§3.5.1omnis autem oratio constat aut ex iis, quae significantur, aut et iis, quae significant, id est rebus et verbis.
But every speech consists either of those things which are signified, or also of those things which signify, that is, of things and words.
facultas orandi consummatur natura, arte, exercitatione, cui partem quartam adiiciunt quidam imitationis, quam nos arti subiicimus.
The faculty of oratory is completed by nature, art, and exercise, to which some add a fourth part, imitation, which we subject to art.
§3.5.2tria sunt item, quae praestare debeat orator; ut doceat, moveat, delectet.
There are likewise three things which an orator ought to perform: to instruct, to move, and to delight.
haec enim clarior divisio quam eorum, qui totum opus in res et in adfectus partiuntur.
For this is a clearer division than that of those who partition the whole work into things and feelings.
non semper autem omnia in eam quae tractabitur materiam cadent.
But all of these will not always fall upon the subject-matter which is to be treated.
erunt enim quaedam remotae ab adfectibus, qui ut non ubique habent locum, ita quocunque irruperunt, plurimum valent.
For there will be some subjects removed from feelings, which, as they do not have a place everywhere, so wherever they have broken in, they have the greatest power.
§3.5.3praestantissimis auctoribus placet alia in rhetorice esse, quae probationem desiderent, alia quae non desiderent, cum quibus ipse consentio.
It pleases the most excellent authors that there are some things in rhetoric which require proof, and others which do not require it, with whom I myself agree.
quidam vero, ut Celsus, de nulla re dicturum oratorem, nisi de qua quaeratur, existimant, cui cum maxima pars scriptorum repugnat tum etiam ipsa partitio; nisi forte laudare, quae constet esse honesta, et vituperare, quae ex confesso sint turpia, non est oratoris officium.
But some, like Celsus, think that an orator will speak of nothing except that about which inquiry is made, which not only the greatest part of writers opposes, but also that very division; unless perhaps to praise those things which are established as honorable, and to blame those which are confessedly shameful, is not the duty of an orator.
§3.5.4illud iam omnes fatentur, esse quaestiones aut in scripto aut in non scripto; in scripto de iure, in non scripto de re.
This indeed all now admit, that questions are either on what is written or on what is not written; on what is written concerning law, on what is not written concerning fact.
illud rationale hoc legale genus Hermagoras atque eum secuti vocant, id est νομικόν et λογικόν.
Hermagoras and those who followed him call the former the rational and the latter the legal genus, that is, *nomikon* and *logikon*.
§3.5.5idem sentiunt, qui omnem quaestionem ponunt in rebus et in verbis.
Those who place every question in things and in words think the same.
item convenit, quaestiones esse aut infinitas aut finitas.
It is likewise agreed that questions are either infinite or finite.
infinitae sunt, quae remotis personis et temporibus et locis ceterisque similibus in utramque partem tractantur, quod Graeci θέσιν dicunt, Cicero propositum, alii quaestiones universales civiles, alii quaestiones philosopho convenientes, Athenaeus partem causae appellat.
The infinite are those which, having removed persons, times, places, and other such things, are treated on both sides, which the Greeks call *thesis*, Cicero *propositum*, others universal civil questions, others questions suitable to a philosopher, and Athenaeus calls a part of a cause.
§3.5.6hoc genus Cicero scientia et actione distinguit, ut sit scientiae, an providentia mundus regatur; actionis, an accedendum ad rempublicam administrandam.
Cicero distinguishes this genus into knowledge and action, so that it belongs to knowledge, whether the world is ruled by providence; to action, whether one should take part in administering the republic.
prius trium generum, an sit? quid sit? quale sit? omnia enim haec ignorari possunt;
The former consists of three kinds: Is it? What is it? Of what nature is it?
sequens duorum, quo modo adipiscamur? quo modo utamur?
For all these may be unknown; the latter of two: How do we obtain it? How do we use it?
§3.5.7finitae autem sunt ex complexu rerum personarum temporum ceterorumque; hae ὑποθέσεις a Graecis dicuntur, causae a nostris.
But the finite are from the combination of things, persons, times, and other elements; these are called *hypotheses* by the Greeks, and *causae* by our writers.
in his omnis quaestio videtur circa res personasque consistere.
In these, every question seems to consist around things and persons.
§3.5.8amplior est semper infinite, inde enim finita descendit.
The infinite question is always broader, for from it the finite descends.
quod ut exemplo pateat, infinita est, an uxor ducenda? finita, an Catoni ducenda? ideoque esse suasoria potest.
That this may be clear by an example: the infinite is, whether one should marry? the finite, whether Cato should marry? and therefore it can be a deliberative speech.
sed etiam remotae personis propriis ad aliquid referri solent.
But even those removed from proper persons are accustomed to be referred to something.
est enim simplex, an respublica administranda? refertur ad aliquid, an in tyrannide administranda?
For the simple is, whether the republic should be administered? it is referred to something, whether it should be administered under a tyranny?
§3.5.9sed hic quoque; subest velut latens persona:; tyrannus enim geminat quaestionem, subestque et temporis et qualitatis tacita vis; nondum tamen hoc proprie dixeris causam.
But here also there is present as it were a latent person: for the tyrant doubles the question, and there is present a tacit force both of time and of quality; yet you would not yet properly call this a cause.
hae autem, quas infinitas voco, et generales appellantur; quod si est verum, finitae speciales erunt.
But these, which I call infinite, are also called general; which if it is true, the finite will be special.
in omni autem speciali utique inest generalis, ut quae sit prior.
But in every special question the general is certainly inherent, as being that which is prior.
§3.5.10ac nescio an in causis quoque, quidquid in quaestionem venit qualitatis, generale sit.
And I do not know whether in causes also, whatever of quality comes into question, is general.
Milo Clodium occidit, iure occidit insidiatorem;
Milo killed Clodius; he killed the waylayer rightfully; is not this the question, whether there is a right to kill a waylayer?
nonne hoc quaeritur, an sit ius insidiatorem occidendi? quid in coniecturis? non illa generalia, an causa sceleris odium? cupiditas? an tormentis credendum? testibus an argumentis maior fides habenda? nam finitione quidem comprehendi nihil non in universum certum erit.
What in conjectures? Are not those general: whether hatred is the cause of a crime? or covetousness? whether torture is to be believed? whether greater credit is to be given to witnesses or to arguments? For it will be certain that there is nothing comprehended by definition which is not universal.