§2.17.25et medicus sanitatem aegri petit; si tamen aut valetudinis vi aut intemperantia aegri aliove quo casu summa non contingit, dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit, medicinae fine non excidet.
And the physician seeks the health of the patient; if, however, either by the force of the disease, or by the intemperance of the patient, or by some other casualty, the ultimate cure is not attained, so long as he himself does everything according to reason, he will not fall short of the end of medicine.
ita oratori bene dixisse finis est.
Thus, to have spoken well is the end for the orator.
nam est ars ea, ut post paulum clarius ostendemus, in actu posita non in effectu.
For that art, as we shall show a little more clearly afterwards, is placed in the act, not in the effect.
§2.17.26ita falsum erit illud quoque, quod dicitur, artes scire quando sint finem consecutae, rhetoricen nescire.
Thus, that also which is said will be false, namely, that other arts know when they have attained their end, but rhetoric does not.
nam se quisque bene dicere intelligit.
For everyone understands that he speaks well.
uti etiam vitiis rhetoricen, quod ars nulla faciat, criminantur, quia et falsum dicat et adfectus moveat.
They also accuse rhetoric of making use of vices, which no art would do, because it both speaks what is false and moves the passions.
§2.17.27quorum neutrum est turpe, cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur, ideoque nec vitium.
Neither of which is disgraceful when it proceeds from good reason, and therefore it is not a vice.
nam et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando concessum est, et adfectus, si aliter ad aequitatem perduci iudex non poterit, necessario movebit orator.
For to tell a lie is sometimes permitted even to a wise man, and the orator must of necessity move the passions, if the judge cannot otherwise be brought to equity.
§2.17.28imperiti enim iudicant et qui frequenter in hoc ipsum fallendi sint, ne errent.
For it is the unskilful who judge, and who must frequently be deceived for this very purpose, lest they should err.
nam, si mihi sapientes iudices dentur, sapientium contiones atque omne consilium, nihil invidia valeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio praesumpta falsique testes: perquam sit exiguus eloquentiae locus et prope in sola delectatione ponatur.
For, if wise judges were given to me, assemblies of wise men, and every council, envy would have no power, nor favor, nor preconceived opinion, nor false witnesses: the place for eloquence would be extremely small, and placed almost in delight alone.
§2.17.29sin et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia veritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt.
But if the minds of the hearers are changeable, and truth is exposed to so many evils, we must fight with art, and employ those means which are useful.
neque enim, qui recta via depulsus est, reduci ad eam nisi alio flexu potest.
For neither can he who has been driven from the straight path be brought back to it except by some other turn.
§2.17.30plurima vero ex eo contra rhetoricen cavillatio est, quod ex utraque causae parte dicatur.
But the greatest cavil against rhetoric is from this, that it is spoken on both sides of a cause.
inde haec: nullam esse artem contrariam sibi, rhetoricen esse contrariam sibi; nullam artem destruere quod effecerit, accidere hoc rhetorices operi; item aut dicenda eam docere aut non dicenda; ita vel per hoc non esse artem, quod non dicenda praecipiat, vel per hoc, quod, cum dicenda praeceperit, etiam contraria his doceat.
Hence these arguments: that no art is contrary to itself, but rhetoric is contrary to itself; that no art destroys what it has accomplished, but this happens to the work of rhetoric; likewise, that it teaches either what ought to be said or what ought not to be said; thus, either on this account it is not an art, because it prescribes what ought not to be said, or on this account, because, when it has prescribed what ought to be said, it also teaches things contrary to these.
§2.17.31quae omnia apparet de ea rhetorice dici, quae sit a bono viro atque ab ipsa virtute seiuncta; alioqui ubi iniusta causa est, ibi rhetorice non est, adeo ut vix admirabili quodam casu possit accidere, ut ex utraque parte orator, id est vir bonus, dicat.
All which things it is manifest are said of that rhetoric which is separated from a good man and from virtue itself; otherwise, where the cause is unjust, there rhetoric is not, so that it can scarcely happen by some wonderful casualty that an orator, that is, a good man, should speak on both sides.
§2.17.32tamen quoniam hoc quoque in rerum naturam cadit, ut duos sapientes aliquando iustae causae in diversum trahant, (quando etiam pugnaturos eos inter se, si ratio ita duxerit, credunt) respondebo propositis, atque ita quidem, ut appareat, haec adversus eos quoque frustra excogitata, qui malis moribus nomen oratoris indulgent.
Yet since this also falls in with the nature of things, that two wise men should sometimes be drawn by just causes in opposite directions (since they believe that they will even fight among themselves, if reason should so lead them), I will reply to the objections proposed, and in such a manner indeed that it may appear that these things are devised in vain even against those who indulge the name of orator to bad characters.
§2.17.33nam rhetorice non est contraria sibi.
For rhetoric is not contrary to itself.
causa enim cum causa, non illa secum ipsa componitur.
For cause is matched against cause, not rhetoric against itself.
nec, si pugnent inter se, qui idem didicerunt, idcirco ars, quae utrique tradita est, non erit; alioqui nec armorum, quia saepe gladiatores sub eodem magistro eruditi inter se componuntur; §2.17.34nec gubernandi, quia navalibus proeliis gubernator est gubernatori adversus; nec imperatoria, quia imperator cum imperatore contendit.
Nor, if those who have learned the same thing fight among themselves, will the art which has been delivered to both on that account not exist; otherwise, there would be no art of arms, because gladiators, instructed under the same master, are often matched against each other; nor of steering, because in naval battles a helmsman is opposed to a helmsman; nor of generalship, because a general contends with a general.
item non evertit opus rhetorice, quod efficit.
Likewise, rhetoric does not overthrow the work which it accomplishes.
neque enim positum a se argumentum solvit orator sed ne rhetorice quidem, quia apud eos, qui in persuadendo finem putant, aut si quis (ut dixi) casus duos inter se bonos viros composuerit, verisimilia quaerentur; non autem, si quid est altero credibilius, id ei contrarium est, quod fuit credibile.
For the orator does not solve the argument proposed by himself, nor indeed does rhetoric itself; because among those who place the end in persuading, or if (as I said) some casualty should match two good men against each other, verisimilitudes will be sought; but if one thing is more credible than another, that is not contrary to that which was credible.