§5.10.12alioqui nihil erit quo probemus, nisi fuerit quod aut sit verum aut videatur, ex quo dubiis fides fiat.
Otherwise, there will be nothing with which we may prove, unless there is something which is either true or seems to be so, from which belief may be given to things in doubt.
pro certis autem habemus primum, quae sensibus percipiuntur, ut quae uidemus, audimus, qualia sunt signa; deinde ea, in quae communi opinione consensum est, deos esse, §5.10.13praestandam pietatem parentibus; praeterea, quae legibus cauta sunt, quae persuasione etiamsi non omnium hominum, eius tamen civitatis aut gentis, in qua res agitur, in mores recepta sunt, ut pleraque in iure non legibus sed moribus constant; si quid inter utramque partem convenit, si quid probatum est, denique cuicunque adversarius non contradicit.
Now, we hold as certain, first, those things which are perceived by the senses, such as what we see and hear, of which kind are signs; secondly, those things upon which there is agreement by common opinion, as that the gods exist, that duty must be rendered to parents; furthermore, those things which are provided for by laws, or which, by the conviction of at least that state or nation in which the case is conducted, even if not of all mankind, have been received into customs, just as most things in law consist of customs rather than written laws; if anything is agreed upon between both parties, if anything has already been proved, and finally, whatever the adversary does not contradict.
sic enim fiet argumentum, §5.10.14cum providentia mundus regatur, administranda respublica est; sequitur ut administranda respublica sit, si liquebit mundum prouidentia regi.
For in this way an argument will be formed: 'Since the universe is ruled by providence, the state must be administered'; it follows that the state must be administered, if it shall be clear that the universe is ruled by providence.
§5.10.15debet etiam nota esse recte argumenta tractaturo vis et natura omnium rerum, et quid quaeque earum plerumque efficiat; hinc enim sunt, quae εἰκότα dicuntur.
Also, to one who is to treat arguments correctly, the force and nature of all things must be known, and what each of them generally produces; for from this source come those things which are called eikota.
§5.10.16credibilium autem genera sunt tria: unum firmissimum, quia fere accidit, ut liberos a parentibus amari; alterum velut propensius, eum qui recte valeat in crastinum perventurum; tertium tantum non repugnans, in domo furtum factum ab eo qui domi fuit.
Now there are three kinds of credible things: one most firm, because it almost always happens, such as that children are loved by their parents; another, as it were, more probable, that he who is in good health will survive until tomorrow; the third, merely not contradictory, that a theft committed in a house was done by someone who was in the house.
§5.10.17ideoque Aristoteles in secundo de Arte Rhetorica libro diligentissime est exsecutus, quid cuique rei et quid cuique homini soleret accidere, et quas res quosque homines quibus rebus aut hominibus vel conciliasset vel alienasset ipsa natura: ut divitias quid sequatur aut ambitum aut superstitionem, quid boni probent, quid mali petant, quid milites, quid rustici, quo quaeque modo res vitari vel appeti soleat.
And for this reason, Aristotle, in his second book of the Art of Rhetoric, has set forth with the greatest care what is accustomed to happen to each thing and to each person, and what things and what persons nature itself has either reconciled to or alienated from certain things or persons: as what follows wealth, or ambition, or superstition, what good men approve, what bad men seek, what soldiers, what rustics desire, and in what manner each thing is accustomed to be avoided or desired.
verum hoc exsequi mitto; §5.10.18non enim longum tantum, sed etiam impossibile aut potius infinitum est, praeterea positum in communi omnium intellectu.
But I pass over the detailed treatment of this; for it is not only long, but also impossible, or rather infinite, and furthermore, it is placed in the common understanding of all.
si quis tamen desideraverit, a quo peteret, ostendi.
If, however, anyone should desire it, I have shown from whom he may seek it.
omnia autem credibilia, §5.10.19in quibus pars maxima consistit argumentationis, ex huiusmodi fontibus fluunt: an credibile sit a filio patrem occisum, incestum cum filia commissum; et contra, veneficium in noverca, adulterium in luxurioso; illa quoque, an scelus palam factum, an falsum propter exiguam summam, quia suos quidque horum velut mores habet, plerumque tamen, non semper; alioqui indubitata essent, non argumenta.
But all credible things, in which the greatest part of argumentation consists, flow from sources of this kind: whether it is credible that a father was killed by his son, or that incest was committed with a daughter; and on the contrary, poisoning in the case of a stepmother, or adultery in the case of a luxurious man; those things also, whether a crime was committed openly, or a forgery for the sake of a small sum of money, because each of these has, as it were, its own character, generally indeed, but not always; otherwise they would be unquestionable facts, not arguments.
§5.10.20excutiamus nunc argumentorum locos; quanquam quibusdam hi quoque, de quibus supra dixi, videntur.
Let us now examine the topics of arguments; although to some, those things also of which I have spoken above seem to be so.
locos appello non, ut vulgo nunc intelliguntur, in luxuriam et adulterium et similia; sed sedes argumentorum, in quibus latent, ex quibus sunt petenda.
I call them 'topics', not as they are commonly understood now, as commonplaces against luxury, adultery, and the like, but the seats of arguments, in which they lie hidden, and from which they must be sought.
nam, §5.10.21ut in terra non omni generantur omnia, nec avem aut feram reperias, ubi quaeque nasci aut morari soleat ignarus, et piscium quoque genera alia planis gaudent alia saxosis, regionibus etiam litoribusque discreta sunt, nec helopem nostro mari aut scarum ducas, ita non omne argumentum undique venit ideoque non passim quaerendum est.
For, just as not all things are produced in every soil, nor can you find a bird or a wild beast if you are ignorant of where each is accustomed to be born or to dwell, and as some kinds of fish delight in flat waters, others in rocky ones, being distinguished by regions and shores, nor can you catch a sturgeon or a parrot-fish in our sea, so not every argument comes from everywhere, and therefore it must not be sought at random.
§5.10.22multus alioqui error est; exhausto labore, quod non ratione scrutabimur, non poterimus invenire nisi casu.
Otherwise, there is much wandering; though labor is exhausted, we shall not be able to find what we do not search for with system, except by chance.
at si scierimus, ubi quodque nascatur, cum ad locum ventum erit, facile quod in eo est pervidebimus.
But if we know where each thing is produced, when we have come to the place, we shall easily discern what is in it.
§5.10.23in primis igitur argumenta a persona ducenda sunt; cum sit, ut dixi, divisio, ut omnia in haec duo partimur, res atque personas, ut causa, tempus, locus, occasio, instrumentum, modus et cetera, rerum sint accidentia.
First, therefore, arguments must be drawn from the person; since, as I have said, there is a division by which we partition all things into these two, things and persons, so that cause, time, place, opportunity, instrument, manner, and the rest, are accidents of things.
personis autem non quidquid accidit exsequendum mihi est, ut plerique fecerunt, sed unde argumenta sumi possunt.
But in regard to persons, I must not set forth everything that happens to them, as most writers have done, but only those things from which arguments can be drawn.