§12.3.1iuris quoque civilis necessaria huic viro scientia est et morum ac religionum eius rei publicae, quam capesset.
Knowledge of the civil law is also necessary for this man, as well as of the customs and religions of that state which he is to direct.
nam qualis esse suasor in consiliis publicis privatisve poterit tot rerum, quibus praecipue civitas continetur, ignarus? quo autem modo patronum se causarum non falso dixerit, qui, quod est in causis potentissimum, sit ab altero petiturus, paene non dissimilis iis, qui poetarum scripta pronuntiant?
For what sort of adviser in public or private councils will he be able to be, who is ignorant of so many things by which a state is principally held together? And in what way will he call himself a patron of cases without falsehood, who is to seek from another that which is most powerful in cases, being almost not dissimilar to those who pronounce the writings of poets?
§12.3.2nam quodammodo mandata perferet, et ea, quae sibi a iudice credi postulaturus est, aliena fide dicet, et ipse litigantium auxiliator egebit auxilio.
For in a manner he will deliver mandates, and those things which he is to request of the judge to be believed on his own account, he will speak on the credit of another, and he himself, the helper of litigants, will stand in need of help.
quod ut fieri nonnunquam minore incommodo possit, cum domi praecepta et composita et sicut cetera, quae in causa sunt, inde discendo cognita ad iudicem perfert, quid fiet in iis quaestionibus, quae subito inter ipsas actiones nasci solent? non deformiter respectet et inter subsellia minores advocatos interroget?
Even if this can sometimes be done with less inconvenience, when he carries to the judge things taught and composed at home and, like the rest of the things in the case, learned by studying from there, what will become of those questions which are accustomed to arise suddenly in the midst of the actions themselves? Will he not look back in an unseemly manner and ask the minor advocates between the benches?
§12.3.3potest autem satis diligenter accipere, quae tum audiet, cum ei dicenda sunt, aut fortiter adfirmare aut ingenue pro suis dicere? possit in actionibus: quid fiet in altercatione, ubi occurrendum continuo, nec libera ad discendum mora est? Quid, si forte peritus iuris ille non aderit? quid, si quis non satis in ea re doctus falsum aliquid subiecerit? hoc enim est maximum ignorantiae malum, quod credit eum scire qui moneat.
But can he receive with sufficient care what he will then hear, at the very moment when they are to be spoken by him, or firmly assert them, or speak ingenuously as if for his own? He might be able in the main pleadings; what will become of the altercation, where he must meet opponents immediately, and there is no free delay for learning? What if by chance that expert in law is not present? What if someone not sufficiently learned in that matter should suggest something false? For this is the greatest evil of ignorance, that he believes the person advising him knows.
§12.3.4neque ego sum nostri moris ignarus oblitusve eorum, qui velut ad arculas sedent et tela agentibus subministrant, neque idem Graecos quoque nescio factitasse, unde nomen his pragmaticorum datum est.
Nor am I ignorant of our custom, or forgetful of those who sit as it were by the chests and minister weapons to those who are pleading, nor indeed do I not know that the Greeks also practiced this, whence the name of pragmatics was given to them.
sed loquor de oratore, qui non clamorem modo suum causis, sed omnia, quae profutura sunt, debet.
But I am speaking of the orator, who owes to cases not only his voice, but all things that are to be of service.
§12.3.5itaque eum nec inutilem, si ad horam forte constiterit, neque in testationibus faciendis esse imperitum velim.
Therefore, I would not have him to be useless if he should by chance stand for an hour, nor unskillful in drawing up testations.
quis enim potius praeparabit ea quae, cum aget, esse in causa velit? nisi forte imperatorem quis idoneum credit in proeliis quidem strenuum et fortem et omnium, quae pugna poscit, artificem, sed neque delectus agere nec copias contrahere atque instruere nec prospicere commeatus nec locum capere castris scientem; prius est enim certe parare bella quam gerere.
For who rather will prepare those things which, when he pleads, he would wish to be in the case? Unless by chance someone believes a general to be qualified who is indeed active and brave in battles and an artist of all things that fight requires, but knows neither how to make levies, nor to assemble and draw up forces, nor to provide provisions, nor to take a place for a camp; for it is certainly prior to prepare wars than to wage them.
§12.3.6atqui simillimus huic sit advocatus, si plura, quae ad vincendum valent, aliis reliquerit, cum praesertim hoc, quod est maxime necessarium, nec tam sit arduum, quam procul intuentibus fortasse videatur.
