§4.1.12sed ego cum auctoritate summorum oratorum magis ducor, tum pertinere ad causam puto quidquid ad dicentem pertinet, cum sit naturale, ut iudices iis, quos libentius audiunt, etiam facilius credant.
But I am not only led more by the authority of the greatest orators, but also think that whatever concerns the speaker concerns the case, since it is natural that judges believe even more easily those whom they listen to more willingly.
§4.1.13ipsius autem litigatoris persona tractanda varie est.
Moreover, the person of the litigant himself must be treated in various ways.
nam tum dignitas eius adlegatur, tum commendatur infirmitas.
For sometimes his dignity is alleged, sometimes his weakness is recommended.
nonnunquam contingit relatio meritorum, de quibus verecundius dicendum erit sua quam aliena laudanti.
Sometimes there occurs a mention of merits, about which one who praises his own must speak with more restraint than one who praises another's.
multum agit sexus, aetas, condicio, ut in feminis, senibus, pupillis, liberos, parentes, coniuges adlegantibus.
Sex, age, and condition have a great effect, as in the case of women, old men, and wards who allege children, parents, or spouses.
nam sola rectum quoque iudicem inclinat miseratio.
For pity alone inclines even a just judge.
§4.1.14degustanda tamen haec prooemio, non consumenda.
Yet these things must be tasted in the prooemium, not consumed.
adversarii vero persona prope iisdem omnibus, sed e contrario ductis impugnari solet.
On the other hand, the person of the adversary is usually attacked from almost all these same points, but derived from the opposite.
nam et potentes sequitur invidia et humiles abiectosque contemptus et turpes ac nocentes odium, quae tria sunt ad alienandos iudicum animos potentissima.
For envy follows the powerful, contempt the humble and abject, and hatred the base and guilty, which three things are the most powerful for alienating the minds of the judges.
§4.1.15neque haec dicere sat est, quod datur etiam imperitis; pleraque augenda aut minuenda, ut expediet.
Nor is it enough to say these things, which is allowed even to the unskilful; most things must be amplified or diminished, as it shall be expedient.
hoc enim oratoris est, illa causae.
For the latter is the business of the orator, the former of the case.
§4.1.16iudicem conciliabimus nobis non tantum laudando eum, quod et fieri cum modo debet et est tamen parti utrique commune, sed si laudem eius ad utilitatem causae nostrae coniunxerimus, ut adlegemus pro honestis dignitatem illi suam, pro humilibus iustitiam, pro infelicibus misericordiam, pro laesis severitatem et similiter cetera.
We shall conciliate the judge to us not only by praising him, which both ought to be done with moderation and is nevertheless common to both sides, but if we connect his praise with the utility of our case, so that we may allege for the honorable his own dignity, for the humble his justice, for the unhappy his mercy, for the injured his severity, and similarly for the rest.
§4.1.17mores quoque, si fieri potest, iudicis velim nosse.
I should also wish to know, if it can be done, the character of the judge.
nam prout asperi, lenes, iucundi, graves, duri, remissi erunt, aut adsumere in causam naturas eorum, qua competent, aut mitigare, qua repugnabunt, oportebit.
For according as they are harsh, gentle, pleasant, grave, severe, or easygoing, it will be necessary either to enlist their natures into the case where they fit, or to soften them where they conflict.
accidit autem interim hoc quoque, §4.1.18ut aut nobis inimicus aut adversariis sit amicus qui iudicat; quae res utrique parti tractanda est ac nescio an etiam ei magis, in quam videatur propensior.
Moreover, this also happens in the meantime, that he who judges is either hostile to us or friendly to our adversaries; which matter must be handled by both sides, and I suspect even more by that side toward which he seems more inclined.
est enim nonnunquam pravis hic ambitus adversus amicos aut pro iis, quibuscum simultates gerant, pronuntiandi faciendique iniuste, ne fecisse videantur.
For there is sometimes in corrupt men this vanity of pronouncing and acting unjustly against their friends or in favor of those with whom they have feuds, lest they should seem to have done so.
§4.1.19fuerunt etiam quidam rerum suarum iudices.
There have also been some who were judges of their own affairs.
nam et in libris Observationum a Septimio editis adfuisse Ciceronem tali causae invenio, et ego pro regina Berenice apud ipsam eam causam dixi.
For I find in the books of Observations published by Septimius that Cicero was present at such a case, and I myself pleaded for Queen Berenice before herself.
similis hic quoque superioribus ratio est.
Here too the method is similar to the preceding ones.
adversarius enim fiduciam partis suae iactat, patronus timet cognoscentis verecundiam.
For the adversary boasts of the confidence of his side, while the advocate fears the shame of the one who is investigating.
§4.1.20praeterea detrahenda vel confirmanda opinion, praecipue si quam domo videbitur iudex attulisse.
In addition, an opinion must be removed or confirmed, especially if the judge seems to have brought any with him from home.
metus etiam nonnunquam est amovendus, ut Cicero pro Milone, ne arma Pompeii disposita contra se putarent, laboravit; nonnunquam adhibendus, ut idem in Verrem facit.
Fear also must sometimes be removed, as Cicero in defense of Milo labored lest they should think Pompey’s weapons drawn up were directed against them; sometimes it must be applied, as the same does against Verres.
§4.1.21sed adhibendi modus alter ille frequens et favorabilis: ne male sentiat populus Romanus, ne iudicia transferantur; alter autem asper et rarus, quo minatur corruptis accusationem, et id quidem in consilio ampliore utcunque tutius; nam et mali inhibentur et boni gaudent; apud singulos vero nunquam suaserim, nisi defecerint omnia.
But there are two ways of applying fear: the one is frequent and favorable, namely, lest the Roman people think ill, or lest the courts be transferred; the other is harsh and rare, by which he threatens the corrupt with prosecution, and that indeed is somewhat safer in a larger council; for both the wicked are restrained and the good rejoice; but before single judges I should never recommend it, unless all things have failed.
§4.1.22quod si necessitas exigit, non erit iam ex arte oratoria, non magis quam appellare, etiamsi id quoque saepe utile est, aut, antequam pronuntiet, reum facere; nam et minari et deferre etiam non orator potest.
But if necessity demands it, it will no longer belong to the oratorical art, any more than to appeal—even though that too is often useful—or, before he pronounces judgment, to make him a defendant; for even a non-orator can threaten and accuse.
§4.1.23si causa conciliandi nobis iudicis materiam dabit, ex hac potissimum aliqua in usum principii, quae maxime favorabilia videbuntur, decerpi oportebit.
If the case itself shall give us material for conciliating the judge, it will be most proper to gather from this some things for the use of the introduction, which shall seem most favorable.
Quo in loco Verginius fallitur, qui Theodoro placere tradit, ut ex singulis quaestionibus singuli sensus in prooemium conferantur.
In which place Verginius is mistaken, who reports that it pleased Theodorus that individual thoughts from individual questions should be brought into the prooemium.