Humanitext Reader

Quintilian · Institutes of Oratory §4.1.46-4.1.55

Roles of Advocate and Litigant and Extempore Exordia

Passage 103 of 366 · Latin

Summary

The author discusses when to adopt the persona of an advocate or litigant, the situations requiring an insinuation, and the critique of Apollodorus' division, highlighting the effectiveness of an extemporaneous introduction.

§4.1.46nam se quoque moveri interim finget, ut pro Rabirio Postumo Cicero, dum aditum sibi ad aures faciat et auctoritatem induat vera sentientis, quo magis credatur vel defendenti eadem vel neganti.
For he will also pretend at times to be moved himself, as Cicero did in defense of Rabirius Postumus, until he makes an entrance for himself to their ears and puts on the authority of one who feels the truth, so that he may be more believed, whether defending or denying the same things.
ideoque hoc primum intuebimur, litigatoris an advocati persona sit utendum, quotiens utrumque fieri potest; nam id in schola liberum est, in foro rarum, ut sit idoneus suae rei quisque defensor.
And therefore we shall first consider this, whether the persona of the litigant or of the advocate is to be used, whenever both can be done; for that is free in school, but rare in the forum, that each should be a suitable defender of his own case.
§4.1.47declamaturus autem maxime positas in adfectibus causas propriis personis debet induere.
But one who is about to declaim ought especially to clothe cases based on feelings with their own personae.
hi sunt enim, qui mandari non possunt, nec eadem vi profertur alieni animi qua sui motus.
For these are things which cannot be delegated, nor is the movement of another's mind brought forward with the same force as one's own.
§4.1.48his etiam de causis insinuatione videtur opus esse, si adversarii actio iudicum animos occupavit, si dicendum apud fatigatos est; quorum alterum promittendo nostras probationes et adversas eludendo vitabimus, alterum et spe brevitatis et iis, quibus attentum fieri iudicem docuimus.
For these reasons also, there seems to be need of insinuation, if the adversary's pleading has occupied the minds of the judges, or if one must speak before those who are fatigued; the former of which we shall avoid by promising our own proofs and eluding the adversary's, the latter by the hope of brevity and by those means by which we taught that the judge is made attentive.
§4.1.49et urbanitas opportuna reficit animos et undecunque petita iudicis voluptas levat taedium.
And timely wit refreshes minds, and pleasure of the judge, sought from wherever, relieves boredom.
non inutilis etiam est ratio occupandi quae videntur obstare, ut Cicero dicit, scire se mirari quosdam, quod is, qui per tot annos defenderit multos, laeserit neminem, ad accusandum Verrem descenderit; deinde ostendit, hanc ipsam esse sociorum defensionem; quod schema πρόλημψις dicitur.
It is also not useless to employ the method of anticipating what seems to stand in the way, as Cicero says, knowing that some wonder why he, who for so many years defended many and harmed none, should descend to accusing Verres; then he shows that this is the very defense of the allies; which figure is called prolepsis.
§4.1.50id cum sit utile aliquando, nunc a declamatoribus quibusdam paene semper adsumitur, qui fas non putant nisi a contrario incipere.
Although this is useful at times, it is now adopted almost always by certain declaimers, who do not think it right to begin except from the contrary.
negant Apollodorum secuti tris esse, de quibus supra diximus, praeparandi iudicis partes; sed multas species enumerant, ut ex moribus iudicis, ex opinionibus ad causam extra pertinentibus, ex opinione de ipsa causa, quae sunt prope infinitae, tum iis, ex quibus omnes controversiae constant, personis, factis, dictis, causis, temporibus, locis, occasionibus, ceteris. quas veras esse fateor, sed in haec genera recidere.
Those who follow Apollodorus deny that there are three parts, of which we spoke above, of preparing the judge; but they enumerate many species, as from the character of the judge, from opinions pertaining externally to the case, and from the opinion about the case itself, which are nearly infinite, then from those things of which all controversies consist: persons, deeds, words, causes, times, places, occasions, and the rest; which I confess to be true, but they fall back into these classes.
§4.1.51nam si iudicem benevolum, attentum, docilem habeo, quid amplius debeam optare, non reperio; cum metus ipse, qui maxime videtur esse extra haec, et attentum iudicem faciat et ab adverso favore deterreat.
