§2.21.1materiam rhetorices quidam dixerunt esse orationem, qua in sententia ponitur apud Platonem Gorgias.
Some have said that the subject matter of rhetoric is speech; in which opinion Gorgias is placed in Plato.
quae si ita accipitur, ut sermo quacunque de re compositus dicatur oratio, non materia sed opus est, ut statuarii statua; nam et oratio efficitur arte sicut statua.
If this is accepted in such a way that a discourse composed on any subject whatever is called speech, it is not the subject matter but the work, like a statue for a sculptor; for speech also is produced by art just as a statue is.
sin hac appellatione verba ipsa significari putamus, nihil haec sine rerum substantia faciunt.
But if we think that by this name the words themselves are signified, these do nothing without the substance of things.
§2.21.2quidam argumenta persuasibilia; quae et ipsa in parte sunt operis et arte fiunt et materia egent.
Some have said persuadable arguments; which themselves are also in part the work, and are made by art, and stand in need of subject matter.
quidam civiles quaestiones; quorum opinio non qualitate sed modo erravit, est enim haec materia rhetorices sed non sola.
Some say civil questions; whose opinion erred not in quality but in limit, for this is indeed the subject matter of rhetoric, but not the only one.
§2.21.3quidam, quia virtus sit rhetorice, materiam eius totam vitam vocant.
Some, because rhetoric is a virtue, call its subject matter the whole of life.
alii, quia non omnium virtutum materia sit tota vita, sed pleraeque earum versentur in partibus, sicut iustitia, fortitudo, continentia propriis officiis et suo fine intelliguntur, rhetoricen quoque dicunt in una aliqua parte ponendam, eique locum in ethice negotialem adsignant id est πραγματικόν. §2.21.4ego (neque id sine auctoribus) materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecunque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt.
Others, because the subject matter of all virtues is not the whole of life, but most of them are occupied with particular parts, just as justice, courage, and temperance are understood by their proper duties and their own end, say that rhetoric also is to be placed in some one part, and they assign to it a business-like place in ethics, that is, "pragmatikon." I myself (and not without authorities) judge that the subject matter of rhetoric is all things whatever that shall be subjected to it for speaking.
nam Socrates apud Platonem dicere Gorgiae videtur, non in verbis esse materiam sed in rebus. et in Phaedro palam, non in iudiciis modo et contionibus, sed in rebus etiam privatis ac domesticis rhetoricen esse demonstrat.
For Socrates in Plato seems to say to Gorgias that the subject matter is not in words but in things; and in the Phaedrus he openly demonstrates that rhetoric is not only in trials and assemblies, but also in private and domestic affairs.
§2.21.5quo manifestum est hanc opinionem ipsius Platonis fuisse.
From which it is manifest that this was the opinion of Plato himself.
et Cicero quodam loco materiam rhetorices vocat res, quae subiectae sint ei, sed certas demum putat esse subiectas.
And Cicero in a certain place calls the things that are subjected to it the subject matter of rhetoric, but he thinks that only certain things are subjected.
alio vero de omnibus rebus oratori dicendum arbitratur his quidem verbis: quanquam vis oratoris professioque ipsa bene dicendi hoc suscipere ac polliceri videtur, ut omni de re, quaecunque sit proposita, ornate ab eo copioseque dicatur. §2.21.6atque adhuc alibi: vero enim oratori, quae sunt in hominum vita, quandoquidem in ea versatur orator atque ea est ei subiecta materies, omnia quaesita, audita, lecta, disputata, tractata, agitata esse debent. §2.21.7hanc autem, quam nos materiam vocamus, id est res subiectas, quidam modo infinitam modo non propriam rhetorices esse dixerunt, eamque artem circumcurrentem vocaverunt, quod in omni materia diceret, cum quibus mihi minima pugna est.
In another place, however, he thinks that the orator must speak about all things, indeed in these words: "although the power of the orator and the very profession of speaking well seems to undertake and promise this, that whatever subject is proposed, it should be spoken of by him elegantly and copiously." And still elsewhere: "for to the true orator, all things that are in human life, since the orator is occupied in them and they are his subjected matter, ought to have been searched out, heard, read, discussed, treated, and turned over." But this, which we call subject matter, that is, the subjected things, some have called sometimes infinite, sometimes not proper to rhetoric, and they have called this art "circumnavigating," because it spoke on every subject matter; with whom I have the least conflict.
§2.21.8nam de omni materia dicere eam fatentur; propriam habere materiam, quia multiplicem habeat, negant.
For they confess that it speaks of every subject matter; they deny that it has a proper subject matter because it has a manifold one.
sed neque infinita est, etiamsi est multiplex; et aliae quoque artes minores habent multiplicem materiam, velut architectonice, namque ea in omnibus, quae sunt aedificio utilia, versatur, et caelatura, quae auro, argento, aere, ferro opera efficit.
But it is neither infinite, even though it is manifold; and other minor arts also have a manifold subject matter, such as architecture, for it is occupied in all things that are useful for a building, and engraving, which produces works in gold, silver, bronze, and iron.
§2.21.9nam sculptura etiam lignum, ebur, marmor, vitrum, gemmas praeter ea quae supra dixi complectitur.
For sculpture also embraces wood, ivory, marble, glass, and gems besides those things which I have mentioned above.
§2.21.10neque protinus non est materia rhetorices, si in eadem versatur et alius.
Nor does it immediately follow that it is not the subject matter of rhetoric if another is also occupied in the same.
nam si quaeram, quae sit materia statuarii, dicetur aes; si quaeram quae sit excusoris, id est fabricae eius quam Graeci χαλκευτικήν vocant, similiter aes esse respondeant.
For if I should ask what is the subject matter of a sculptor, bronze will be said; if I should ask what is that of a coppersmith, that is, of his craft which the Greeks call "chalkeutike," they would similarly answer that it is bronze.
atqui plurimum statuis differunt vasa.
And yet vessels differ greatly from statues.
§2.21.11nec medicina ideo non erit ars, quia unctio et exercitatio cum palaestrica, ciborum vero qualitas etiam cum cocorum ei sit arte communis.
Nor will medicine therefore not be an art because anointing and exercise are common to it with gymnastics, and the quality of foods even with the art of cooks.
§2.21.12quod vero de bono, utili, iusto disserere philosophiae officium esse dicunt, non obstat.
But that they say it is the duty of philosophy to discourse about the good, the useful, and the just, is no obstacle.
nam cum philosophum dicunt, hoc accipi volunt virum bonum. quare igitur oratorem, quem a bono viro non separo, in eadem materia versari mirer?
For when they say "philosopher," they wish this to be understood as "a good man." Why then should I wonder that the orator, whom I do not separate from a good man, is occupied in the same subject matter?