§6.2.18denique Ἦθος omne bonum et comem virum poscit.
In short, ethos requires a thoroughly good and gentle man.
quas virtutes cum etiam in litigatore debeat orator, si fieri potest, approbare, utique ipse aut habeat aut habere credatur.
Since the orator ought to recommend these virtues even in the litigant, if it can be done, he himself should especially either possess them or be believed to possess them.
sic proderit plurimum causis, quibus ex sua bonitate faciet fidem.
Thus he will be of the greatest service to his causes, to which he will give credibility from his own goodness.
nam qui, dum dicit, malus videtur, utique male dicit; non enim videtur iusta dicere, alioqui Ἦθος videretur.
For he who, while speaking, appears to be bad, speaks badly in any case; for he does not seem to speak just things, otherwise his ethos would be visible.
§6.2.19quare ipsum etiam dicendi genus in hoc placidum debet esse ac mite; nihil superbum, nihil elatum saltem ac sublime desiderat; proprie, iucunde, credibiliter dicere sat est, ideoque et medius ille orationis modus maxime convenit.
Therefore, even the style of speaking in this matter ought to be calm and mild; it desires nothing proud, nothing at least lofty and sublime; it is enough to speak properly, pleasantly, and credibly, and therefore that intermediate style of speech is most suitable.
§6.2.20diversum est huic, quod πάθος dicitur, quodque nos adfectum proprie vocamus; et, ut proxime utriusque differentiam signem, illud comoediae, hoc tragoediae magis simile.
Different from this is what is called pathos, and which we properly call emotion; and, to mark the nearest difference between the two, the former is more like comedy, the latter more like tragedy.
haec pars circa iram, odium, metum, invidiam, miserationem fere tota versatur.
This part is almost entirely concerned with anger, hatred, fear, envy, and pity.
quae quibus ex locis ducenda sint, et manifestum omnibus et a nobis in ratione prooemii atque epilogi dictum est.
From what topics these are to be drawn is both manifest to all and has been stated by us in our treatment of the proem and the epilogue.
et metum tamen duplicem intelligi volo, §6.2.21quem patimur et quem facimus, et invidiam; namque altera invidum, altera invidiosum facit.
Yet I wish fear to be understood in a double sense, that which we suffer and that which we cause, and also envy; for the one makes a person envious, the other makes them odious.
hoc autem hominis, illud rei est; in quo et plus habet operis oratio.
Now, the latter belongs to the person, the former to the thing; in which speech has more work to do.
nam quaedam videntur gravia per se, parricidium, caedes, veneficium; §6.2.22quaedam efficienda sunt.
For some things seem grave of themselves, such as parricide, murder, poisoning; others must be made so.
id autem contingit, cum magnis alioqui malis gravius esse id quod passi sumus, ostenditur; quale est apud Virgilium:
"
O felix una ante alias Priameïa virgo,
hostilem ad tumulum Troiae sub moenibus altis
iussa mori—
"
(quam miser enim casus Andromachae, si comparata ei felix Polyxena); §6.2.23aut cum ita exaggeramus iniuriam nostram, ut etiam quae multo minora sunt intoleranda dicamus: si pulsasses, defendi non poteras; vulnerasti. sed haec diligentius, cum de amplificatione dicemus.
This happens when it is shown that what we have suffered is more grievous than other evils which are otherwise great; such as in Virgil: "O happy above all others, virgin daughter of Priam, commanded to die at the enemy's tomb under the high walls of Troy— "(for how miserable was the lot of Andromache, if compared to her Polyxena was happy!); or when we so exaggerate our injury that we call even much smaller things intolerable: "If you had only struck me, you could not be defended; you have wounded me." But we shall speak of these things more carefully when we discuss amplification.
Interim notasse contentus sum, non id solum agere adfectus, ut, quae sunt, ostendantur acerba ac luctuosa, sed etiam ut, quae toleranda haberi solent, gravia videantur: ut cum in maledicto plus iniuriae quam in manu, in infamia plus poenae dicimus quam in morte.
Meanwhile, I am content to have noted that emotions do not only act to show that things which are, are bitter and mournful, but also to make things which are usually considered tolerable seem grave: as when we say that there is more injury in an insult than in a blow, and more punishment in infamy than in death.
§6.2.24namque in hoc eloquentiae vis est, ut iudicem non in id tantum compellat, in quod ipsa rei natura ducetur, sed aut, qui non est, aut maiorem quam est, faciat adfectum.
For the power of eloquence lies in this, that it does not only impel the judge to that direction to which the very nature of the matter will lead him, but either creates an emotion which does not exist, or makes it greater than it is.
haec est illa, quae δείνωσις vocatur, rebus indignis, asperis, invidiosis addens vim oratio; qua virtute praeter alias plurimum Demosthenes valuit.
This is that which is called deinosis, a speech adding force to things unworthy, harsh, and hateful; in which virtue Demosthenes prevailed most of all, besides his other virtues.
§6.2.25quodsi tradita mihi sequi praecepta sufficeret satisfeceram huic parti, nihil eorum quae legi vel didici, quod modo probabile fuit, omittendo; sed eruere in animo est quae latent, et penitus ipsa huius loci aperire penetralia, quae quidem non aliquo tradente, sed experimento meo ac natura ipsa duce accepi.
But if it were sufficient for me to follow the handed-down precepts, I would have fully satisfied this part, by omitting nothing of what I have read or learned, as long as it was acceptable; but my intention is to dig out what is hidden, and to open thoroughly the very secrets of this topic, which indeed I received not from anyone's teaching, but from my own experience and with nature itself as leader.
summa enim, §6.2.26quantum ego quidem sentio, circa movendos adfectus in hoc posita est, ut moveamur ipsi.
For the sum, as far as I indeed feel, regarding the moving of emotions is placed in this, that we ourselves are moved.
nam et luctus et irae et indignationis aliquando etiam ridicula fuerit imitatio, si verba vultumque tantum, non etiam animum accommodarimus.
For the imitation of grief, anger, and indignation will sometimes even be ridiculous, if we adapt only our words and face, and not also our mind.
quid enim aliud est causae, ut lugentes utique in recenti dolore disertissime quaedam exclamare videantur et ira nonnunquam indoctis quoque eloquentiam faciat, quam quod illis inest vis mentis et veritas ipsa morum? quare in iis,
For what other cause is there that mourners, especially in fresh grief, seem to exclaim certain things most eloquently, and that anger sometimes gives eloquence even to the unlearned, than that there is in them the force of the mind and the very truth of character? Therefore, in these,