§4.1.24nam ille non hoc dicit, sed ad potentissimas quaestiones iudicem praeparandum; in quo vitii nihil erat, nisi in universum id praeciperet, quod nec omnis quaestio patitur nec omnis causa desiderat.
For he does not say this, but that the judge must be prepared for the most important questions; in which there would be nothing wrong, if he did not prescribe as a universal rule that which neither every question permits nor every case desires.
nam protinus a petitore primo loco, dum ignota iudici lis est, quomodo ex quaestionibus ducemus sententias? nimirum res erunt indicandae prius.
For right at the start, from the plaintiff in the first place, while the lawsuit is still unknown to the judge, how shall we derive thoughts from the questions? Doubtless the facts must be indicated first.
demus aliquas (nam id exiget ratio nonnunquam);
Let us grant some questions (for reason will sometimes demand that); but even all the most important ones, that is, the whole case?
etiamne potentissimas omnes, id est totam causam? sic erit in prooemio peracta narratio.
In that way, the narration will have been completed in the prooemium.
§4.1.25quid vero? si, ut frequenter accidit, paulo est durior causa, non benevolentia iudicis petenda ex aliis partibus erit, sed non ante conciliato eius animo nuda quaestionum committetur asperitas? quae si recte semper initio dicendi tractarentur, nihil prooemio opus esset.
What indeed? If, as frequently happens, the case is a little hard, must not the goodwill of the judge be sought from other parts, but rather, without his mind being first conciliated, shall the naked harshness of the questions be joined? If these were always correctly treated at the beginning of speaking, there would be no need for a prooemium.
§4.1.26aliqua ergo nonnunquam, quae erunt ad conciliandum nobis iudicem potentissima, non inutiliter interim ex quaestionibus in exordio locabuntur.
Therefore, sometimes some things which will be most powerful for conciliating the judge to us will not uselessly in the meantime be placed in the introduction from the questions.
quae sint porro in causis favorabilia, enumerare non est necesse, quia et manifesta erunt cognita cuiusque controversiae condicione et omnia colligi in tanta litium varietate non possunt.
Furthermore, what is favorable in cases, it is not necessary to enumerate, because they will both be manifest once the condition of each controversy is known, and they cannot all be gathered in such a variety of lawsuits.
§4.1.27ut autem haec invenire et augere, ita quod laedit aut omnino repellere aut certe minuere ex causa est.
Moreover, just as it belongs to the case to find and amplify these things, so it is to either entirely repel or at least diminish what harms.
miseratio quoque aliquando ex eadem venit, sive quid passi sumus grave sive passuri.
Pity also sometimes comes from the same, whether we have suffered something grave or are about to suffer it.
§4.1.28neque enim sum in hac opinione, qua quidam, ut eo distare prooemium ab epilogo credam, quod in hoc praeterita, in illo futura dicantur, sed quod in ingressu parcius et modestius praetemptanda sit iudicis misericordia, in epilogo vero liceat totos effundere adfectus et fictam orationem induere personis et defunctos excitare et pignora reorum producere; quae minus in exordiis sunt usitata.
For I am not of this opinion, which some hold, as to believe that the prooemium differs from the epilogue in this, that in the latter past things, and in the former future things are spoken of, but because in the entrance the mercy of the judge must be sounded more sparingly and modestly, whereas in the epilogue it is permitted to pour out all feelings, to put a feigned speech into the mouths of characters, to raise the dead, and to produce the pledges of the defendants; which things are less customary in introductions.
§4.1.29sed haec, quae supra dixi, non movere tantum, verum ex diverso amoliri quoque prooemio opus est.
But it is necessary in the prooemium not only to move these things which I have mentioned above, but also from the opposite side to ward them off.
ut autem nostrum miserabilem, si vincamur, exitum, ita adversariorum superbum, si vicerint, utile est credi.
And just as it is useful that our ruin, if we should be defeated, be believed to be miserable, so it is useful that the proud outcome of our adversaries, if they should win, be believed to be arrogant.
§4.1.30sed ex iis quoque, quae non sunt personarum nec causarum, verum adiuncta personis et causis, duci prooemia solent.
But introductions are also accustomed to be drawn from those things which are neither of the persons nor of the cases, but attached to persons and cases.
personis applicantur non pignora modo, de quibus supra dixi, sed propinquitates, amicitiae, interim regiones etiam civitatesque, et si quid aliud eius quem defendimus casu laedi potest.
To persons are attached not only pledges, of which I spoke above, but relationships, friendships, sometimes even regions and states, and whatever else can be harmed by the misfortune of him whom we defend.
§4.1.31ad causam extra pertinent tempus, unde principium pro Caelio; locus, unde pro Deiotaro; habitus, unde pro Milone; opinio, unde in Verrem; deinceps, ne omnia enumerem, infamia iudiciorum, exspectatio vulgi; nihil enim horum in causa est, ad causam tamen pertinent.
To the case belong from the outside: time, whence the beginning in defense of Caelius; place, whence that in defense of Deiotarus; dress, whence that in defense of Milo; public opinion, whence that against Verres; next, lest I enumerate everything, the ill repute of the courts, the expectation of the crowd; for none of these is in the case, yet they pertain to the case.
§4.1.32adiicit Theophrastus ab oratione principium, quale videtur esse Demosthenis pro Ctesiphonte, ut sibi dicere suo potius arbitrio liceat rogantis quam eo modo, quem actione accusator praescripserit.
Theophrastus adds a beginning from the speech itself, such as seems to be that of Demosthenes on behalf of Ctesiphon, as of one asking that it may be permitted to him to speak according to his own judgment rather than in that manner which the accuser prescribed in his action.
§4.1.33fiducia ipsa solet opinione arrogantiae laborare.
Confidence itself is accustomed to suffer from the reputation of arrogance.
faciunt favorem et ilia paene communia non tamen omittenda, vel ideo ne occupentur, optare, abominari, rogare, sollicitum agere; quia plerumque attentum iudicem facit, si res agi videtur nova, magna, atrox, pertinens ad exemplum, praecipue tamen, si index aut sua vice aut reipublicae commovetur, cuius animus spe, metu, admonitione, precibus, vanitate denique, si id profuturum credimus, agitandus est.
Those things also produce favor which are almost common, yet not to be omitted, if only lest they be preoccupied: to wish, to abominate, to entreat, to act anxious; because it usually makes the judge attentive if the matter seems to be new, great, atrocious, or pertaining to a precedent, especially, however, if the judge is moved either on his own account or on account of the state, whose mind must be agitated by hope, fear, admonition, entreaties, and finally vanity, if we believe that will be of benefit.
§4.1.34sunt et illa excitandis ad audiendum non inutilia, si nos neque diu moraturos neque extra causam dicturos existiment.
Those things also are not useless for exciting them to listen, if they think that we will neither delay long nor speak outside of the case.
docilem sine dubio et haec ipsa praestat attentio; sed et illud, si breviter et dilucide summam rei, de qua cognoscere debeat, indicaverimus, quod Homerus atque Vergilius operum suorum principiis faciunt.
Doubtless this attention itself makes the hearer teachable; but also that, if we briefly and clearly indicate the sum of the matter about which he must investigate, which Homer and Virgil do in the beginnings of their works.