§3.5.11quidam putant etiam eas thesis posse aliquando nominari, quae personis causisque contineantur, aliter tantummodo positas: ut causa sit, cum Orestes accusatur: thesis, an Orestes recte sit absolutus; cuius generis est, an Cato recte Marciam Hortensio tradiderit. hi thesin a causa sic distinguunt, ut illa sit spectativae partis, haec activae; illic enim veritatis tantum gratia disputari, hic negotium agi.
Some think that even those questions which are confined to persons and causes can sometimes be called theses, if they are only proposed in a different way: so that it is a cause when Orestes is accused, but a thesis, "whether Orestes was rightfully acquitted"; to which class belongs, "whether Cato rightfully delivered Marcia to Hortensius." These distinguish a thesis from a cause in this way: that the former belongs to the speculative part, and the latter to the active; for in the former, the discussion is conducted only for the sake of truth, while in the latter, business is transacted.
§3.5.12quanquam inutiles quidam oratori putant universales quaestiones, quia nihil prosit, quod constet ducendam esse uxorem vel administrandam rempublicam, si quis vel aetate vel valetudine impediatur.
Although some think universal questions useless to an orator, because it is of no benefit that it is agreed that a wife should be married or a republic administered, if one is hindered either by age or ill-health.
sed non omnibus eiusmodi quaestionibus sic occurri potest, ut illis, sitne virtus finis? regaturne providentia mundus? §3.5.13quin etiam in iis, quae ad personam referuntur, ut non est satis generalem tractasse quaestionem, ita perveniri ad speciem nisi illa prius excussa non potest.
But not all questions of this kind can be met in this way, as those: "is virtue the end?" "is the world governed by providence?" Nay, even in those which are referred to a person, just as it is not enough to have treated the general question, so it is impossible to arrive at the species unless that general question has first been thoroughly examined.
nam quomodo, an sibi uxor ducenda sit, deliberabit Cato, nisi constiterit, uxores esse ducendas? et quomodo, an ducere debeat Marciam, quaeretur, nisi Catoni ducenda uxor est?
For how will Cato deliberate whether he should marry a wife, unless it is established that wives should be married? And how will it be inquired whether he ought to marry Marcia, unless Cato is to marry a wife?
§3.5.14sunt tamen inscripti nomine Hermagorae libri, qui confirmant illam opinionem, sive falsus est titulus sive alius hic Hermagoras fuit.
Yet there are books inscribed with the name of Hermagoras which confirm that opinion, whether the title is false or this was another Hermagoras.
nam eiusdem esse quomodo possunt, qui de hac arte mirabiliter multa composuit, cum, sicut ex Ciceronis quoque rhetorico primo manifestum est, materiam rhetorices in thesis et causas diviserit? quod reprehendit Cicero ac thesin nihil ad oratorem pertinere contendit totumque hoc genus quaestionis ad philosophos refert.
For how can they belong to the same man who composed wonderfully many things on this art, when, as is manifest also from Cicero's first book on rhetoric, he divided the matter of rhetoric into theses and causes? Which Cicero censures, and contends that the thesis has nothing to do with the orator, and refers this whole kind of question to the philosophers.
§3.5.15sed me liberavit respondendi verecundia, et quod ipse hos libros improbat, et quod in Oratore atque his, quos de Oratore scripsit, et Topicis praecipit, ut a propriis personis atque temporibus avocemus controversiam: quia latius dicere liceat de genere quam de specie, et, quod in universo probatum sit, in parte probatum esse necesse sit.
But I was freed from the embarrassment of replying both because he himself disallows these books, and because in the *Orator*, and in those books which he wrote *On the Orator*, and in the *Topics*, he directs us to withdraw the controversy from proper persons and times; because it is permitted to speak more broadly of the genus than of the species, and what is proved in the whole must necessarily be proved in the part.
§3.5.16status autem in hoc omne genus materiae iidem, qui in causas, cadunt.
Moreover, the same states of cause fall into this whole genus of matter as into causes.
adhuc adiicitur, alias esse quaestiones in rebus ipsis, alias quae ad aliquid referantur: illud, an uxor ducenda? hoc, an seni ducenda? illud, an fortis? hoc, an fortior? et similia.
To this it is added that some questions are in the things themselves, others which are referred to something: the former, "whether a wife should be married?" the latter, "whether by an old man?" the former, "whether brave?" the latter, "whether braver?" and the like.
§3.5.17causam finit Apollodorus, ut interpretation Valgi discipuli eius utar, ita: causa est negotium omnibus suis partibus spectans ad quaestionem; aut: causa est negotium, cuius finis est controversia. ipsum deinde negotium sic finit: negotium est congregatio personarum, locorum, temporum, causarum, modorum, casuum, factorum, instrumentorum, sermonum, scriptorum et non scriptorum. §3.5.18causam nunc intelligamus ὑπόθεσιν, negotium περίστασιν.
Apollodorus defines a cause—to use the translation of Valgius, his disciple—thus: "a cause is a business looking in all its parts to a question"; or, "a cause is a business whose end is controversy." Then he defines the business itself thus: "a business is a gathering of persons, places, times, causes, manners, circumstances, acts, instruments, speeches, written and unwritten things." Let us now understand cause as *hypothesis*, business as *peristasis*.
sed et ipsam causam quidam similiter finierunt, ut Apollodorus negotium.
But some have also defined the cause itself in a similar way to Apollodorus's definition of business.
Isocrates autem causam esse ait quaestionem finitam civilem aut rem controversam in personarum finitarum complexu; Cicero his verbis: causa certis personis, locis, temporibus, actionibus, negotiis cernitur, aut in omnibus aut in plerisque eorum.
Isocrates, however, says that a cause is a finite civil question, or a matter in dispute in a combination of finite persons; Cicero in these words: "a cause is discerned by certain persons, places, times, actions, and businesses, either in all or in most of them."