§2.15.13quidam recesserunt ab eventu, sicut Aristoteles dicit: rhetorice est vis inveniendi omnia in oratione persuasibilia. qui finis et illud vitium, de quo supra diximus, habet et insuper quod nihil nisi inventionem complectitur, quae sine elocutione non est oratio.
Some have departed from the result, as Aristotle says: "rhetoric is the power of finding all the persuasive means in a speech." This definition has both that fault of which we spoke above, and in addition that it embraces nothing but invention, which is not a speech without elocution.
§2.15.14Hermagorae, qui finem eius esse ait persuasibiliter dicere, et aliis, qui eandem sententiam non iisdem tantum verbis explicant ac finem esse demonstrant dicere quae oporteat omnia ad persuadendum, satis responsum est, cum persuadere non tantum oratoris esse convicimus.
To Hermagoras, who says that its end is "to speak persuasively," and to others, who explain the same opinion, though not in the very same words, and show that the end is "to speak all things which are necessary for persuasion," a sufficient answer has been given, since we have proved that to persuade is not the task of the orator alone.
§2.15.15addita sunt his alia varie.
Other definitions have been added to these in various ways.
quidam enim circa res omnes, quidam circa civiles modo versari rhetoricen putaverunt; quorum verius utrum sit, in eo loco, qui huius quaestionis proprius est, dicam.
For some have thought that rhetoric is concerned with all matters, some only with civil matters; which of these is more true, I shall say in that place which is proper to this question.
§2.15.16omnia subiecisse oratori videtur Aristoteles, cum dixit vim esse videndi, quid in quaque re possit esse persuasibile.
Aristotle seems to have subjected all things to the orator, when he said that it is the power of seeing what can be persuasive in each thing.
et Patrocles, qui non quidem adiicit in quaque re, sed nihil excipiendo idem ostendit; vim enim vocat inveniendi, quod sit in oratione persuasibile; qui fines et ipsi solam complectuntur inventionem.
And Patrocles, who indeed does not add "in each thing," but shows the same by excepting nothing; for he calls it "the power of finding what is persuasive in a speech"; which definitions also themselves embrace only invention.
quod vitium fugiens Theodorus vim putat inveniendi et eloquendi cum ornatu credibilia in omni oratione. §2.15.17sed cum eodem modo credibilia quo persuasibilia etiam non orator inveniat, adiiciendo in omni oratione magis quam superiores concedit scelera quoque suadentibus pulcherrimae rei nomen.
Shunning this fault, Theodorus thinks it is "the power of finding and expressing with ornament credible things in every speech." But since a non-orator also finds credible things in the same way as persuasive things, by adding "in every speech" he, more than his predecessors, concedes the name of a most beautiful thing even to those who recommend crimes.
§2.15.18Gorgias apud Platonem suadendi se artificem in iudiciis et aliis coetibus esse ait, de iustis quoque et iniustis tractare; cui Socrates persuadendi, non docendi concedit facultatem.
Gorgias in Plato says that he is "a craftsman of persuasion in courts and other assemblies," and that he treats "also of things just and unjust"; to whom Socrates concedes the faculty of persuading, not of teaching.
§2.15.19qui vero non omnia subiiciebant oratori, sollicitius ac verbosius, ut necesse erat, adhibuerunt discrimina; quorum fuit Ariston, Critolai Peripatetici discipulus, cuius hic finis est, scientia videndi et agendi in quaestionibus civilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis. hic scientiam, §2.15.20quia Peripateticus est, non, ut Stoici, virtutis loco ponit; popularem autem comprehendendo persuasionem etiam contumeliosus est adversus artem orandi, quam nihil putat doctis persuasuram.
But those who did not subject all things to the orator, applied distinctions more carefully and with more words, as was necessary; among whom was Ariston, the disciple of Critolaus the Peripatetic, whose definition is this: "the science of seeing and acting in civil questions through a speech of popular persuasion." He places "science," because he is a Peripatetic, not, like the Stoics, in the place of virtue; but by embracing "popular persuasion," he is also insulting to the art of speaking, which he thinks will persuade the learned of nothing.
illud de omnibus, qui circa civiles demum quaestiones oratorem iudicant versari, dictum sit, excludi ab his plurima oratoris officia, illam certe laudativam totam, quae est rhetorices pars tertia.
