§3.3.1omnis autem orandi ratio, ut plurimi maximique auctores tradiderunt, quinque partibus constat, inventione, dispositione, elocutione, memoria, pronuntiatione sive actione, utroque enim modo dicitur.
Now the whole system of oratory, as most of the greatest authorities have handed down, consists of five parts: invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and pronunciation or action, for it is spoken of in both ways.
omnis vero sermo, quo quidem voluntas aliqua enuntiatur, habeat necesse est rem et verba.
But every speech, by which indeed some intention is expressed, must necessarily have matter and words.
§3.3.2ac si est brevis et una conclusione finitus, nihil fortasse ultra desideret; at oratio longior plura exigit.
And if it is brief and finished within a single conclusion, it may perhaps require nothing more; but a longer speech demands more.
non tantum enim refert, quid et quo modo dicamus, sed etiam quo loco; opus ergo est et dispositione.
For it is of importance not only what and how we speak, but also in what place; therefore, there is need also of disposition.
sed neque omnia, quae res postulat, dicere neque suo quaeque loco poterimus nisi adiuvante memoria; quapropter ea quoque pars quarta erit.
But we shall be able neither to say all things that the matter requires, nor each in its own place, unless memory assists us; wherefore that also will be the fourth part.
§3.3.3verum haec cuncta corrumpit ac propemodum perdit indecora vel voce vel gestu pronuntiatio.
But a disgraceful pronunciation, either in voice or in gesture, spoils and almost ruins all these things.
huic quoque igitur tribuendus est necessario quintus locus.
To this, therefore, the fifth place must also of necessity be assigned.
§3.3.4nec audiendi quidam, quorum est Albucius, qui tris modo primas esse partes volunt, quoniam memoria atque actio natura non arte contigant: quarum nos praecepta suo loco dabimus; licet Thrasymachus quoque idem de actione crediderit.
Nor are certain people to be listened to, of whom Albucius is one, who wish there to be only the first three parts, since memory and action happen by nature, not by art; of which we shall give the rules in their own place; although Thrasymachus also believed the same regarding action.
§3.3.5his adiecerunt quidam sextam partem, ita ut inventioni iudicium subnecterent, quia primum esset invenire, deinde iudicare.
To these some added a sixth part, so as to connect judgment with invention, because first would be to invent, then to judge.
ego porro ne invenisse quidem credo eum, qui non iudicavit; neque enim contraria, communia, stulta invenisse dicitur quisquam, sed non vitasse.
I, moreover, do not even believe that he has invented who has not judged; for no one is said to have invented contradictory, common, or foolish things, but rather not to have avoided them.
§3.3.6et Cicero quidem in Rhetoricis iudicium subiecit invention; mihi autem adeo tribus primis partibus videtur esse permixtum (nam neque dispositio sine eo neque elocutio fuerit), ut pronuntiationem quoque vel plurimum ex eo mutuari putem.
And Cicero indeed in his Rhetorica subjected judgment to invention; but to me it seems to be so thoroughly mixed with the first three parts (for neither disposition nor elocution would exist without it) that I think even pronunciation borrows very much from it.
§3.3.7quod hoc audacius dixerim, quod in Partitionibus oratoriis ad easdem, de quibus supra dictum est, quinque pervenit partes.
Which I might say all the more boldly because in his Partitiones Oratoriae he arrives at the same five parts of which we have spoken above.
nam cum dupliciter primum divisisset in inventionem atque elocutionem, res ac dispositionem inventioni, verba et pronuntiationem elocutioni dedit quintamque constituit, communem ac velut custodem omnium, memoriam.
For when he had first divided it twofold into invention and elocution, he gave matter and disposition to invention, words and pronunciation to elocution, and established memory as the fifth, common and as it were the guardian of all.
idem in Oratore quinque rebus constare eloquentiam dicit, in quibus postea scriptis certior eius sententia est.
The same writer in his Orator says that eloquence consists of five things, in which later writings his opinion is more certain.
§3.3.8non minus mihi cupidi novitatis alicuius videntur fuisse, qui adiecerunt ordinem, cum dispositionem dixissent, quasi aliud sit dispositio quam rerum ordine quam optimo collocatio.
Those seem to me to have been no less desirous of some novelty who added "order" when they had already said "disposition," as if disposition were anything else than the collocation of things in the best possible order.
Dion inventionem modo et dispositionem tradidit sed utramque duplicem, rerum et verborum, ut sit elocutio inventionis, pronuntiatio dispositionis, his quinta pars memoriae, accedat.
