§2.16.1sequitur quaestio, an utilis rhetorice.
The question follows, whether rhetoric is useful.
nam quidam vehementer in eam invehi solent, et, quod sit indignissimum, in accusationem orationis utuntur orandi viribus: §2.16.2eloquentiam esse, quae poenis eripiat scelestos, cuius fraude damnentur interim boni, consilia ducantur in peius, nec seditiones modo turbaeque populares sed bella etiam inexpiabilia excitentur; cuius denique tum maximus sit usus, cum pro falsis contra veritatem valet.
For some are accustomed to inveigh vehemently against it, and, what is most unworthy, they use the powers of speaking in order to accuse speech: they say that eloquence is that which rescues the wicked from punishment, by whose fraud the good are sometimes condemned, counsels are led for the worse, and not only seditions and popular tumults but even inexpiable wars are excited; and of which, finally, the use is greatest when it prevails for falsehood against the truth.
§2.16.3nam et Socrati obiiciunt comici docere eum, quomodo peiorem causam meliorem faciat, et contra Tisian et Gorgian similia dicit polliceri Plato.
For both the comic poets object to Socrates that he teaches how to make the worse cause appear the better, and Plato says that Tisias and Gorgias promise similar things.
§2.16.4et his adiiciunt exempla Graecorum Romanorumque et enumerant, qui perniciosa non singulis tantum sed rebus etiam publicis usi eloquentia turbaverint civitatium status vel everterint, eoque et Lacedaemoniorum civitate expulsam et Athenis quoque, ubi actor movere adfectus vetabatur, velut recisam orandi potestatem.
And to these they add the examples of the Greeks and Romans, and enumerate those who, having used an eloquence pernicious not only to individuals but also to public affairs, disturbed or overturned the states of cities; and they say that on this account it was expelled from the city of the Lacedaemonians, and that at Athens also, where the pleader was forbidden to move the passions, the power of speaking was, as it were, cut off.
§2.16.5quo quidem modo nec duces erunt utiles nec magistratus nec medicina nec denique ipsa sapientia.
In which indeed manner, neither generals will be useful, nor magistrates, nor medicine, nor finally wisdom itself.
nam et dux Flaminius et Gracchi, Saturnini, Glauciae magistratus, et in medicis venena et in his, qui philosophorum nomine male utuntur, gravissima nonnunquam flagitia deprehensa sunt.
For both the general Flaminius, and the Gracchi, Saturnini, and Glauciae as magistrates, and poisons among physicians, and the most grievous crimes among those who make a bad use of the name of philosophers, have sometimes been detected.
§2.16.6cibos aspernemur; attulerunt saepe valetudinis causas.
Let us reject food; it has often brought on causes of ill health.
nunquam tecta subeamus; super habitantes aliquando procumbunt.
Let us never enter houses; they sometimes fall down upon those who dwell in them.
non fabricetur militi gladius; potest uti eodem ferro latro.
Let not a sword be forged for a soldier; a robber can use the same iron.
quis nescit, ignes, aquas, sine quibus nulla sit vita, et (ne terrenis immorer) solem lunamque, praecipua siderum, aliquando et nocere?
Who does not know that fire and water, without which there is no life, and (not to dwell on earthly things) the sun and moon, the chief of the stars, sometimes also do harm?
§2.16.7num igitur negabitur deformem Pyrrhi pacem caecus ille Appius dicendi viribus diremisse? aut non divina M. Tulli eloquentia et contra leges agrarias popularis fuit et Catilinae fregit audaciam et supplicationes, qui maximus honor victoribus bello ducibus datur, in toga meruit?
Will it therefore be denied that the famous blind Appius broke off the disgraceful peace with Pyrrhus by the powers of his speaking? Or was not the divine eloquence of Marcus Tullius both popular in opposing the agrarian laws, and did it not break the audacity of Catiline, and merit in the toga public thanksgivings, which is the greatest honor given to generals who are victorious in war?
§2.16.8nonne perterritos militum animos frequenter a metu revocat oratio et tot pugnandi pericula ineuntibus laudem vita potiorem esse persuadet? neque vero me Lacedaemonii atque Athenienses magis moverint quam populus Romanus, apud quem summa semper oratoribus dignitas fuit.
Does not a speech frequently recall the terrified minds of soldiers from fear, and persuade those entering upon so many dangers of fighting that praise is preferable to life? Nor indeed would the Lacedaemonians and Athenians move me more than the Roman people, among whom the highest dignity has always belonged to orators.
§2.16.9equidem nec urbium conditores reor aliter effecturos fuisse ut vaga ilia multitudo coiret in populos, nisi docta voce commota; nec legum repertores sine summa vi orandi consecutos, ut se ipsi homines ad servitutem iuris astringerent.
For my part, I do not think that the founders of cities would otherwise have brought it about that that wandering multitude should unite into nations, unless moved by an instructed voice; nor that the discoverers of laws, without the greatest power of speaking, would have succeeded in binding men themselves to the servitude of the law.
