§4.1.35nam is eius rei modus est, ut propositioni similior sit quam expositioni, nec quomodo quidque sit actum, sed de quibus dicturus sit orator ostendat.
For the method of this thing is such that it should be more similar to a proposition than to an exposition, and should show not how each thing was done, but about what things the orator is going to speak.
nec video, quod huius rei possit apud oratores reperiri melius exemplum quam Ciceronis pro A.
And I do not see what better example of this thing can be found among orators than that of Cicero in defense of A.
§4.1.36Cluentio: animadverti, iudices, omnem accusatoris orationem in duas divisam esse pares; quarum altera mihi inniti et magnopere confidere videbatur invidia iam inveterata iudicii Iuniani, altera tantum modo consuetudinis causa timide et diffidenter attingere rationem veneficii criminum, qua de re lege est haec quaestio constituta. id tamen totum respondenti facilius est quam proponenti, quia hic admonendus iudex, illic docendus est.
Cluentius: "I have noticed, judges, that the whole speech of the accuser is divided into two equal parts; of which one seemed to me to rely on and greatly trust in the already long-standing ill repute of the Junius trial, while the other touched upon the nature of the poison charges only for the sake of custom, timidly and diffidently, although this investigation has been established by law for that very matter." Yet this whole thing is easier for the respondent than for the proponent, because here the judge must be reminded, there he must be instructed.
§4.1.37nec me quanquam magni auctores in hoc duxerint, ut non semper facere attentum ac docilem iudicem velim; non quia nesciam, id quod ab illis dicitur, esse pro mala causa, qualis ea sit non intelligi, verum quia istud non negligentia iudicis contingit,
Nor would authors, although great, lead me to this: that I should not wish always to make the judge attentive and teachable; not because I do not know what is said by them, that for a bad case it is advantageous that what sort of case it is should not be understood, but because that happens not by the negligence of the judge, but by his error.
§4.1.38sed errore. dixit enim adversarius et fortasse persuasit; nobis opus est eius diversa opinione, quae mutari non potest, nisi illi fecerimus ad ea quae dicemus docile et intentum.
For the adversary has spoken and perhaps persuaded; we need his different opinion, which cannot be changed unless we make him teachable and attentive to what we shall say.
quid ergo est? imminuenda quaedam et levanda et quasi contemnenda esse consentio ad remittendam intentionem iudicis, quam adversario praestat, ut fecit pro Ligario Cicero.
What is it then? I agree that certain things must be diminished, lightened, and as if despised to relax the attention of the judge which he yields to the adversary, as Cicero did in defense of Ligarius.
§4.1.39quid enim agebat aliud ironia illa, quam ut Caesar minus se in rem tanquam non novam intenderet? quid pro Caelio, quam ut res exspectatione minor videretur? verum ex iis, quae proposuimus, aliud in alio genere causae desiderari palam est.
For what else did that irony intend than that Caesar should direct his attention less to the matter as if it were not new? What in defense of Caelius, than that the matter should seem smaller than expected? But from those things which we have proposed, it is clear that one thing is required in one class of case, and another in another.
§4.1.40genera porro causarum plurimi quinque fecerunt, honestum, humile, dubium vel anceps, admirabile, obscurum: id est ἔνδοξον, ἄδοξον, ἀμφίδοξον, παράδοξον, δυσπαρακολούθητον.
Furthermore, many have made five classes of cases: honorable, humble, doubtful or two-sided, extraordinary, and obscure; that is, endoxon, adoxon, amphidoxon, paradoxon, and dysparakoloutheton.
sunt quibus recte videtur adiici turpe, quod alii humili, alii admirabili subiiciunt.
There are those to whom it seems right to add the disgraceful, which some subject to the humble, others to the extraordinary.
§4.1.41admirabile autem vocant, quod est praeter opinionem hominum constitutum.
Now they call extraordinary that which is established contrary to the opinion of men.
in ancipiti maxime benevolum iudicem, in obscuro docilem, in humili attentum parare debemus.
In a two-sided case we must prepare especially a benevolent judge, in an obscure case a teachable one, and in a humble case an attentive one.
nam honestum quidem ad conciliationem satis per se valet, admirabili et turpi remediis opus est.
For the honorable case is sufficient of itself to win favor, whereas the extraordinary and the disgraceful need remedies.
§4.1.42eo quidam exordium in duas dividunt partes, principium et insinuationem, ut sit in principiis recta benevolentiae et attentionis postulatio; quae quia esse in turpi causae genere non possit, insinuatio surrepat animis, maxime ubi frons causae non satis honesta est, vel quia res sit improba vel quia hominibus parum probetur, aut si facie quoque ipsa premitur vel invidiosa consistentis ex diverso patroni aut patris vel miserabili senis, caeci, infantis.
For this reason, some divide the introduction into two parts, the beginning and the insinuation, so that in the beginnings there may be a direct demand for goodwill and attention; which, because it cannot exist in a disgraceful class of case, the insinuation should creep into minds, especially where the face of the case is not sufficiently honorable, either because the matter is wicked or because it is little approved by men, or if it is also weighed down by its very appearance, whether of an envious advocate or father standing on the opposite side, or the miserable appearance of an old man, a blind man, or an infant.
§4.1.43et quidem quibus adversus haec modis sit medendum, verbosius tradunt materiasque sibi ipsi fingunt et ad morem actionum persequuntur; sed hae cum oriantur ex causis, quarum species consequi omnes non possumus, nisi generaliter comprehenduntur, in infinitum sunt extrahendae.
And indeed, by what means these things must be remedied they deliver too verbosely, and they fashion subjects for themselves and pursue them according to the manner of pleadings; but since these arise from cases, of which we cannot follow all the species unless they are comprehended generally, they must be drawn out to infinity.
§4.1.44quare singulis consilium ex propria ratione nascetur.
Wherefore, counsel for each case will arise from its own nature.
illud in universum praeceperim, ut ab his quae laedunt ad ea quae prosunt refugiamus.
This I would prescribe in general, that we should fly from those things which harm to those things which profit.
si causa laborabimus, persona subveniat; si persona, causa; si nihil quod nos adiuvet erit, quaeramus quid adversarium laedat; nam ut optabile est plus favoris mereri, sic proximum odii minus.
If we struggle in our case, let the person help us; if we struggle in the person, let the case help us; if there is nothing to help us, let us seek what may harm our adversary; for just as it is desirable to deserve more favor, so the next best thing is to deserve less hatred.
§4.1.45in iis, quae negari non potuerint, elaborandum, ut aut minora quam dictum est aut alia mente facta aut nihil ad praesentem quaestionem pertinere aut emendari posse paenitentia aut satis iam punita videantur.
In those things which cannot be denied, we must labor so that they may seem either smaller than what has been said, or done with another intention, or to pertain nothing to the present investigation, or to be able to be corrected by repentance, or already sufficiently punished.
ideoque agere advocato quam litigatori facilius, quia et laudat sine arrogantiae crimine et aliquando utiliter etiam reprehendere potest.
And therefore it is easier for an advocate to plead than for a litigant, because he both praises without the charge of arrogance and can sometimes even usefully reprehend.