Yet an advocate would be very similar to him, if he should leave to others the greater part of the things that avail for victory, especially since this, which is most necessary, is not so difficult as it might perhaps seem to those who look at it from afar.
namque omne ius, quod est certum, aut scripto aut moribus constat; dubium aequitatis regula examinandum est.
For all law that is certain consists either of written law or of customs; that which is doubtful must be examined by the rule of equity.
§12.3.7quae scripta sunt aut posita in more civitatis, nullam habent difficultatem, cognitionis sunt enim, non inventionis; at quae consultorum responsis explicantur, aut in uerborum interpretatione sunt posita aut in recti pravique discrimine.
Those things which are written or placed in the custom of the state have no difficulty, for they are matters of cognition, not of invention; but those which are explained by the answers of the consultants are placed either in the interpretation of words or in the distinction of right and wrong.
vim cuiusque vocis intelligere aut commune prudentium est aut proprium oratoris; aequitas optimo cuique notissima.
To understand the force of each word is either common to the prudent or proper to the orator; equity is most well known to every best man.
§12.3.8nos porro et bonum virum et prudentem in primis oratorem putamus, qui cum se ad id, quod est optimum natura, direxerit, non magnopere commovebitur, si quis ab eo consultus dissentiet; cum ipsis illis diversas inter se opiniones tueri concessum sit.
Moreover, we consider the orator to be in the first place a good and prudent man, who, when he has directed himself to that which is best by nature, will not be greatly moved if anyone consulting him should dissent; since it is conceded to those very men to maintain diverse opinions among themselves.
sed etiam, si nosse, quid quisque senserit, volet, lectionis opus est, qua nihil est in studiis minus laboriosum.
But even if he wishes to know what each person has thought, it is a work of reading, than which nothing is less laborious in studies.
§12.3.9quodsi plerique, desperata facultate agendi, ad discendum ius declinaverunt, quam id scire facile est oratori, quod discunt qui sua quoque confessione oratores esse non possunt? verum et M. Cato cum in dicendo praestantissimus, tum iuris idem fuit peritissimus, et Scaevolae Servioque Sulpicio concessa est etiam facundiae virtus.
But if most men, having despaired of the faculty of pleading, have turned aside to learning the law, how easy is it for the orator to know that which those learn who, by their own confession also, cannot be orators? Indeed, Marcus Cato was both most outstanding in speaking and also most expert in law, and to the Scaevolas and Servius Sulpicius the virtue of eloquence was also conceded.
§12.3.10et M. Tullius non modo inter agendum nunquam est destitutus scientia iuris, sed etiam componere aliqua de eo coeperat, ut appareat posse oratorem non discendo tantum iuri vacare, sed etiam docendo.
And Marcus Tullius was not only never destitute of the knowledge of law in the course of his pleading, but had also begun to compose some things concerning it, so that it may appear that the orator can find time not only for learning the law, but even for teaching it.
§12.3.11verum ea, quae de moribus excolendis studioque iuris praecipimus, ne quis eo credat reprehendenda, quod multos cognovimus, qui taedio laboris, quem ferre tendentibus ad eloquentiam necesse est, confugerint ad haec deverticula desidiae.
But as to those things which we prescribe concerning the cultivation of morals and the study of law, let no one believe they are to be blamed on this account, that we have known many who, through weariness of the labor which it is necessary for those striving after eloquence to bear, have fled to these bypasses of sloth.
quorum alii se ad album ac rubricas transtulerunt et formularii vel, ut Cicero ait, leguleii quidam esse maluerunt, tanquam utiliora eligentes ea, quorum solam facilitatem sequebantur; §12.3.12alii pigritiae arrogantioris, qui subito fronte conficta immissaque barba, veluti despexissent oratoria praecepta, paulum aliquid sederunt in scholis philosophorum, ut deinde in publico tristes, domi dissoluti captarent auctoritatem contemptu ceterorum.
Of whom some have transferred themselves to the white tablet and the red titles, and preferred to be formulists or, as Cicero says, certain pettifoggers, as if choosing more useful things, of which they were only pursuing the facility; others, of a more arrogant laziness, who, having suddenly feigned a countenance and let grow a beard, as if they had despised oratorical precepts, sat for a little while in the schools of the philosophers, so that afterwards, sad in public and dissolute at home, they might catch at authority by the contempt of others.
philosophia enim simulari potest, eloquentia non potest.
For philosophy can be simulated, eloquence cannot.