§2.16.10quin ipsa vitae praecepta, etiamsi natura sunt honesta, plus tamen ad formandas mentes valent, quotiens pulchritudinem rerum claritas orationis illuminat.
Nay, the very precepts of life, although they are honorable by nature, yet have more power to form minds as often as the clearness of speech illuminates the beauty of things.
quare, etiamsi in utramque partem valent arma facundiae, non est tamen aequum id haberi malum, quo bene uti licet.
Therefore, although the weapons of eloquence prevail on either side, it is not however fair that that should be held an evil, which it is permitted to use well.
§2.16.11verum haec apud eos forsitan quaerantur, qui summam rhetorices ad persuadendi vim rettulerunt.
But these things may perhaps be questioned among those who have referred the sum of rhetoric to the power of persuading.
si vero est bene dicendi scientia, quem nos finem sequimur, ut sit orator in primis vir bonus, utilem certe esse eam confitendum est.
But if it is the science of speaking well, which end we follow, so that the orator may be in the first place a good man, it must certainly be confessed that it is useful.
§2.16.12et hercule deus ille princeps, parens rerum fabricatorque mundi, nullo magis hominem separavit a ceteris, quae quidem mortalia essent, animalibus, quam dicendi facultate.
And indeed, that principal God, the parent of things and creator of the world, separated man from other animals, at least such as were mortal, by nothing more than by the faculty of speech.
§2.16.13nam corpora quidem magnitudine, viribus, firmitate, patientia, velocitate praestantiora in illis mutis videmus, eadem minus egere adquisitae extrinsecus opis.
For indeed we see that their bodies are superior in size, strength, firmness, endurance, and speed, in those dumb creatures, and that they stand in less need of assistance acquired from without.
nam et ingredi citius et pasci et tranare aquas citra docentem natura ipsa sciunt.
For they know how to walk more quickly, to feed, and to swim across waters by nature itself, without a teacher.
§2.16.14et pleraque contra frigus ex suo corpore vestiuntur, et arma iis ingenita quaedam et ex obvio fere victus, circa quae omnia multus hominibus labor est.
And most of them are clothed against the cold by their own bodies, and they have certain weapons born with them, and sustenance is generally ready at hand, about all of which things there is much labor for men.
rationem igitur nobis praecipuam dedit eiusque nos socios esse cum dis immortalibus voluit.
God, therefore, gave to us reason as our chief distinction, and wished us to be partners in it with the immortal gods.
§2.16.15sed ipsa ratio neque tam nos iuvaret neque tam esset in nobis manifesta, nisi, quae concepissemus mente, promere etiam loquendo possemus, quod magis deesse ceteris animalibus quam intellectum et cogitationem quandam videmus.
But reason itself would neither assist us so much, nor would it be so manifest in us, unless we were able also to bring forth by speaking what we had conceived in our minds; which faculty we see is more lacking in other animals than understanding and a certain power of thought.
§2.16.16nam et mollire cubilia et nidos texere et educare fetus et excludere, quin etiam reponere in hiemem alimenta, opera quaedam nobis inimitabilia (qualia sunt cerarum ac mellis) efficere, nonnullius fortasse rationis est; sed quia carent sermone, quae id faciunt, muta atque irrationalia vocantur.
For both to soften beds and to weave nests and to bring up and hatch young, nay even to store up food for the winter, and to perform certain works inimitable by us (such as those of wax and honey), is perhaps the part of some reason; but because those which do them lack speech, they are called dumb and irrational.
§2.16.17denique homines, quibus negata vox est, quantulum adiuvat animus ille caelestis? quare si nihil a dis oratione melius accepimus, quid tam dignum cultu ac labore ducamus, aut in quo malimus praestare hominibus, quam quo ipsi homines ceteris animalibus praestant, §2.16.18eo quidem magis, quod nulla in arte plenius labor gratiam refert? id adeo manifestum erit, si cogitaverimus, unde et quo usque iam provecta sit orandi facultas; et adhuc augeri potest.
Finally, as for men to whom voice is denied, how very little does that heavenly mind assist them? Therefore, if we have received nothing better from the gods than speech, what should we consider so worthy of cultivation and labor, or in what should we prefer to excel men, than in that by which men themselves excel other animals, and indeed so much the more, because in no art does labor return a more abundant reward? This indeed will be manifest, if we reflect whence and how far the faculty of speaking has now advanced; and it can still be increased.
§2.16.19nam ut omittam, defendere amicos, regere consiliis senatum, populum, exercitum in quae velit ducere, quam sit utile conveniatque bono viro, nonne pulchrum vel hoc ipsum est, ex communi intellectu verbisque, quibus utuntur omnes, tantum adsequi laudis et gloriae, ut non loqui et orare sed, quod Pericli contigit, fulgurare ac tonare videaris?
For, to omit how useful it is and how well it becomes a good man to defend his friends, to guide the senate by his counsels, and to lead the people or the army whithersoever he wishes, is not this very thing beautiful, to attain so much praise and glory from the common understanding and words which all use, that you seem not to speak and plead, but, as happened to Pericles, to flash and thunder?