Dion taught only invention and disposition, but each of them double, of matter and of words, so that elocution belongs to invention, pronunciation to disposition, and to these memory is added as a fifth part.
Theodorei fere inventionem duplicem, rerum atque elocutionis, deinde tris ceteras partes.
The followers of Theodorus, for the most part, make invention double, of matter and of elocution, and then the three other parts.
§3.3.9Hermagoras iudicium, partitionem, ordinem, quaeque sunt elocutionis, subiicit oeconomiae, quae Graece appellata ex cura rerum domesticarum et hic per abusionem posita nomine Latino caret.
Hermagoras subjects judgment, division, order, and what things belong to elocution, to economy, which, named in Greek from the care of household affairs and placed here by catachresis, lacks a Latin name.
§3.3.10est et circa hoc quaestio, quod memoriam in ordine partium quidam inventioni, quidam dispositioni subiunxerunt; nobis quartus eius locus maxime placet.
There is also a question concerning this, because in the order of the parts some have subordinated memory to invention, some to disposition; the fourth place for it pleases us best.
non enim tantum inventa tenere, ut disponamus, nec disposita, ut eloquamur, sed etiam verbis formata memoriae mandare debemus.
For we must not only retain what is invented so that we may dispose it, nor what is disposed so that we may express it, but we must also commit to memory what is formed by words.
hac enim omnia, quaecunque in orationem collata sunt, continentur.
For by this all things, whatever have been brought into a speech, are contained.
§3.3.11fuerunt etiam in hac opinione non pauci, ut has non rhetorices partes esse existimarent sed opera oratoris; eius enim esse invenire, disponere, eloqui et cetera.
There were also not a few of this opinion, that these were not parts of rhetoric, but the works of the orator; for it is his business to invent, dispose, express, and so forth.
§3.3.12quod si accipimus, nihil arti relinquemus.
But if we accept this, we shall leave nothing to the art.
nam bene dicere est oratoris, rhetorice tamen erit bene dicendi scientia; vel, ut alii putant, artificis est persuadere, vis autem persuadendi artis.
For to speak well belongs to the orator, yet rhetoric will be the science of speaking well; or, as others think, it is the business of the artist to persuade, but the power of persuading belongs to the art.
ita invenire quidem et disponere oratoris, inventio autem et dispositio rhetorices propria videri potest.
Thus to invent indeed and to dispose belongs to the orator, but invention and disposition can seem proper to rhetoric.
§3.3.13in eo plures dissenserunt, utrumne hae partes essent rhetorices an eiusdem opera an, ut Athenaeus credit, elementa, quae vocant στοιχεῖα Sed neque elementa recte quis dixerit, alioqui tantum initia erunt, ut mundi vel umor vel ignis vel materia vel corpora insecabilia;
On this point many have disagreed, whether these were parts of rhetoric, or works of the same, or, as Athenaeus believes, elements, which they call stoicheia.
nec operum recte nomen accipient, quae non ab allis perficiuntur, sed aliud ipsa perficiunt: partes igitur.
But neither would anyone correctly call them elements, otherwise they will be only beginnings, like water, fire, matter, or indivisible bodies of the universe; nor will they correctly receive the name of works, which are not completed by other things, but themselves complete something else: therefore they are parts.
§3.3.14nam cum sit ex his rhetorice, fieri non potest ut, cum totum ex partibus constet, non sint partes totius ex quibus constat.
For since rhetoric is from these, it cannot be that, since a whole consists of parts, those things from which it consists are not parts of the whole.
videntur autem mihi, qui haec opera dixerunt, eo quoque moti, quod in alia rursus divisione nollent in idem nomen incidere, partes enim rhetorices esse dicebant laudativam, deliberativam, iudicialem.
But those who called these "works" seem to me to have been moved also by this, that in another division they did not wish to fall into the same name; for they said that the parts of rhetoric were the laudatory, the deliberative, and the judicial.
quae si partes sunt, materiae sunt potius quam artis.
But if these are parts, they are parts of the matter rather than of the art.
§3.3.15namque in his singulis rhetorice tota est, quia et inventionem et dispositionem et elocutionem et memoriam et pronuntiationem quaecunque earum desiderat.
For in each of these rhetoric is whole, since each of them requires invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and pronunciation.
itaque quidam genera tria rhetorices dicere maluerunt, optime autem ii, quos secutus est Cicero, genera causarum.
Therefore, some have preferred to call them three genera of rhetoric, but most correctly those whom Cicero followed, genera of causes.