§2.15.1ante omnia, quid sit rhetorice.
First of all, what 'rhetorice' is.
quae finitur quidem varie, sed quaestionem habet duplicem, aut enim de qualitate ipsius rei aut de comprehensione verborum dissensio est.
It is indeed defined in various ways, but it involves a double question; for the disagreement is either about the quality of the thing itself or about the definition of the words.
prima atque praecipua opinionum circa hoc differentia, quod alii malos quoque viros posse oratores dici putant; alii, quorum nos sententiae accedimus, nomen hoc artemque, de qua loquimur, bonis demum tribui volunt.
The first and principal difference of opinion on this matter is that some think that even bad men can be called orators; others, with whose opinion we agree, wish this name and the art of which we speak to be attributed only to good men.
eorum autem, §2.15.2qui dicendi facultatem a maiore ac magis expetenda vitae laude secernunt, quidam rhetoricen vim tantum, quidam scientiam sed non virtutem, quidam usum, quidam artem quidem sed a scientia et virtute diiunctam, quidam etiam pravitatem quandam artis, id est κακοτεχνίαν nominaverunt.
Of those, however, who separate the faculty of speaking from the greater and more desirable praise of life, some have called 'rhetorice' a mere power, some a science but not a virtue, some a practice, some an art indeed but disjoined from science and virtue, and some even a certain perversion of art, that is, 'kakotechnia'.
§2.15.3hi fere aut in persuadendo aut in dicendo apte ad persuadendum positum orandi munus sunt arbitrati.
Almost all of these have thought that the duty of pleading is placed either in persuading or in speaking in a manner suitable for persuasion.
id enim fieri potest ab eo quoque, qui vir bonus non sit.
For this can be done also by one who is not a good man.
est igitur frequentissimus finis, rhetoricen esse vim persuadendi.
Therefore, the most common definition is that 'rhetorice' is the power of persuading.
quod ego vim appello, plerique potestatem, nonnulli facultatem vocant; quae res ne quid adferat ambiguitatis, vim dico δύναμιν.
What I call 'power' ('vis'), most call 'authority' ('potestas'), and some 'faculty' ('facultas'); lest this circumstance should bring any ambiguity, I call 'power' 'dynamis' ('δύναμις').
§2.15.4haec opinio originem ab Isocrate (si tamen re vera Ars, quae circumfertur, eius est) duxit.
This opinion took its origin from Isocrates (if indeed the 'Art' which is circulated is really his).
qui, cum longe sit a voluntate infamantium oratoris officia, finem artis temere comprehendit, dicens esse rhetoricen persuadendi opificem, id est πειθοῦς δημιουργόν; neque enim mihi permiserim eadem uti declinatione, qua Ennius M. Cethegum suadae medullam vocat.
He, although he is far from the intention of those who defame the duties of the orator, defined the end of the art too hastily, saying that 'rhetorice' is the worker of persuasion, that is, 'peithous demiourgos' ('πειθοῦς δημιουργόν'); for I would not permit myself to use the same expression by which Ennius calls Marcus Cethegus 'the marrow of persuasion'.
§2.15.5apud Platonem quoque Gorgias in libro, qui nomine eius inscriptus est, idem fere dicit; sed hanc Plato illius opinionem vult accipi non suam.
In Plato also, Gorgias, in the book inscribed with his name, says nearly the same thing; but Plato wishes this opinion to be accepted as Gorgias's, not his own.
Cicero pluribus locis scripsit, officium oratoris esse dicere apposite ad persuadendum.
Cicero has written in several places that the duty of the orator is to speak in a manner suitable for persuasion.
§2.15.6in rhetoricis etiam, quos sine dubio ipse non probat, finem facit persuadere.
In his treatise on rhetoric also, which he himself doubtless does not approve of, he makes the end to be persuasion.
verum et pecunia persuadet et gratia et auctoritas dicentis et dignitas, postremo aspectus etiam ipse sine voce, quo vel recordatio meritorum cuiusque vel facies aliqua miserabilis vel formae pulchritudo sententiam dictat.
