§2.15.27Socrates autem seu Plato eam quidem, quae tum exercebatur, rhetoricen talem putat, nam et dicit his verbis τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς πολιτεύεσθε, veram autem et honestam intelligit.
Socrates, however, or Plato, thinks that rhetoric as it was then practiced is indeed such (for he even says in these words: τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς πολιτεύεσθε), but understands that there is a true and honorable one.
itaque disputatio ilia contra Gorgian ita clauditur, οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν; §2.15.28ad quod ille quidem conticescit, sed sermonem suscipit Polus iuvenili calore inconsideratior, contra quem illa de simulacro et adulatione dicuntur.
Therefore, that discussion against Gorgias is concluded thus: οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν?; To which indeed he falls silent, but Polus, more inconsiderate with youthful warmth, takes up the discourse, against whom those things about the shadow and flattery are said.
tum Callicles adhuc concitatior, qui tamen ad hanc perducitur clausulam, τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι, δίκαιον ἄνδρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων; ut appareat, Platoni non rhetoricen videri malum, sed eam veram nisi iusto ac bono non contingere.
Then Callicles, still more excited, who is nevertheless brought to this conclusion: τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι, δίκαιον ἄνδρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων?; so that it may appear that to Plato rhetoric does not seem an evil, but that the true rhetoric does not fall to the lot of any but the just and good.
§2.15.29adhuc autem in Phaedro manifestius facit, hanc artem consummari citra iustitiae quoque scientiam non posse; cui opinioni nos quoque accedimus.
Moreover, in the 'Phaedrus' he makes it still more manifest that this art cannot be completed without the science of justice; to which opinion we also subscribe.
an aliter defensionem Socratis et eorum, qui pro patria ceciderant, laudem scripsisset?
Otherwise, would he have written the defense of Socrates, and the praise of those who had fallen for their country?
§2.15.30quae certe sunt oratoris opera.
Which are certainly the works of an orator.
sed in illud hominum genus, quod facilitate dicendi male utebatur, invectus est.
But he inveighed against that class of men who made a bad use of their facility of speaking.
nam et Socrates inhonestam sibi credidit orationem, quam ei Lysias reo composuerat; et tum maxime scribere litigatoribus, quae illi pro se ipsi dicerent, erat moris, atque ita iuri, quo non licebat pro altero agere, fraus adhibebatur.
For even Socrates believed that the speech which Lysias had composed for him when on trial was dishonorable to him; and at that time it was especially the custom to write for litigants what they themselves should say on their own behalf, and thus a fraud was practiced upon the law, which did not allow one to plead for another.
§2.15.31doctores quoque eius artis parum idonei Platoni videbantur, qui rhetoricen a iustitia separarent et veris credibilia praeferrent; nam id quoque dicit in Phaedro.
The teachers also of that art seemed to Plato to be little qualified, since they separated rhetoric from justice, and preferred credible things to true ones; for he says that also in the 'Phaedrus'.
§2.15.32consensisse autem illis superioribus videri potest etiam Cornelius Celsus, cuius haec verba sunt: orator simile tantum veri petit. deinde paulo post: non enim bona conscientia sed victoria litigantis est praemium. quae si vera essent, pessimorum hominum foret, haec tam perniciosa nocentissimis moribus dare instrumenta et nequitiam praeceptis adiuvare.
Cornelius Celsus also may seem to have agreed with those predecessors, whose words are these: "An orator seeks only what is like the truth." Then, a little after: "For not a good conscience, but the victory of the litigant is the reward." If these things were true, it would be the part of the worst of men to give such destructive instruments to the most noxious habits, and to assist wickedness by precepts.
sed illi rationem opinionis suae viderint.
But let them see to the reason of their own opinion.
§2.15.33nos autem ingressi formare perfectum oratorem, quem in primis esse virum bonum volumus, ad eos qui de hoc opere melius sentiunt, revertamur.