Let this be said of all who judge that the orator is concerned only with civil questions, that by them very many duties of the orator are excluded, certainly that whole laudatory part, which is the third part of rhetoric.
§2.15.21cautius Theodorus Gadareus, ut iam ad eos veniamus, qui artem quidem esse eam sed non virtutem putaverunt.
Theodorus of Gadara is more cautious, so that we may now come to those who thought that it is indeed an art but not a virtue.
ita enim dicit (ut ipsis eorum verbis utar, qui haec ex Graeco transtulerunt), ars inventrix et iudicatrix et enuntiatrix decenti ornatu secundum mensionem eius, quod in quoque potest sumi persuasibile, in materia civili. §2.15.22itemque Cornelius Celsus, qui finem rhetorices ait dicere persuasibiliter in dubia civili materia. quibus sunt non dissimiles, qui ab aliis traduntur; qualis est ille, vis videndi et eloquendi de rebus civilibus subiectis sibi cum quadam persuasione et quodam corporis habitu et eorum, quae dicet, pronuntiatione. §2.15.23mille alia, sed aut eadem aut ex eisdem composita; quibus item, cum de materia rhetorices dicendum erit, respondebimus.
For he says thus (to use the very words of those who have translated these things from the Greek): "an art inventive, judicial, and declarative, with decent ornament, according to the measure of that which can be taken as persuasive in each thing, in civil matter." And likewise Cornelius Celsus, who says that the end of rhetoric is "to speak persuasively in doubtful civil matter." To which those are not dissimilar which are handed down by others; such as that one: "the power of seeing and speaking about civil matters subjected to it, with a certain persuasion and a certain habit of body and pronunciation of those things which he will say." A thousand other things, but either the same or composed of the same; to which likewise, when we must speak of the matter of rhetoric, we shall answer.
quidam eam neque vim neque scientiam neque artem putaverunt, sed Critolaus usum dicendi (nam hoc τριβή significat), Athenaeus fallendi artem. §2.15.24plerique autem, dum pauca ex Gorgia Platonis a prioribus imperite excerpta legere contenti neque hoc totum neque alia eius volumina evolvunt, in maximum errorem inciderunt, creduntque eum in hac esse opinione, ut rhetoricen non artem sed peritiam quandam gratiae ac voluptatis existimet; §2.15.25et alio loco civilitatis particulae simulacrum et quartam partem adulationis, quod duas partes civilitatis corpori adsignet, medicinam et quam interpretantur exercitatricem, duas animo, legalem atque iustitiam; adulationem autem medicinae vocet cocorum artificium, exercitatricis mangonum, qui colorem fuco et verum robur inani sagina mentiantur, legalis cavillatricem, iustitiae rhetoricen. §2.15.26quae omnia sunt quidem scripta in hoc libro dictaque a Socrate, cuius persona videtur Plato significare quid sentiat; sed alii sunt eius sermones ad coarguendos, qui contra disputant, compositi, quos ἐλεγκτικούς vocant, alii ad praecipiendum, qui δογματικοί appellantur.
Some have thought it to be neither a power, nor a science, nor an art, but Critolaus "a practice of speaking" (for this is what 'tribe' means), Athenaeus "an art of deceiving." But most, content to read a few passages from the 'Gorgias' of Plato, unskilfully excerpted by predecessors, and unfolding neither this whole work nor his other volumes, have fallen into a very great error, and believe that he is of this opinion, that he considers rhetoric not an art but a certain knack of grace and pleasure; and in another place, "a shadow of a portion of statecraft" and "a fourth part of flattery," because he assigns two parts of statecraft to the body, medicine and what they interpret as gymnastics, and two to the soul, law-making and justice; and calls the flattery of medicine "the art of cooks," of gymnastics "that of dealers in slaves," who lie about color with paint and true strength with empty fattening, of law-making "sophistry," and of justice "rhetoric." All of which are indeed written in this book and spoken by Socrates, through whose persona Plato seems to signify what he thinks; but some of his discourses are composed to refute those who dispute against him, which they call 'elenctic', and others to teach, which are called 'dogmatic'.