§3.4.1sed tria an plura sint, ambigitur.
But whether there are three or more is disputed.
nec dubie prope omnes utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis scriptores Aristotelem secuti, qui nomine tantum alio contionalem pro deliberativa appellat, hac partitione contenti fuerunt.
And without doubt almost all writers of the highest authority among the ancients, following Aristotle—who calls it assembly-speech instead of deliberative, only by another name—were content with this division.
§3.4.2verum et tum leviter est temptatum, cum apud Graecos quosdam tum apud Ciceronem in libris de Oratore, et nunc maximo temporum nostrorum auctore prope impulsum, ut non modo plura haec genera, sed paene innumerabilia videantur.
But this was both lightly attempted in former times, both among certain Greeks and by Cicero in his books On the Orator, and is now almost pushed forward by the greatest authority of our times, so that these genera seem not only more numerous, but almost innumerable.
§3.4.3nam si laudandi ac vituperandi officium in parte tertia ponimus, in quo genere versari videbimur, cum querimur, consolamur, mitigamus, concitamus, terremus, confirmamus, praecipimus, obscure dicta interpretamur, narramus, deprecamur, gratias agimus, gratulamur, obiurgamus, maledicimus, describimus, mandamus, renuntiamus, optamus, opinamur, plurima alia?
For if we place the duty of praising and blaming in the third part, in what genus shall we seem to be employed when we complain, console, soothe, excite, terrify, encourage, instruct, interpret obscure sayings, relate, entreat, give thanks, congratulate, rebuke, revile, describe, commission, report, wish, opine, and do many other things?
§3.4.4ut mihi in illa vetere persuasione permanenti velut petenda sit venia, quaerendunque, quo moti priores rem tam late fusam tam breviter astrinxerint.
So that to me, remaining in that old conviction, a pardon must as it were be sought, and it must be asked by what motive the ancients bound a matter so widely diffused within such narrow limits.
quos qui errasse putant, hoc secutos arbitrantur, quod in his fere versari tum oratores videbant;
Those who think that they erred believe that they followed this: that they saw the orators of that time employed almost in these activities.
§3.4.5nam et laudes ac vituperationes scribebantur, et ἐπιταφίους dicere erat moris, et plurimum in consiliis ac iudiciis insumebatur operae, ut scriptores artium pro solis comprehenderint frequentissima.
For both praises and blame were written, and it was the custom to deliver funeral orations, and the greatest part of their labor was spent in councils and trials, so that the writers of the arts included the most frequent as if they were the only ones.
§3.4.6qui vero defendunt, tria faciunt genera auditorum, unum, quod ad delectationem conveniat, alterum, quod consilium accipiat, tertium, quod de causis iudicet.
But those who defend them make three classes of hearers: one which comes together for pleasure, another which receives counsel, and a third which judges of causes.
mihi cuncta rimanti et talis quaedam ratio succurrit, quod omne orationis officium aut in iudiciis est aut extra iudicia.
To me, examining everything deeply, another such reason also suggests itself: that every duty of speech is either in trials or outside of trials.
§3.4.7eorum, de quibus iudicio quaeritur, manifestum est genus; ea, quae ad iudicem non veniunt, aut praeteritum habent tempus aut futurum; praeterita laudamus aut vituperamus, de futuris deliberamus.
Of those things about which inquiry is made in trial, the genus is manifest; those things which do not come before a judge have either a past or a future time; we praise or blame past things, and we deliberate about future things.
§3.4.8item omnia, de quibus dicendum est, aut certa sint necesse est aut dubia.
Likewise, all things about which we must speak must of necessity be either certain or doubtful.
certa, ut cuique est animus, laudat aut culpat; ex dubiis partim nobis ipsis ad electionem sunt libera, de his deliberatur; partim aliorum sententiae commissa, de his lite contenditur.
Certain things, according to each one's inclination, one praises or blames; of doubtful things, some are free to our own choice, and about these we deliberate; others are committed to the judgment of others, and about these we contend in litigation.
§3.4.9Anaximenes iudicialem et contionalem generales partes esse voluit, septem autem species: hortandi, dehortandi, laudandi, vituperandi, accusandi, defendendi, exquirendi, quod ἐξεταστικόν dicit; quarum duae primae deliberativi, duae sequentes demonstrativi, tres ultimae iudicialis generis sunt partes.
Anaximenes wished the judicial and assembly-speech to be general parts, but the species to be seven: of exhorting, dehorting, praising, blaming, accusing, defending, and inquiring (which he calls *exetastikon*); of which the first two are parts of the deliberative genus, the next two of the demonstrative, and the last three of the judicial.
§3.4.10Protagoran transeo, qui interrogandi, respondendi, mandandi, precandi, quod εὐχωλήν dixit, partes solas putat.
I pass over Protagoras, who thinks the only parts are of questioning, answering, commanding, and praying (which he called *euchole*).
Plato in Sophiste iudiciali et contionali tertiam adiecit προσομιλητικήν, quam sane permittamus nobis dicere sermocinatricem; quae a forensi ratione diiungitur et est accommodata privatis disputationibus, cuius vis eadem profecto est quae dialecticae.
Plato in the *Sophist* added to the judicial and assembly-speech a third, *prosomiletike*, which we may indeed allow ourselves to call conversational; this is separated from public business and is adapted to private disputes, the force of which is indeed the same as that of dialectic.
§3.4.11Isocrates in omni genere inesse laudem ac vituperationem existimavit.
Isocrates thought that praise and blame are present in every genus.
nobis et tutissimum est auctores plurimos sequi, et ita videtur ratio dictare.
For us, it is both safest to follow the majority of authors, and reason seems to dictate so.
§3.4.12est igitur, ut dixi, unum genus, quo laus ac uituperatio continetur, sed est appellatum a parte meliore laudativum; idem alii demonstrativum vocant. utrumque nomen ex Graeco creditur fluxisse, nam ἐγκωμιαστικόν aut ἐπιδεικτικόν dicunt. §3.4.13sed mihi ἐπιδεικτικόν non tam demonstrationis vim habere quam ostentationis videtur et multum ab illo ἐγκωμιαστικῷ differre; nam ut continet laudativum in se genus, ita non intra hoc solum consistit. §3.4.14an quisquam negaverit Panegyricos ἐπιδεικτικούς esse? atqui formam suadendi habent et plerumque de utilitatibus Graeciae loquuntur; ut causarum quidem genera tria sint, sed ea tum in negotiis tum in ostentatione posita. nisi forte non ex Graeco mutantes demonstrativum vocant, uerum id sequuntur, quod laus ac uituperatio quale sit quidque demonstrat. §3.4.15alterum est deliberativum, tertium iudiciale. ceterae species in haec tria incident genera, nec invenietur ex his ulla, in qua non laudare ac vituperare, suadere ac dissuadere, intendere quid vel depellere debeamus. illa quoque sunt communia, conciliare, narrare, docere, augere, minuere, concitandis componendisve adfectibus animos audientium fingere. §3.4.16ne iis quidem accesserim, qui laudativam materiam honestorum, deliberatiuam utilium, iudicialem iustorum quaestione contineri putant, celeri magis ac rotunda usi distributione quam vera. stant enim quodam modo mutuis auxiliis omnia. nam et in laude iustitia utilitasque tractatur et in consiliis honestas, et raro iudicialem inveneris causam, in cuius non parte aliquid eorum, quae supra diximus, reperiatur.
There is therefore, as I said, one genus in which praise and blame are contained, but it is called