But let us, having entered upon the formation of a perfect orator, whom we wish in the first place to be a good man, return to those who think better of this work.
rhetoricen autem quidam eandem civilitatem esse iudicaverunt; Cicero scientiae civilis partem vocat (civilis autem scientia idem quod sapientia est); quidam eandem philosophiam, §2.15.34quorum est Isocrates.
Some have judged rhetoric to be the same as statecraft; Cicero calls it a part of civil science (and civil science is the same as wisdom); some, the same as philosophy, of whom is Isocrates.
huic eius substantiae maxime conveniet finitio, rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam. nam et orationis omnes virtutes semel complectitur et protinus etiam mores oratoris, cum bene dicere non possit nisi bonus.
To this substance of it the definition will best agree: "rhetoric is the science of speaking well." For it at once embraces all the virtues of speech, and also immediately the morals of the orator, since one cannot speak well unless he is good.
§2.15.35idem valet Chrysippi finis ille ductus a Cleanthe scientia recte dicendi. sunt plures eiusdem, sed ad alias quaestiones magis pertinent.
Of the same force is that definition of Chrysippus, derived from Cleanthes, "the science of speaking rightly." There are more definitions of his, but they belong more to other questions.
idem sentit et finis hoc modo comprehensus, persuadere quod oporteat, nisi quod artem ad exitum alligat.
The same is felt in the definition expressed in this manner: "to persuade what is necessary," except that it binds the art to the result.
§2.15.36at bene Areus dicere secundum virtutem orationis. excludunt a rhetorice malos et illi, qui scientiam civilium officiorum eam putaverunt, si scientiam virtutem iudicant; sed anguste intra civiles quaestiones coercent.
But Areus defined it well: "to speak according to the virtue of speech." Those also exclude bad men from rhetoric who have thought it to be "the science of civil duties," if they judge science to be a virtue; but they confine it narrowly within civil questions.
Albucius, non obscurus professor atque auctor, scientiam bene dicendi esse consentit, sed exceptionibus peccat adiiciendo circa civiles quaestiones et credibiliter; quarum utrique iam responsum est.
Albucius, a well-known professor and author, agrees that it is "the science of speaking well," but errs by adding the limitations "about civil questions" and "credibly"; to both of which answers have already been given.
§2.15.37probabilis et illi voluntatis, qui recte sentire et dicere rhetorices putaverunt.
The intention of those also is commendable, who have thought that "to feel and speak rightly" belongs to rhetoric.
hi sunt fere fines maxime illustres et de quibus praecipue disputatur.
These are, for the most part, the most famous definitions, and those about which there is the chief dispute.
nam omnes quidem persequi neque attinet neque possum, cum pravum quoddam, ut arbitror, studium circa scriptores artium extiterit, nihil eisdem verbis, quae prior aliquis occupasset, finiendi, quae ambitio procul aberit a me.
For indeed to pursue all of them is neither necessary nor is it in my power, since there has arisen, as I think, a certain perverse zeal among writers on the arts, of defining nothing in the same words which someone before had already occupied, an ambition which will be far from me.
§2.15.38dicam enim non utique quae invenero sed quae placebunt, sicut hoc, rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam; cum reperto quod est optimum, qui quaerit aliud, peius velit.
For I shall speak not necessarily what I have invented, but what shall please me, as this: "rhetoric is the science of speaking well"; since, when that which is best has been found, he who seeks another, wishes for what is worse.
his approbatis, simul manifestum est illud quoque, quem finem vel quid summum et ultimum habeat rhetorice, quod τέλος dicitur, ad quod omnis ars tendit; nam si est ipsa bene dicendi scientia, finis eius et summum est bene dicere.
These things being approved, at the same time that also is manifest, what end or what highest and ultimate object rhetoric has, which is called τέλος, to which every art tends; for if it is itself "the science of speaking well," its end and highest object is "to speak well."