§5.10.24ea porro sunt, genus, nam similes parentibus ac maioribus suis plerumque creduntur, et nonnunquam ad honeste turpiterque vivendum inde causae fluunt; natio, nam et gentibus proprii mores sunt, nec idem in barbaro, Romano, Graeco probabile est; §5.10.25patria, quia similiter etiam civitatum leges, instituta, opiniones habent differentiam; sexus, ut latrocinium facilius in viro, veneficium in femina credas; aetas, quia aliud aliis annis magis convenit; educatio et disciplina, quoniam refert, a quibus et quo quisque modo sit institutus; habitus corporis, §5.10.26ducitur enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae, his contraria in diversum; fortuna, neque enim idem credibile est in divite ac paupere, propinquis amicis clientibus abundante et his omnibus destitute; condicionis etiam distantia, nam clarus an obscurus, magistratus an privatus, pater an filius, civis an peregrinus, liber an servus, maritus an caelebs, parens liberorum an orbus sit, plurimum distat; animi natura, §5.10.27etenim avaritia, iracundia, misericordia, crudelitas, severitas aliaque his similia adferunt frequenter fidem aut detrahunt, sicut victus luxuriosus an frugi an sordidus, quaeritur; studia quoque, nam rusticus, forensis, negotiator, miles, navigator, medicus aliud atque aliud efficiunt.
These, furthermore, are: birth, for people are generally believed to be similar to their parents and ancestors, and sometimes the causes for living honorably or basely flow from there; nation, for nations also have their own customs, nor is the same thing probable in a barbarian, a Roman, and a Greek; fatherland, because in a similar way also the laws, institutions, and opinions of states have differences; sex, so that you would more easily believe robbery in a man, poisoning in a woman; age, because different things are more suitable to different years; education and discipline, since it matters by whom and in what manner each person has been trained; bodily constitution, for personal appearance is frequently drawn into argument for lust, strength for insolence, and the opposites of these for the contrary; fortune, for the same thing is not credible in a rich man and a poor man, in one who abounds in relations, friends, and clients, and one who is destitute of all these; and the difference of status, for it makes a very great difference whether one is famous or obscure, a magistrate or a private citizen, a father or a son, a citizen or a foreigner, free or a slave, married or single, a parent of children or childless; the nature of the mind, for greed, anger, mercy, cruelty, severity, and other things similar to these, frequently bring or take away credibility, just as it is asked whether one's lifestyle is luxurious or frugal or squalid; occupations also, for the rustic, the advocate, the merchant, the soldier, the sailor, the physician produce different results.
§5.10.28intuendum etiam, quid adfectet quisque, locuples videri an disertus, iustus an potens.
It must also be observed what each person affects, whether to seem rich or eloquent, just or powerful.
spectantur ante acta dictaque, ex praeteritis enim aestimari solent praesentia.
Past actions and words are also looked at, for from the past the present is accustomed to be estimated.
his adiiciunt quidam commotionem; hanc accipi volunt temporarium animi motum, sicut iram, pavorem; §5.10.29consilia autem et praesentis et praeteriti et futuri temporis; quae mihi, etiamsi personis accidunt, per se referenda tamen ad illam partem argumentorum videntur, quam ex causis ducimus; sicut habitus quidam animi, quo tractatur, amicus an inimicus.
To these some add temporary emotion; they wish this to be understood as a temporary movement of the mind, such as anger or fear; and also designs, of present, past, and future time; which, although they happen to persons, seem to me nevertheless to be referred by themselves to that part of arguments which we derive from causes; just as a certain disposition of mind by which one is treated as a friend or an enemy.
ponunt in persona et nomen; §5.10.30quod quidem ei accidere necesse est, sed in argumentum raro cadit, nisi cum aut ex causa datum est, ut Sapiens, Magnus, Pius; aut et ipsum alicuius cogitationis attulit causam, ut Lentulo coniurationis, quod libris Sibyllinis aruspicumque responsis dominatio dari tribus Corneliis dicebatur, seque eum tertium esse credebat post Sullam Cinnamque, quia et ipse Cornelius erat.
They also place in the person the name; which indeed must necessarily belong to a person, but rarely falls into argument, unless when it has been given for some reason, as 'Wise', 'Great', 'Pious'; or when it has itself brought the cause of some thought, as in the case of Lentulus regarding the conspiracy, because in the Sibylline books and the responses of the soothsayers it was said that sovereign power was given to three Cornelii, and he believed that he was the third after Sulla and Cinna, because he himself was also a Cornelius.
nam et illud apud Euripidem frigidum sane, §5.10.31quod nomen Polynicis, ut argumentum morum, frater incessit.
For that instance in Euripides is indeed very cold, in which his brother attacked the name of Polynices as an argument of his character.
iocorum tamen ex eo frequens materia, qua Cicero in Verrem non semel usus est.
However, it is a frequent material for jests, which Cicero used more than once in his speeches against Verres.
haec fere circa personas sunt aut his similia.
These are generally the things concerning persons, or similar to them.
neque enim complecti omnia vel hac in parte vel in ceteris possumus, contenti rationem plura quaesituris ostendere.
For we cannot embrace everything, either in this part or in the others, being content to show the method to those who will seek for more.
§5.10.32nunc ad res transeo, in quibus maxime sunt personis iuncta, quae agimus, ideoque prima tractanda.
Now I pass to things, among which those which we do are most closely connected with persons, and therefore must be treated first.
in omnibus porro, quae fiunt, quaeritur aut Quare? aut Ubi? aut Quando? aut Quomodo? aut Per quae facta sunt?
Furthermore, in all things which are done, it is asked either: Why? or Where? or When? or How? or By what means they were done?
§5.10.33ducuntur igitur argumenta ex causis factorum vel futurorum; quarum materiam, quam quidam ὕλην, alii δύναμιν nominaverunt, in duo genera, sed quaternas utriusque dividunt species.
Arguments, therefore, are derived from the causes of actions done or to be done; the material of these, which some have called hyle and others dynamis, they divide into two genera, but into four species for each.
nam fere versatur ratio faciendi circa bonorum adeptionem, incrementum, conservationem, usum, aut malorum evitationem, liberationem, imminutionem, tolerantiam; §5.10.34quae et in deliberando plurimum valent.
For the motive of action generally turns around the acquisition, increase, preservation, and use of good things, or the avoidance, deliverance from, diminution, and endurance of evils; which are also of the greatest value in deliberation.
sed honestas causas habent recta, prava contra ex falsis opinionibus veniunt.
But right actions have honorable causes, while wrong ones, on the contrary, come from false opinions.
nam est his initium ex iis, quae credunt bona aut mala; inde errores existunt et pessimi adfectus, in quibus sunt ira, odium, invidia, cupiditas, spes, ambitus, audacia, metus, cetera generis eiusdem.
For the beginning of these is from those things which they believe to be good or bad; thence errors arise and the worst passions, among which are anger, hatred, envy, desire, hope, ambition, audacity, fear, and others of the same kind.
accedunt aliquando fortuita, ebrietas, ignorantia, quae interim ad veniam valent, interim ad probationem criminis, ut si quis, dum alii insidiatur, alium dicitur interemisse.
Sometimes accidental circumstances, drunkenness, ignorance are added, which are sometimes effective for pardon, sometimes for the proof of a crime, as if someone, while lying in wait for one person, is said to have killed another.