§3.6.1ergo cum omnis causa contineatur aliquo statu, priusquam dicere aggredior, quo modo genus quodque causae sit tractandum, id quod est commune omnibus, quid sit status et unde ducatur et quot et qui sint, intuendum puto.
Therefore, since every cause is contained by some state of cause, before I begin to speak on how each genus of cause is to be treated, I think we must look into that which is common to all: what a state is, whence it is derived, and how many and what they are.
quanquam id nonnulli ad iudiciales tantum pertinere materias putaverunt, quorum inscitiam, cum omnia tria genera fuero exsecutus, res ipsa deprehendet.
Although some have thought that this pertains only to judicial matters, whose ignorance the subject itself will detect when I have gone through all three genres.
§3.6.2quod nos statum, id quidam constitutionem vocant, alii quaestionem, alii quod ex quaestione appareat, Theodorus caput id est κεφάλαιον γενικώτατον, ad quod referantur omnia.
What we call "state", some call "constitution", others "question", others "that which appears from the question", and Theodorus "head", that is, the most general head (*kephalaion genikōtaton*), to which all things are referred.
quorum diversa appellatio, vis eadem est; nec interest discentium, quibus quidque nominibus appelletur, dum res ipsa manifesta sit.
Their appellation is different, but their power is the same; nor does it matter to learners by what names each is called, as long as the thing itself is clear.
§3.6.3statum Graeci στάσιν vocant, quod nomen non primum ab Hermagora traditum putant, sed alii ab Naucrate, Isocratis discipulo, alii a Zopyro Clazomenio; quanquam videtur Aeschines quoque in oratione contra Ctesiphontem uti hoc verbo, cum a iudicibus petit, ne Demostheni permittant evagari, sed eum dicere de ipso causae statu cogant.
The Greeks call the state *stasis*, which name they think was not first handed down by Hermagoras, but some say by Naucrates, a disciple of Isocrates, others by Zopyrus of Clazomenae; although Aeschines also seems to use this word in his speech against Ctesiphon, when he requests the judges not to permit Demosthenes to wander, but to compel him to speak on the very state of the cause.
§3.6.4quae appellatio dicitur ducta vel ex eo, quod ibi sit primus causae congressus, vel quod in hoc causa consistat.
Which appellation is said to be derived either from the fact that there is the first conflict of the cause, or because the cause consists in this.
et nominis quidem haec origo; nunc quid sit.
And this indeed is the origin of the name; now let us see what it is.
statum quidam dixerunt primam causarum conflictionem; quos recte sensisse, parum elocutos puto.
Some have said that the state is the first conflict of causes; whom I think felt rightly, but expressed it insufficiently.
§3.6.5non enim est status prima conflictio, fecisti, non feci; sed quod ex prima conflictione nascitur, id est genus quaestionis, fecisti, non feci, an fecerit? hoc fecisti, non hoc feci, quid fecerit? quia ex his apparet, illud coniectura, hoc finitione quaerendum, atque in eo pars utraque insistit, erit quaestio coniecturalis vel finitivi status.
For the state is not the first conflict, "you did it," "I did not do it"; but what is born from the first conflict, that is, the genus of the question: "you did it," "I did not do it, did he do it?" "you did this," "I did not do this, what did he do?" Because from these it appears that the former is to be inquired into by conjecture, the latter by definition, and since both parties insist upon that, there will be a question of a conjectural or definitive state.
§3.6.6quid si enim dicat quis, sons est duorum inter se corporum conflictio: erret, ut opinor, non enim sonus est conflictio sed ex conflictione.
For if anyone should say, "sound is the conflict of two bodies with each other," he would err, as I think; for sound is not the conflict, but is from the conflict.
sed hoc levius; intelligitur enim utcunque dictum.
But this is of less consequence; for it is understood however it is expressed.
inde vero ingens male interpretantibus innatus est error, qui, quia primam conflictionem legerant, crediderunt statum semper ex prima quaestione ducendum; quod est vitiosissimum.
But from that indeed a huge error has arisen among those who interpret it badly, who, because they had read "first conflict," believed that the state must always be derived from the first question; which is most erroneous.
§3.6.7nam quaestio nulla non habet utique statum, constat enim ex intentione et depulsione; sed aliae sunt propriae causarum, de quibus ferenda sententia est, aliae adductae extrinsecus, aliquid tamen ad summam causae conferentes, velut auxilia quaedam, quo fit ut in controversia una plures quaestiones esse dicantur.
For there is no question that does not have a state, since it consists of accusation and defense; but some are proper to causes, on which judgment must be passed, others are brought in from without, yet contributing something to the sum of the cause, like certain auxiliary aids, whence it happens that in one controversy there are said to be several questions.
§3.6.8harum porro plerumque levissima quaeque primo loco fungitur.
Furthermore, of these, for the most part, the lightest of all occupies the first place.
namque et illud frequens est, ut ea, quibus minus confidimus, cum tractata sunt, omittamus, interim sponte nostra velut donantes, interim ad ea quae sunt potentiora gradum ex iis fecisse contenti.
For it is also a frequent occurrence that we omit those things in which we have less confidence after they have been treated, sometimes of our own accord as if granting them, sometimes content to have made a step from them to those which are more powerful.
§3.6.9simplex autem causa etiamsi varie defenditur, non potest habere plus uno, de quo pronuntietur, atque inde erit status causae, quod et orator praecipue sibi obtinendum et iudex spectandum maxime intelligit; in hoc enim causa consistet.
But a simple cause, although it is defended in various ways, cannot have more than one point on which judgment is to be pronounced, and from that will be the state of the cause, which the orator understands he must especially hold and the judge must chiefly look to; for in this the cause will consist.
ceterum quaestionum possunt esse diversi.
However, the states of the questions can be diverse.
§3.6.10quod ut brevissimo pateat exemplo: cum dicit reus, etiamsi feci, recte feci, qualitatis utitur statu; cum adiicit, sed non feci, coniecturam movet.
To show this by the briefest example: when the accused says, "even if I did it, I did it rightfully," he uses the state of quality; when he adds, "but I did not do it," he raises a conjecture.
semper autem firmius est non fecisse, ideoque in eo statum esse iudicabo, quod dicerem, si mihi plus quam unum dicere non liceret.
But it is always stronger to say that one has not done it, and therefore I shall judge the state to be in that which I would say if I were not allowed to say more than one thing.