§2.17.35nam ut candido candidius et dulci dulcius non est adversum, ita nec probabili probabilius.
For just as that which is whiter than white, or sweeter than sweet, is not contrary to it, so neither is that which is more credible contrary to what is credible.
neque praecipit unquam non dicenda nec dicendis contraria, sed quae in quaque causa dicenda sunt.
Nor does rhetoric ever prescribe what ought not to be said, or things contrary to what ought to be said, but only what ought to be said in each particular cause.
§2.17.36non semper autem ei, etiamsi frequentissime, tuenda veritas erit; sed aliquando exigit communis utilitas, ut etiam falsa defendat.
Yet the orator will not always have to defend the truth, even if he does so most frequently; but sometimes the common utility demands that he should also defend what is false.
ponuntur hae quoque in secundo Ciceronis de Oratore libro contradictiones: artem earum rerum esse, quae sciantur; oratoris omnem actionem opinione, non scientia contineri, quia et apud eos dicat, qui nesciant, et ipse dicat aliquando, quod nesciat.
These objections also are proposed in the second book of Cicero's De Oratore: that an art is of those things which are known; that the entire action of the orator is contained in opinion, not in knowledge, because he both speaks before those who do not know, and sometimes speaks himself what he does not know.
§2.17.37ex his alterum, id est, an sciat index, de quo dicatur, nihil ad oratoris artem; alteri respondendum, ars earum rerum est, quae sciuntur.
Of these, the one, that is, whether the judge knows what is being spoken of, has nothing to do with the art of the orator; to the other, we must reply that an art is of those things which are known.
rhetorice ars est bene dicendi, bene autem dicere scit orator.
Rhetoric is the art of speaking well, and the orator knows how to speak well.
§2.17.38sed nescit, an verum sit quod dicit. ne hi quidem, qui ignem aut aquam aut quattuor elementa aut corpora insecabilia esse, ex quibus res omnes initium duxerint, tradunt, nec qui intervalla siderum et mensuras solis ac terrae colligunt; disciplinam tamen suam artem vocant.
"But he does not know," they say, "whether what he says is true." Neither do those know who teach that fire, or water, or the four elements, or indivisible bodies are those from which all things have derived their origin; nor those who calculate the distances of the stars and the measurements of the sun and the earth; yet they call their discipline an art.
quodsi ratio efficit, ut haec non opinari sed propter vim probationum scire videantur, eadem ratio idem praestare oratori potest.
But if reason causes them to seem not to opinions but to know these things on account of the force of proofs, the same reason can perform the same for the orator.
§2.17.39sed an causa vera sit, nescit. ne medicus quidem, an dolorem capitis habeat, qui hoc se pati dicet; curabit tamen, tamquam id verum sit, et erit ars medicina.
"But he does not know," they say, "whether the cause is true." Neither does the physician know whether a person who says he suffers from it actually has a headache; yet he will treat him as if it were true, and medicine will be an art.
quid quod rhetorice non utique propositum habet semper vera dicendi, sed semper verisimilia? scit autem esse verisimilia quae dicit.
What of the fact that rhetoric does not indeed always propose to speak what is true, but always what is credible? And he knows that what he says is credible.
§2.17.40adiiciunt his, qui contra sentiunt, quod saepe, quae in allis litibus impugnarunt actores causarum, eadem in aliis defendant.
Those who hold the contrary opinion add to these objections that the advocates of causes often defend in some lawsuits the very things which they have attacked in others.
quod non artis sed hominis est vitium.
But this is a fault of the man, not of the art.
haec sunt praecipua, quae contra rhetoricen dicantur; alia et minora et tamen ex his fontibus derivata.
These are the chief things which are said against rhetoric; others are minor and yet derived from these sources.
confirmatur autem esse artem eam breviter.
But that it is an art is briefly confirmed.
§2.17.41nam sive, ut Cleanthes voluit, ars est potestas via, id est ordine, efficiens, esse certe viam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitaverit; sive ille ab omnibus fere probatus finis observatur, artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad fine utilem vitae, iam ostendemus nihil non horum in rhetorice inesse.
For whether, as Cleanthes would have it, an art is a power effecting its purpose by a way, that is, by order, certainly no one will doubt that there is a way and order in speaking well; or if that definition approved by almost everyone is observed, that an art consists of perceptions agreeing and exercised together toward an end useful to life, we shall now show that there is nothing of these which is not in rhetoric.
§2.17.42quid quod et inspectione et exercitatione ut artes ceterae constat? nec potest ars non esse, si est ars dialectice, quod fere constat, cum ab ea specie magis quam genere differat.
What of the fact that it consists of both observation and practice, like other arts? Nor can it not be an art, if dialectic is an art, which is almost universally agreed, since it differs from it in species rather than in genus.
sed nec illa omittenda sunt, qua in re alius se inartificialiter alius artificialiter gerat, in ea esse artem, et in eo quod, qui didicerit, melius faciat quam qui non didicerit, esse artem.
But neither must we omit those points: that in whatever matter one person behaves without art and another with art, in that matter there is an art; and in that he who has learned does better than he who has not learned, there is an art.
§2.17.43atqui non solum doctus indoctum, sed etiam doctior doctum in rhetorices opere superabit, neque essent aliter eius tam multa praecepta tamque magni, qui docerent; idque cum omnibus confitendum est, tum nobis praecipue, qui rationem dicendi a bono viro non separamus.
And yet, not only will the learned surpass the unlearned, but also the more learned will surpass the learned in the work of rhetoric; otherwise there would not be so many precepts of it, nor such great men to teach them; and as this must be confessed by all, so especially by us, who do not separate the method of speaking from a good man.