But money also persuades, as do influence, the authority of the speaker, and dignity; finally, even the mere sight without voice, by which either the recollection of anyone's services, or a pitiable face, or the beauty of form, dictates the decision.
§2.15.7nam et Manium Aquilium defendens Antonius, cum scissa veste cicatrices, quas is pro patria pectore adverso suscepisset, ostendit, non orationis habuit fiduciam sed oculis populi Romani vim attulit, quem illo ipso aspectu maxime motum in hoc, ut absolveret reum, creditum est.
For Antonius also, when defending Manius Aquilius, when he tore open his garment and showed the scars which he had received on his breast in front for his country, did not place his trust in his speech, but brought force upon the eyes of the Roman people, who, believed to have been chiefly moved by that very sight, acquitted the accused.
§2.15.8Servium quidem Galbam miseratione sola, qua non suos modo liberos parvulos in contione produxerat, sed Galli etiam Sulpicii filium suis ipse manibus circumtulerat, elapsum esse, cum aliorum monumentis tum Catonis oratione testatum est.
That Servius Galba indeed escaped solely by pity, because he had not only produced his own little children in the assembly, but had also carried around in his own hands the son of Gallus Sulpicius, is attested both by the records of others and by the speech of Cato.
§2.15.9et Phrynen non Hyperidis actione, quanquam admirabili, sed conspectu corporis, quod illa speciosissimum alioqui diducta nudaverat tunica, putant periculo liberatam.
And Phryne is thought to have been freed from danger, not by the pleading of Hyperides, however admirable, but by the sight of her body, which she had exposed by parting her tunic, being otherwise most beautiful.
quae si omnia persuadent, non est hic, de quo locuti sumus, idoneus finis.
If all these things persuade, then this end of which we have spoken is not suitable.
§2.15.10ideoque diligentiores sibi sunt visi, qui, cum de rhetorice idem sentirent, existimaverunt eam vim dicendo persuadendi.
And therefore those seemed to themselves more precise, who, while holding the same opinion about 'rhetorice', thought it to be the power of persuading by speaking.
quem finem Gorgias in eodem, de quo supra diximus, libro, velut coactus a Socrate facit; a quo non dissentit Theodectes, sive ipsius id opus est, quod de rhetorice nomine eius inscribitur, sive, ut creditum est, Aristotelis, in quo est, finem esse rhetorices ducere homines dicendo in id, quod actor velit.
This end Gorgias, in the same book of which we spoke above, makes as if forced by Socrates; from whom Theodectes does not dissent, whether that work which is inscribed with his name concerning rhetoric is really his own, or, as is believed, Aristotle's, in which it is stated that the end of 'rhetorice' is to lead men by speaking into that which the speaker wishes.
§2.15.11sed ne hoc quidem satis est comprehensum; persuadent enim dicendo vel ducunt in id quod volunt alii quoque, ut meretrices, adulatores, corruptores.
But not even this is sufficiently defined; for others also persuade by speaking or lead into what they wish, such as courtesans, flatterers, and corruptors.
at contra non persuadet semper orator; ut interim non sit proprius hic finis eius, interim sit communis cum iis, qui ab oratore procul absunt.
On the contrary, the orator does not always persuade; so that this end is sometimes not peculiar to him, and sometimes common to those who are far removed from the orator.
§2.15.12atqui non multum ab hoc fine abest Apollodorus, dicens iudicialis orationis primum et super omnia esse persuadere iudici et sententiam eius ducere in id, quod velit; nam et ipse oratorem fortunae subiicit, ut, si non persuaserit, nomen suum retinere non possit.
And yet Apollodorus is not far from this end, saying that the first and above all things of a judicial speech is to persuade the judge and to lead his decision into that which he wishes; for he himself also subjects the orator to fortune, so that if he does not persuade, he cannot retain his name.