§2.17.12ad cuius rei confirmationem adferunt, Demaden remigem, et Aeschinen hypocriten oratores fuisse.
To establish which fact, they bring forward the cases of Demades the oarsman and Aeschines the actor as having been orators.
falso; nam neque orator esse, qui non didicit, potest, et hos sero potius quam nunquam didicisse quis dixerit, quanquam Aeschines ab initio sit versatus in litteris, quas pater eius etiam docebat, Demaden neque non didicisse certum sit, et continua dicendi exercitatio potuerit tantum, quantuscunque postea fuit, fecisse; nam id potentissimum discendi genus est.
Falsely; for neither can he be an orator who has not learned, and someone might say that these men learned late rather than never, although Aeschines was from the beginning versed in literature, which his father also used to teach, and it is certain that Demades did not fail to learn, and that constant practice in speaking could have made him as great as he afterwards was; for that is the most powerful kind of learning.
§2.17.13sed et praestantiorem, si didicisset, futurum fuisse dicere licet; neque enim orationes scribere est ausus, ut eum multum valuisse in dicendo sciamus.
But we may also say that he would have been more excellent if he had learned; for he did not even dare to write speeches, so that we might know that he had great power in speaking.
§2.17.14Aristoteles, ut solet, quaerendi gratia quaedam subtilitatis suae argumenta excogitavit in Gryllo; sed idem et de arte rhetorica tris libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur, sed ei particulam civilitatis sicut dialectices adsignat.
Aristotle, as is his custom, devised certain arguments of his own subtlety for the sake of inquiry in his *Gryllus*; but the same man also wrote three books on the art of rhetoric, and in the first of them he not only confesses it to be an art, but assigns to it a department of politics, just as of dialectic.
§2.17.15multa Critolaus contra, multa Rhodius Athenodorus.
Critolaus argued much against it, and Athenodorus of Rhodes much also.
agnon quidem detraxit sibi inscriptione ipsa fidem, qua rhetorices accusationem professus est.
Agnon indeed detracted from his own credibility by the very title of his book, in which he professed an accusation of rhetoric.
nam de Epicuro, qui disciplinas omnes fugit, nihil miror.
For as to Epicurus, who fled from all disciplines, I am not at all surprised.
§2.17.16hi complura dicunt sed ex paucis locis ducta; itaque potentissimis eorum breviter occurram, ne in infinitum quaestio evadat.
These men say many things, but derived from few sources; therefore I will briefly meet the most powerful of them, lest the inquiry should run on to infinity.
§2.17.17prima iis argumentatio ex materia est.
Their first argument is from material.
omnes enim artes aiunt habere materiam, quod est verum; rhetorices nullam esse propriam, quod esse falsum in sequentibus probabo.
For they say that all arts have a material, which is true; but that rhetoric has none of its own, which I shall prove in what follows to be false.
§2.17.18altera est calumnia nullam artem falsis assentiri opinionibus, quia constitui sine perceptione non possit, quae semper vera sit; rhetoricen assentiri falsis, non esse igitur artem.
Another calumny is that no art assents to false opinions, because an art cannot be established without perception, which is always true; but that rhetoric assents to false opinions, and therefore is not an art.
§2.17.19ego rhetoricen nonnunquam dicere falsa pro veris confitebor, sed non ideo in falsa quoque esse opinione concedam, quia longe diversum est, ipsi quid videri et, ut alii videatur, efficere.
I will confess that rhetoric sometimes speaks what is false instead of what is true, but I will not on that account concede that it is also in a false opinion, because it is far different how a thing appears to oneself and how one brings it about that it appears so to another.
nam et imperator falsis utitur saepe, ut Hannibal, cum inclusus a Fabio, sarmentis circum cornua boum deligatis incensisque, per noctem in adversos montes agens armenta speciem hosti abeuntis exercitus dedit, sed illum fefellit, ipse, quid verum esset, non ignoravit.
For a general also often uses falsehoods, as Hannibal, when enclosed by Fabius, having bound and set fire to brushwood around the horns of oxen, and driving the herds by night towards the opposite mountains, gave the enemy the appearance of a retreating army; but he deceived Fabius, while he himself was not ignorant of what was true.
§2.17.20nec vero Theopompus Lacedaemonius, cum permutato cum uxore habitu e custodia ut mulier evasit, falsam de se opinionem habuit, sed custodibus praebuit.
Nor indeed did Theopompus the Lacedaemonian, when, having exchanged clothes with his wife, he escaped from custody as a woman, hold a false opinion about himself, but presented it to his guards.
item orator, cum falso utitur pro vero, scit esse falsum eoque se pro vero uti; non ergo falsam habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium.
In like manner the orator, when he uses what is false instead of what is true, knows that it is false and that he is using it instead of what is true; he does not therefore hold a false opinion himself, but deceives another.
§2.17.21nec Cicero, cum se tenebras offudisse iudicibus in causa Cluenti gloriatus est, nihil ipse vidit.
Nor did Cicero, when he boasted that he had cast darkness over the judges in the cause of Cluentius, see nothing himself.
et pictor, cum vi artis suae efficit, ut quaedam eminere in opere, quaedam recessisse credamus, ipse ea plana esse non nescit.
And the painter, when by the power of his art he makes us believe that some things stand out in his work and others have receded, does not himself fail to know that they are flat.
§2.17.22aiunt etiam omnes artes habere finem aliquem propositum, ad quem tendant; hunc modo nullum esse in rhetorice, modo non praestari eum, qui promittatur.
They also say that all arts have some proposed end towards which they tend; that this end is at one time non-existent in rhetoric, and at another time that which is promised is not performed.
mentiuntur; nos enim esse finem iam ostendimus, et quis esset diximus.
They lie; for we have already shown that there is an end, and have said what it is.
§2.17.23et praestabit hunc semper orator, semper enim bene dicet.
And the orator will always perform this, for he will always speak well.
firmum autem hoc, quod opponitur, adversus eos fortasse sit, qui persuadere finem putaverunt.
But this objection which is opposed to us may perhaps be strong against those who thought that to persuade is the end.
noster orator arsque a nobis finita non sunt posita in eventu.
Our orator and the art as defined by us do not depend on the outcome.
tendit quidem ad victoriam qui dicit; sed cum bene dixit, etiamsi non vincat, id quod arte continetur effecit.
He who speaks indeed aims at victory; but when he has spoken well, even if he does not win, he has accomplished that which is contained in the art.
§2.17.24nam et gubernator vult salva nave in portum pervenire; si tamen tempestate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator dicetque notum illud, dum clavum rectum teneam.
For the helmsman also wishes to reach the port with his ship safe; if, however, he is carried away by a tempest, he will not on that account be any less a helmsman, and will say that well-known phrase: 'so long as I keep the helm straight'.