§2.21.13cum praesertim primo libro iam ostenderim, philosophos omissam hanc ab oratoribus partem occupasse, quae rhetorices propria semper fuisset, ut illi potius in nostra materia versentur.
especially since I have already shown in the first book that philosophers have occupied this part abandoned by orators, which had always been proper to rhetoric, so that they rather are engaged in our subject matter.
denique cum sit dialectices materia de rebus subiectis disputare, sit autem dialectice oratio concisa, cur non eadem perpetuae quoque materia videatur?
Finally, since it is the subject matter of dialectic to dispute about the things subjected to it, and dialectic is concise speech, why should not the same seem to be the subject matter of continuous speech as well?
§2.21.14solet a quibusdam et illud opponi: omnium igitur artium peritus erit orator, si de omnibus ei dicendum est. possem hic Ciceronis respondere verbis, apud quem hoc invenio: mea quidem sententia nemo esse poterit omni laude cumulatus orator, nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus; sed mihi satis est eius esse oratorem rei de qua dicet non inscium.
The following is also accustomed to be objected by some: "Therefore the orator will be skilled in all arts, if he must speak about all of them." I could respond here with the words of Cicero, in whose works I find this: "In my opinion indeed, no one can be an orator filled with all praise unless he has attained the knowledge of all great things and arts"; but for me it is enough that the orator is not ignorant of that thing about which he is going to speak.
§2.21.15neque enim omnes causas novit, et debet posse de omnibus dicere.
For indeed he does not know all cases, and yet he must be able to speak about all.
de quibus ergo dicet? de quibus didicit.
About which ones, therefore, will he speak? About those which he has learned.
similiter de artibus quoque, de quibus dicendum erit, interim discet; et de quibus didicerit dicet.
Similarly also about the arts, about which he will have to speak, he will learn in the meantime; and about those which he has learned, he will speak.
§2.21.16quid ergo? non faber de fabrica melius aut de musice musicus? si nesciat orator, quid sit, de quo quaeratur, plane melius.
What then? Does not a craftsman speak better about craftsmanship, or a musician about music? If the orator does not know what that is about which the question is asked, clearly they speak better.
nam et litigator rusticus illitteratusque de causa sua melius, quam orator, qui nesciet quid in lite sit; sed accepta a musico, a fabro, sicut a litigatore melius orator quam ipse qui docuerit.
For indeed even a rustic and illiterate litigant speaks better about his own case than an orator who does not know what is in the dispute; but once these things have been received from a musician, from a craftsman, just as from a litigant, the orator will speak better than the very one who taught him.
§2.21.17verum et faber, cum de fabrica, et musicus, cum de musica, si quid confirmationem desideraverit, dicet.
But both the craftsman, when he speaks of craftsmanship, and the musician, when of music, if anything requires confirmation, will speak.
non quidem erit orator, sed faciet illud quasi orator, sicut cum vulnus imperitus deligabit, non erit medicus, sed faciet ut medicus.
He will not indeed be an orator, but he will do that as if he were an orator, just as when an unskilled person binds up a wound, he will not be a physician, but he will act as a physician.
§2.21.18an huiusmodi res neque in laudem neque in deliberationem neque in iudicium veniunt? ergo cum de faciendo portu Ostiensi deliberatum est, non debuit sententiam dicere orator? atqui opus erat ratione architectorum.
Or do matters of this kind come neither into praise, nor into deliberation, nor into judgment? Therefore, when there was deliberation about constructing the port of Ostia, ought not the orator to have delivered an opinion? And yet there was need of the technical knowledge of architects.
§2.21.19livores et tumores in corpore cruditatis an veneni signa sint, non tractat orator? at est id ex ratione medicinae.
Does the orator not treat of whether dark spots and swellings on the body are signs of indigestion or of poison? But that is from the domain of medicine.
circa mensuras et numeros non versabitur? dicamus has geometriae esse partes.
Will he not be occupied around measures and numbers? Let us say that these are parts of geometry.
equidem omnia fere credo posse casu aliquo venire in officium oratoris; quod si non accidet, non erunt ei subiecta.
Indeed, I believe that almost all things can by some chance come into the duty of the orator; but if this does not happen, they will not be subjected to him.
§2.21.20ita sic quoque recte diximus, materiam rhetorices esse omnes res ad dicendum ei subiectas; quod quidem probat etiam sermo communis.
Thus in this way too we have rightly said that the subject matter of rhetoric is all things subjected to it for speaking; which indeed common speech also proves.
nam cum aliquid, de quo dicamus, accepimus, positam nobis esse materiam frequenter etiam praefatione testamur.
For when we have received something about which we are to speak, we frequently declare even in our introduction that our subject matter has been set before us.
§2.21.21Gorgias quidem adeo rhetori de omnibus rebus putavit esse dicendum, ut se in auditoriis interrogari pateretur, qua quisque de re vellet.
Gorgias indeed thought to such an extent that the orator must speak on all things, that he allowed himself to be asked in the lecture halls on whatever subject anyone wished.
Hermagoras quoque, dicendo materiam esse in causa et in quaestionibus, omnes res subiectas erat complexus.
Hermagoras also, by saying that the subject matter is in the case and in questions, had embraced all subjected things.
§2.21.22sed quaestiones si negat ad rhetoricen pertinere, dissentit a nobis; si autem ad rhetoricen pertinent, ab hoc quoque adiuvamur.
But if he denies that questions belong to rhetoric, he differs from us; but if they do belong to rhetoric, we are helped by him as well.
nihil est enim, quod non in causam aut quaestionem cadat.
For there is nothing that does not fall into a case or a question.
§2.21.23Aristoteles tres faciendo partes orationis, iudicialem, deliberativam, demonstrativam, paene et ipse oratori subiecit omnia; nihil enim non in haec cadit.
Aristotle, by making three parts of speech—judicial, deliberative, and demonstrative—himself also subjected almost all things to the orator; for there is nothing that does not fall into these.
§2.21.24quaesitum a paucissimis et de instrumento est.
Inquiry has been made by a very few also about the instrument.
instrumentum voco, sine quo formari materia in id quod velimus effici opus non possit.
I call "instrument" that without which the material cannot be shaped into that work which we wish to be produced.
verum hoc ego non artem credo egere sed artifice.
But I believe that not the art but the artisan needs this.
neque enim scientia desiderat instrumentum, quae potest esse consummata, etiamsi nihil faciat, sed ille artifex, ut caelator caelum et pictor penicilla.
For knowledge does not require an instrument, which can be complete even if it does nothing, but that artisan does, as the engraver needs the chisel and the painter brushes.
itaque haec in eum locum, quo de oratore dicturi sumus, differamus.
Therefore, let us defer these things to that place in which we are going to speak about the orator.