§5.10.1nunc de argumentis.
Now concerning arguments.
hoc enim nomine complectimur omnia, quae Graeci ἐνθυμήματα, ἐπιχειρήματα, ἀποδείξεις, vocant, quanquam apud illos est aliqua horum nominum differentia, etiamsi vis eodem fere tendit.
For under this name we embrace all those things which the Greeks call enthymēmata, epicheirēmata, and apodeixeis, although among them there is some difference in these names, even if their force tends to almost the same end.
nam enthymema (quod nos commentum sane aut commentationem interpretemur, quia aliter non possumus, Graeco melius usuri) unum intellectum habet, quo omnia mente concepta significat (sed nunc non de eo loquimur); alterum, quo sententiam cum ratione; §5.10.2tertium, quo certam quandam argumenti conclusionem vel ex consequentibus vel ex repugnantibus, quanquam de hoc parum convenit.
For the enthymeme (which we may indeed translate as 'device' or 'reflection,' since we cannot do otherwise, though we would do better to use the Greek word) has one meaning, by which it signifies all things conceived in the mind (but we are not speaking of that now); a second, by which [it signifies] a proposition with a reason; a third, by which [it signifies] a certain conclusion of an argument either from consequents or from opposites, although on this there is little agreement.
sunt enim, qui illud prius epichirema dicant, pluresque invenias in ea opinione, ut id demum, quod pugna constat, enthymema accipi velint, et ideo illud Cornificius contrarium appellat. §5.10.3hunc alii rhetoricum syllogismum, alii imperfectum syllogismum vocaverunt, quia nec distinctis nec totidem partibus concluderetur; quod sane non utique ab oratore desideratur.
For there are those who call that former one an epicheirema, and you would find more in the opinion that they would have only that which consists of conflict accepted as an enthymeme, and for that reason Cornificius calls it 'the contrary.' This some have called a rhetorical syllogism, others an imperfect syllogism, because it is concluded neither with distinct parts nor with as many of them; which indeed is by no means required of an orator.
§5.10.4epichirema Valgius aggressionem vocat; verius autem iudico, non nostram administrationem sed ipsam rem quam aggredimur, id est argumentum, quo aliquid probaturi sumus, etiamsi nondum verbis explanatum, iam tamen mente conceptum, epichirema dici.
Valgius calls the epicheirema an 'aggression'; but I judge it more correct that not our handling of the matter, but the very thing which we undertake, that is, the argument by which we are going to prove something, even if not yet explained in words, but already conceived in the mind, is called an epicheirema.
§5.10.5aliis videtur non destinata vel inchoata, sed perfecta probatio hoc nomen accipere, ultima specie; ideoque propria eius appellatio et maxime in usu est posita, qua significatur certa quaedam sententiae comprehensio, quae ex tribus minimum partibus constat.
To others it seems that not a designed or begun proof, but a completed one, receives this name, as its ultimate form; and therefore its proper and most common appellation has been established, by which is signified a certain comprehension of a proposition, consisting of at least three parts.
§5.10.6quidam epichirema rationem appellarunt, Cicero melius ratiocinationem, quanquam et ille nomen hoc duxisse magis a syllogismo videtur.
Some have called the epicheirema a 'reason,' Cicero more properly 'ratiocination,' although he too seems to have derived this name rather from the syllogism.
nam et statum syllogisticum ratiocinativum appellat, exemplisque utitur philosophorum.
For he also calls the syllogistic issue 'ratiocinative' and uses examples of philosophers.
et quoniam est quaedam inter syllogismum et epichirema vicinitas, potest videri hoc nomine recte abusus.
And since there is a certain affinity between the syllogism and the epicheirema, he may seem to have used this name with correct non-literal application.
§5.10.7Ἀπόδειξις est evidens probatio, ideoque apud Geometras γραμμικαὶ ἀποδείξεις dicuntur Hanc et ab epichiremate Caecilius putat differre solo genere conclusionis et esse apodixin imperfectum epichirema eadem causa, qua diximus enthymema syllogismo distare.
An apodeixis is an evident proof, and therefore among geometers they are called 'linear proofs.' Caecilius thinks that this differs from the epicheirema only in the kind of conclusion, and that an apodeixis is an imperfect epicheirema for the same reason that we said the enthymeme differs from the syllogism.
nam et epichirema syllogismi pars est.
For the epicheirema too is a part of a syllogism.
quidam inesse epichiremati apodixin putant et esse partem eius confirmantem.
Some think that apodeixis is contained in the epicheirema, and assert that it is its confirming part.
§5.10.8utrumque autem quanquam diversi auctores eodem modo finiunt, ut sit ratio per ea, quae certa sunt, fidem dubiis adferens; quae natura est omnium argumentorum, neque enim certa incertis declarantur.
But both of these, although different authors define them in the same way, as being a reason that brings belief to things in doubt through those which are certain; which is the nature of all arguments, for certain things are not made clear by uncertain ones.
haec omnia generaliter πίστεις appellant, quod etiamsi propria interpretatione dicere fidem possumus, apertius tamen probationem interpretabimur.
All these they generally call pisteis, which although we can translate by its proper interpretation as 'belief' (fides), yet we shall more clearly translate as 'proof' (probatio).
sed argumentum quoque plura significat.
But 'argument' (argumentum) also signifies several things.
§5.10.9nam et fabulae ad actum scenarum compositae argumenta dicuntur, et orationum Ciceronis velut thema ipse exponens Pedianus, argumentum, inquit, tale est; et ipse Cicero ad Brutum ita scribit: ueritus fortasse, ne nos in Catonem nostrum transferremus illinc aliquid, etsi argumentum simile non erat. quo apparet omnem ad scribendum destinatam materiam ita appellari.
For even plays composed for acting on the stage are called 'plots' (argumenta), and Pedianus, in expounding as it were the theme of Cicero's speeches, says, 'the argument is as follows'; and Cicero himself writes to Brutus in this way: 'fearing perhaps lest we should transfer something from there into our Cato, although the subject (argumentum) was not similar.' By which it appears that all material intended for writing is so called.
§5.10.10nec mirum, cum id inter opifices quoque vulgatum sit, unde Vergilius, argumentum ingens; vulgoque paulo numerosius opus dicitur argumentosum.
Nor is it surprising, since this is also common among artisans, whence Virgil says, 'a vast design' (argumentum); and commonly a work that is a little more detailed is called 'rich in design' (argumentosum).
sed nunc de eo dicendum argumento est, quod probationem praestat.
But now we must speak of that 'argument' which provides proof.
Celsus quidem probationem, indicium, fidem, adgressionem eiusdem rei nomina facit, parum distincte, ut arbitror.
Celsus indeed makes proof (probatio), indication (indicium), belief (fides), and aggression (adgressio) names of the same thing, with too little distinction, as I think.
§5.10.11nam probatio et fides efficitur non tantum per haec quae sunt rationis, sed etiam per inartificialia.
For proof and belief are produced not only by these things which belong to reason, but also by inartificial means.
signum autem, quod ille indicium vocat, ab argumentis iam separavi.
But the sign, which he calls indication, I have already separated from arguments.
ergo, cum sit argumentum ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliud per aliud, et quae quod est dubium per id quod dubium non est confirmat, necesse est esse aliquid in causa, quod probatione non egeat.
Therefore, since an argument is a reason providing proof, by which one thing is inferred from another, and which confirms what is doubtful by that which is not doubtful, there must necessarily be something in a cause which does not stand in need of proof.