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Quintilian · Institutes of Oratory §12.2.22-12.2.31

Examples of Philosophic Orators and Roman Precedents

Passage 346 of 366 · Latin

Summary

Citing historical examples of great orators who studied philosophy, Quintilian compares the usefulness of various philosophical sects for eloquence, arguing that an orator should avoid dogmatic allegiance to any single sect and instead draw moral guidance from Rome's own glorious historical examples.

§12.2.22haec si ratione manifesta non essent, exemplis tamen crederemus.
Even if these things were not manifest by reason, we should still believe them by examples.
siquidem et Periclem, cuius eloquentiae, etiamsi nulla ad nos monumenta venerunt, vim tamen quandam incredibilem cum historici, tum etiam, liberrimum hominum genus, comici veteres tradunt, Anaxagorae physici constat auditorem fuisse, et Demosthenem, principem omnium Graeciae oratorum, dedisse operam Platoni.
For indeed it is well known that Pericles—of whose eloquence, even if no monuments have come down to us, yet both historians and also, a most free class of men, the old comic poets hand down a certain incredible force—was a pupil of Anaxagoras the physicist, and that Demosthenes, the chief of all the orators of Greece, gave his attention to Plato.
§12.2.23nam M. Tullius, non tantum se debere scholis rhetorum, quantum Academiae spatiis, frequenter ipse testatus est; neque se tanta in eo unquam fudisset ubertas, si ingenium suum consaepto fori, non ipsius rerum naturae finibus terminasset.
For Marcus Tullius himself frequently testified that he owed not so much to the schools of rhetoricians as to the spacious walks of the Academy; nor would such an abundance of wealth have ever poured forth in him if he had bounded his genius by the enclosure of the forum, and not by the limits of nature itself.
verum ex hoc alia mihi quaestio exoritur, quae secta conferre plurimum eloquentiae possit, quanquam ea non inter multas potest esse contentio.
But from this another question arises for me: which sect can contribute most to eloquence? Although there cannot be much contention among many.
§12.2.24nam in primis nos Epicurus a se ipse dimittit, qui fugere omnem disciplinam navigatione quam velocissima iubet.
For first of all Epicurus dismisses us from himself, who orders us to flee all discipline with the swiftest possible voyage.
neque vero Aristippus, summum in voluptate corporis bonum ponens, ad hunc nos laborem hortetur.
Nor indeed would Aristippus, placing the highest good in the pleasure of the body, exhort us to this labor.
Pyrrhon quidem quas in hoc opere habere partes potest? cui iudices esse, apud quos verba faciat, et reum, pro quo loquatur, et senatum, in quo sit dicenda sententia, non liquebit.
What part indeed can Pyrrho have in this work? To whom it will not be clear that there are judges before whom he may speak, a defendant for whom he may plead, and a senate in which an opinion must be delivered.
§12.2.25Academiam quidam utilissimam credunt, quod mos in utramque partem disserendi ad exercitationem forensium causarum proxime accedat.
Some believe the Academy to be the most useful, because the practice of disputing on both sides comes nearest to the exercise of forensic cases.
adiiciunt loco probationis, quod ea praestantissimos in eloquentia viros ediderit.
They add, by way of proof, that it has produced the most outstanding men in eloquence.
Peripatetici studio quoque se quodam oratorio iactant; nam theses dicere exercitationis gratia fere est ab iis institutum.
The Peripatetics also boast of a certain oratorical study; for to speak on theses for the sake of exercise was almost instituted by them.
Stoici, sicut copiam nitoremque eloquentiae fere praeceptoribus suis defuisse concedant necesse est, ita nullos aut probare acrius aut concludere subtilius contendunt.
The Stoics, just as they must concede that abundance and splendor of eloquence were almost lacking in their teachers, so they contend that none either prove more sharply or conclude more subtly.
§12.2.26sed haec inter ipsos, qui velut sacramento rogati vel etiam superstitione constricti nefas ducunt a suscepta semel persuasione discedere.
But these disputes are among themselves, who, as if bound by an oath or even constrained by superstition, hold it a sin to depart from an opinion once embraced.
oratori vero nihil est necesse in cuiusquam iurare leges.
But for the orator, there is no necessity to swear allegiance to the laws of anyone.
§12.2.27maius enim est opus atque praestantius, ad quod ipse tendit, et cuius est velut candidatus, si quidem est futurus cum vitae, tum etiam eloquentiae laude perfectus.
For the work is greater and more outstanding to which he himself strives, and of which he is, as it were, a candidate, if indeed he is to be perfect with the praise both of life and of eloquence.
quare in exemplum bene dicendi facundissimum quemque proponet sibi ad imitandum, moribus vero formandis quam honestissima praecepta rectissimamque ad virtutem viam deliget.
Therefore, for an example of speaking well, he will propose to himself every most eloquent man to imitate, but for forming his character he will choose the most honorable precepts and the straightest path to virtue.
exercitatione quidem utetur omni, sed tamen erit plurimus in maximis quibusque ac natura pulcherrimis.
He will indeed use every exercise, but yet he will be most abundant in all the greatest and by nature most beautiful things.
§12.2.28nam quae potest materia reperiri ad graviter copioseque dicendum magis abundans quam de virtute, de re publica, de providentia, de origine animorum, de amicitia? haec sunt, quibus mens pariter atque oratio insurgat, quae vere bona, quid mitiget metus, coerceat cupiditates, eximat nos opinionibus vulgi animumque caelestem erigat.
For what subject can be found more abundant for speaking weightily and copiously than concerning virtue, the state, providence, the origin of souls, and friendship? These are the things by which the mind equally with speech rises, which show what is truly good, what mitigates fear, restrains desires, rescues us from the opinions of the common people, and raises our heavenly mind.
§12.2.29neque ea solum, quae talibus disciplinis continentur, sed magis etiam, quae sunt tradita antiquitus dicta ac facta praeclare, et nosse et animo semper agitare conveniet.
And it will be fitting not only to know those things which are contained in such disciplines, but even more to know and always to revolve in mind those noble sayings and deeds that have been handed down from antiquity.
quae profecto nusquam plura maioraque quam in nostrae civitatis monumentis reperientur.
Which indeed will nowhere be found more numerous and greater than in the records of our state.
§12.2.30an fortitudinem, iustitiam, fidem, continentiam, frugalitatem, contemptum doloris ac mortis melius alii docebunt quam Fabricii, Curii, Reguli, Decii, Mucii aliique innumerabiles? quantum enim Graeci praeceptis valent, tantum Romani, quod est maius, exemplis.
Or will others teach fortitude, justice, faith, temperance, frugality, and contempt of pain and death better than the Fabricii, the Curii, the Reguli, the Decii, the Mucii, and others innumerable? For as much as the Greeks prevail in precepts, so much the Romans, which is greater, in examples.
§12.2.31tantum quod non cognitis ille rebus adquieverit, qui non modo proximum tempus lucemque praesentem intueri satis credat, sed omnem posteritatis memoriam spatium vitae honestae et curriculum laudis existimet.
Only that he will not rest satisfied with known things, who does not think it enough to look only at the nearest time and the present light, but considers all the memory of posterity as the space of an honorable life and the career of praise.
hinc mihi ille iustitiae haustus bibat, hinc sumptam libertatem in causis atque consiliis praestet.
From here let him drink for me that draught of justice, from here let him exhibit the liberty he has taken in cases and counsels.
neque erit perfectus orator, nisi qui honeste dicere et sciet et audebit.
Nor will he be a perfect orator, unless he who both knows and dares to speak honorably.