For if I have a judge who is benevolent, attentive, and teachable, I do not find what more I ought to wish for; since fear itself, which seems most of all to be outside of these, both makes the judge attentive and deters him from favor toward the adversary.
§4.1.52verum quoniam non est satis demonstrare discentibus, quae sint in ratione prooemii, sed dicendum etiam, quomodo perfici facillime possint, hoc adiicio, ut dicturus intueatur, quid, apud quem, pro quo, contra quem, quo tempore, quo loco, quo rerum statu, qua vulgi fama dicendum sit, quid iudicem sentire credibile sit, antequam incipimus, tum quid aut desideremus aut deprecemur.
But since it is not enough to show to learners what things are in the nature of an introduction, but one must also say how they can be accomplished most easily, I add this: that he who is about to speak should consider, before we begin, what must be said, before whom, for whom, against whom, at what time, in what place, in what state of affairs, under what public rumor, what it is credible that the judge thinks, and then what we either desire or pray to avoid.
ipsa illum natura eo ducet, ut sciat, quid primum dicendum sit.
Nature itself will lead him to this, so that he knows what must be said first.
§4.1.53at nunc omne, quo coeperunt, prooemium putant et, ut quidque succurrit, utique si aliqua sententia blandiatur, exordium.
But now they think that everything with which they begin is an introduction, and whatever comes to mind, especially if some clever thought pleases them, is an exordium.
multa autem sine dubio sunt et aliis partibus causae communia, nihil tamen in quaque melius dicitur, quam quod aeque bene dici alibi non possit.
Undoubtedly, many things are also common to other parts of a case, yet nothing is said better in each part than that which cannot be said equally well elsewhere.
Multum gratiae exordio est, §4.1.54quod ab actione diversae partis materiam trahit, hoc ipso, quod non compositum domi, sed ibi atque ex re natum, et facilitate famam ingenii auget et facie simplicis sumptique ex proximo sermonis fidem quoque adquirit; adeo ut, etiamsi reliqua scripta atque elaborata sint, tamen plerumque videatur tota extemporalis oratio, cuius initium nihil praeparati habuisse manifestum est.
There is much grace in an exordium, which draws its material from the pleading of the opposing side, by this very fact, that it is not composed at home but born there and from the matter itself, it increases the reputation for talent by its ease and also acquires trust by the appearance of simple discourse taken from what is nearest; so much so that, even if the rest has been written and elaborated, the whole speech nevertheless generally seems to be extemporaneous, whose beginning is manifest to have had nothing prepared.
§4.1.55frequentissime vero prooemium decebit et sententiarum et compositionis et vocis et vultus modestia, adeo ut in genere causae etiam indubitabili fiducia se ipsa nimium exserere non debeat.
But most frequently modesty both of thoughts and of composition, of voice and of expression, will befit the introduction, so much so that even in an indubitable class of case confidence ought not to exert itself too much.
odit enim iudex fere litigantis securitatem, cumque ius suum intelligat, tacitus reverentiam postulat.
For the judge generally hates the security of a litigant, and since he understands his own right, he silently demands respect.

Notes

  1. §4.1.46dum aditum sibi ad aures faciat — The conjunction dum with the subjunctive faciat indicates not just a temporal duration but a subjective purpose or intention ("until he makes / in order to make").
  2. §4.1.46quo magis credatur vel defendenti eadem vel neganti — A combination of quo as a conjunction introducing a purpose clause with a comparative (magis) and the impersonal passive credatur taking dative arguments (defendenti, neganti) ("so that he may be more believed, whether defending or denying").
  3. §4.1.50quas veras esse fateor, sed in haec genera recidere — An accusative-and-infinitive construction introduced by fateor. The relative pronoun quas refers to the "many species" of the preceding sentence and functions as the subject accusative for the infinitives esse and recidere.
  4. §4.1.54Multum gratiae exordio est, quod ab actione diversae partis materiam trahit — The relative clause beginning with quod refers back to exordio in the preceding sentence, describing the introduction "which draws its material from the pleading of the opposing side" as having much grace.

Cite this passage

Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory §4.1.46-4.1.55. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.humanitext-lat2:4.1.46-4.1.55

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.