§2.20.1illa quaestio est maior, ex mediis artibus, quae neque laudari per se nec vituperari possunt, sed utiles aut secus secundum mores utentium fiunt, habenda sit rhetorice, an sit, ut compluribus etiam philosophorum placet, virtus.
The greater question is whether rhetoric is to be classed among the "indifferent arts," which can neither be praised nor blamed in themselves, but become useful or otherwise according to the character of those who use them, or whether it is, as is also pleasing to many of the philosophers, a virtue.
§2.20.2equidem illud, quod in studiis dicendi plerique exercuerunt et exercent, aut nullam artem, quae ἀτεχνία nominatur, puto, (multos enim video sine ratione, sine litteris, qua vel impudentia vel fames duxit, ruentes) aut malam quasi artem, quam κακοτεχνίαν dicimus. nam et fuisse multos et esse nonnullos existimo, qui facultatem dicendi ad hominum perniciem converterint.
For my part, as to that which most people have practiced and still practice in the study of speaking, I consider it either no art, which is called "atechnia" (for I see many rushing in without method and without learning, led by either impudence or hunger), or a sort of bad art, which we call "cacotechnia." For I think that there have been many, and still are some, who have turned the faculty of speaking to the destruction of mankind.
§2.20.3ματαιοτεχνία quoque est quaedam, id est supervacua artis imitatio, quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali habeat, sed vanum laborem, qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris ex spatio distanti missa in acum continuo et sine frustratione inserebat, quem cum spectasset Alexander, donasse dicitur eiusdem leguminis modio, quod quidem praemium fuit illo opere dignissimum.
There is also a certain "mataiotēchnia," that is, a useless imitation of art, which has indeed nothing of good or of evil in it, but only vain labor, such as was his who, from a distance, threw grains of chickpeas so as to insert them into a needle continuously and without failure; whom Alexander, having watched him, is said to have rewarded with a bushel of the same legume, which indeed was a reward most worthy of that performance.
§2.20.4his ego comparandos existimo, qui in declamationibus, quas esse veritati dissimillimas volunt, aetatem multo studio ac labore consumunt.
To these I think those should be compared who consume their lives with much zeal and labor in declamations, which they will have to be as unlike the truth as possible.
verum haec, quam instituere conamur et cuius imaginem animo concepimus, quae bono viro convenit quaeque est vere rhetorice, virtus erit.
But this rhetoric, which we are trying to establish and whose image we have conceived in our minds, which is suited to a good man and is truly rhetoric, will be a virtue.
§2.20.5quod philosophi quidem multis et acutis conclusionibus colligunt, mihi vero etiam planiore hac proprieque nostra probatione videtur esse perspicuum.
This, indeed, the philosophers gather by many and acute arguments, but to me it seems clear even by this simpler proof which is properly our own.
ab illis haec dicuntur. si consonare sibi in faciendis ac non faciendis virtus est, quae pars eius prudentia vocatur, eadem in dicendis ac non dicendis erit.
By them the following is said: if it is a virtue to be consistent with oneself in what is to be done and what is not to be done, the part of which is called prudence, the same consistency will exist in what is to be said and what is not to be said.
§2.20.6et si virtutes sunt, ad quas nobis etiam ante quam doceremur initia quaedam ac semina sunt concessa natura, ut ad iustitiam, cuius rusticis quoque ac barbaris apparet aliqua imago, nos certe sic esse ab initio formatos, ut possemus orare pro nobis, etiamsi non perfecte, tamen ut inessent quaedam (ut dixi) semina eius facultatis, manifestum est.
And if those are virtues for which some beginnings and seeds have been granted to us by nature even before we were taught, as for justice, of which some image appears even to rustics and barbarians, it is certainly manifest that we were so fashioned from the beginning as to be able to plead for ourselves, even if not perfectly, yet so that there were in us certain (as I have said) seeds of that faculty.
§2.20.7non eadem autem natura est iis artibus, quae a virtute sunt remotae.
But those arts which are far removed from virtue do not have the same nature.
itaque cum duo sint genera orationis, altera perpetua, quae rhetorice dicitur, altera concisa, quae dialectice (quas quidem Zeno adeo coniunxit, ut hanc compressae in pugnum manus, illam explicatae diceret similem), etiam disputatrix virtus erit.
Therefore, since there are two kinds of speech, the one continuous, which is called rhetoric, the other concise, which is called dialectic (which Zeno indeed so joined that he compared the latter to a hand compressed into a fist, and the former to an open hand), even the disputative art will be a virtue.
adeo de hac, quae speciosior atque apertior tanto est, nihil dubitabitur.
So much so that there will be no doubt concerning this rhetoric, which is so much more splendid and open.
sed plenius hoc idem atque apertius intueri ex ipsis operibus volo.
But I wish to view this same thing more fully and clearly from its actual operations.
§2.20.8nam quid orator in laudando faciet nisi honestorum et turpium peritus? aut in suadendo nisi utilitate perspecta? aut in iudiciis, si iustitiae sit ignarus? quid? non fortitudinem postulat res eadem, cum saepe contra turbulentas populi minas, saepe cum periculosa potentium offensa, nonnunquam, ut iudicio Miloniano, inter circumfusa militum arma dicendum sit; ut, si virtus non est, ne perfecta quidem esse possit oratio.
For what will an orator do in praising unless he is skilled in what is honorable and what is disgraceful? Or in persuading unless he has perceived what is useful? Or in trials if he is ignorant of justice? What? Does not the same task demand courage, since he must often speak against the turbulent threats of the populace, often with dangerous offense to the powerful, and sometimes, as in the trial of Milo, amidst the surrounding arms of soldiers; so that, if it is not a virtue, not even a perfect speech can exist?
§2.20.9quodsi ea in quoque animalium est virtus, qua praestat cetera vel pleraque, ut in leone impetus, in equo velocitas, hominem porro ratione atque oratione excellere ceteris certum est: cur non tam in eloquentia quam in ratione virtutem eius esse credamus, recteque hoc apud Ciceronem dixerit Crassus: est enim eloquentia una quaedam de summis virtutibus, et ipse Cicero sua persona cum ad Brutum in epistulis, tum aliis etiam locis virtutem eam appellet?
But if that is the virtue in each of the animals by which it excels the rest or most of them, as courage in the lion, speed in the horse, and it is certain that man excels the rest in reason and speech: why should we not believe that his virtue lies as much in eloquence as in reason, and that Crassus said this rightly in Cicero: "for eloquence is one of the highest virtues," and Cicero himself in his own person, both in his letters to Brutus and in other places, calls it a virtue?
§2.20.10at prooemium aliquando ac narrationem dicet malus homo et argumenta, sic ut nihil sit in iis requirendum. nam et latro pugnabit acriter, virtus tamen erit fortitudo; et tormenta sine gemitu feret malus servus, tolerantia tamen doloris laude sua non carebit.
But "a bad man," some will say, "will sometimes speak an introduction, a narrative, and arguments in such a way that there is nothing to be desired in them." For even a robber will fight bravely, yet courage will still be a virtue; and a bad slave will bear torture without a groan, yet the endurance of pain will not lack its own praise.
multa fiunt eadem sed aliter.
Many of the same things are done, but in a different way.
sufficiant igitur haec, quia de utilitate supra tractavimus.
Let these remarks therefore suffice, since we have treated of utility above.