomplished, the verdict shows; but the judge moved by the orator confesses what he feels while still sitting and listening.
an cum ille, qui plerisque perorationibus petitur, fletus erumpit, non palam dicta sententia est? huc igitur incumbat orator, hoc opus, hic labor est, sine quo cetera nuda, ieiuna, infirma, ingrata sint;
Or when that weeping, which is sought in most perorations, bursts forth, is not the opinion openly declared?
adeo velut spiritus operis huius atque animus est in adfectibus. horum autem,
To this, therefore, let the orator apply himself; this is the task, this is the labor, without which all other things would be bare, dry, weak, and unpleasing; so much is the breath, as it were, and soul of this work in the emotions.
§6.2.8sicut antiquitus traditum accepimus, duae sunt species: alteram Graeci πάθος vocant, quod nos vertentes recte ac proprie adfectum dicimus, alteram Ἦθος cuius nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo Romanus; mores appellantur, atque inde pars quoque illa philosophiae ἠθική moralis est dicta.
Of these, however, as we have received by tradition from of old, there are two species: one the Greeks call pathos, which we, translating it correctly and properly, call 'affectus' (emotion), the other ethos, for which name, as I indeed feel, the Roman tongue is lacking; they are called 'mores' (character), and from this that part of philosophy likewise, 'ethike', is called moral.