Notes

  1. 12.2.22et Periclem... Anaxagorae physici constat auditorem fuisse, et Demosthenem... dedisse operam Platoni — The impersonal verb `constat` takes the parallel accusative-and-infinitive clauses `Periclem... fuisse` and `Demosthenem... dedisse operam` as its subjects. The concessive `etiamsi` clause is nested within the relative clause `cuius...` modifying `Periclem`.
  2. 12.2.23neque se tanta in eo unquam fudisset ubertas, si... — A contrary-to-fact conditional sentence with pluperfect subjunctives (`fudisset` / `terminasset`). The reflexive phrase `se fudisset` (poured itself forth) grammatically refers to the subject `ubertas`, but contextually describes the outpouring of eloquence in Cicero himself (`in eo`).
  3. 12.2.26nihil est necesse in cuiusquam iurare leges — The idiom `iurare in leges` (literally 'to swear to someone's laws') means 'to swear blind allegiance' or 'to bind oneself strictly to someone's doctrines.' The pronoun `nihil` is used adverbially to strengthen the negation ('there is no necessity at all').
  4. 12.2.31tantum quod non cognitis ille rebus adquieverit, qui... — The phrase `tantum quod` introduces a proviso or limitation ('only that...', 'provided that...'). The perfect subjunctive `adquieverit` conveys a potential or concessive nuance, meaning 'he would not rest content with merely knowing these things.'

Cite this passage

Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory §12.2.22-12.2.31. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.humanitext-lat2:12.2.22-12.2.31

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